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Abstract 
An enduring problem facing microfinance institutions is access to funding. This study investigates 
the determinants of MFIs access to funding using a comprehensive measure of capital structure. 
The design of the study takes account three gaps in our current understanding of this topic. Firstly, 
despite the huge literature on MFIs corporate governance and the significant role of women on 
microfinance outcomes, it is perhaps surprising that no research has been conducted on the effect 
of board gender diversity on MFIs capital structure. Secondly, the role of standard firm-specific 
and institutional-specific factors in determining MFIs capital structure decision is unclear. 
Utilizing an alternative regression framework may provide a reliable analysis. Thirdly, our 
understanding of the composition of MFIs leverage is far from complete. The relationship between 
deposit liabilities and non-deposit liabilities have not yet been subject of investigation.   
In response to these three major issues, this study employs empirical research methods using panel 
data analysis technique. We find that female directors have significant positive influence on 
deposits and subsidies. Furthermore, the study also shows evidence of risk-taking attitude among 
female directors when MFIs have three or more of them on board. Secondly, we find that the effect 
of firm-specific factors on MFIs capital structure differ across countries, while prior studies 
assume equal impact of these determinants. We find that institutional-specific factors significantly 
explain the variation of MFIs leverage across countries. However, commercially related 
institutional factors does not affect MFIs access to subsidies. We also show that there is an indirect 
impact of institutional factors, as we report their significance effect through firm-specific factors. 
Finally, the study provides empirical evidence that deposits and borrowings are substitutes rather 
than complements, and that the degree of substitutability is more pronounced in MFIs operating in 
a developed financial sector, where the degree of information asymmetry is lower. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction and problem statement 
1.0. Introduction  
Microfinance is the provision of broad range financial services to the poor who are traditionally 
not served by the conventional financial institutions (Ledgerwood, 1999; Hartarska, 2005). A great 
scale of organizations is considered as microfinance institutions (MFI). They are the vehicle that 
offer credits and other financial services to low income households. MFIs are considered as an 
effective tool for reducing poverty through improving access to finance and financial services to 
poor families and small businesses situated mostly in developing and newly industrialised 
countries. According to Tchigoua (2014) MFIs complement effectively the formal banking sector 
in providing financial services to the poor. They play a significant role in bridging the gap between 
the formal financial institutions and poor household by mobilizing financial resources through 
provision of savings and loans.  
In recent years, financing problems has become an important issue in the microfinance sector, 
increasingly as a consequence of the financial crisis, subsequent government interventions and the 
institutional restructuring that followed. During a time of financial crisis, when donor funding is 
shrinking, the question of capital structure becomes salient. What is the best mix of debt, equity 
and grant funding that will ensure solvency and self-sufficiency? The question how best to fund 
microfinance institutions, particularly those with access to subsidized funding, is increasingly 
important. 
Within the academy, the issue of capital structure determinants has been studied intensely since 
Modigliani and Miller published their seminal 1958 paper, “The Cost of Capital, Corporate 
Finance and the Theory of Investment.” Significant progress has been made in understanding the 
determinants of firm capital structure using various corporate finance theories (Gropp and Heider, 
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2010; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Harris and Raviv, 1991; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Myers 
and Majluf, 1984; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, the application of Modigliani-Miller 
theorem and other capital structure theories and models on MFIs is less straightforward, especially 
when MFI’s capital structure mix comprises non-commercial funding such as donations, grants 
and subsidies. Basic corporate finance principles are applicable to MFIs only after accounting for 
fundamental differences on how they operate.  MFIs are a particular type of lending institution, 
offering risk and return, and the nature of regulation is markedly different from standard corporate 
firms (Bogan, 2012). Therefore, the theoretical notion of an optimal capital structure of MFIs is 
not very well defined.  
This thesis investigates the determinants of microfinance institutions capital structure based on 
corporate finance theories. It uses a comprehensive measure of capital structure in recognition of 
MFIs unique funding structure.      
1.1. Background of the study  
Microfinance today is a major industry that comprise of thousands of institutions serving around 
155 million clients worldwide (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). In its modern form, poverty 
alleviation practitioners conceived microfinance as a tool to provide sustainable financial services 
to populations typically excluded from mainstream banking institutions (Dichter, 1999; Yunus, 
2007). Aside from the growth of microfinance, funding constraints within the industry have 
prevented MFIs from meeting the enormous demands of poverty alleviation (Earne and Sherk, 
2013).  Gosh and Van Tassel (2011) argue that the MFIs with access to cheap external funding 
have the capacity to offer cheap credits to impoverished clients, and they promote and support 
development through income generating activities.  
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Over the years, microfinance institutions have continued to attract an increased funding from a 
variety of sources. According to Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (2011), between 2007 and 
2010, the total global investment in microfinance quadrupled to reach US$24billion. As of 
December 2009, international funding to microfinance institutions was estimated at US$21billion. 
More than 56% of these funds are allocated directly to MFIs, 38% transit through microfinance 
investment vehicles, and 6.1% go through Apex organizations. The composition of microfinance 
funding remains a topic of discussion. Early microfinance institutions relied predominantly on 
donor funding and grants (Rhyne, 1998; Morduch, 1999), an increasing number of MFIs are 
moving towards commercialisation where investors demand financial returns (Armendiz and 
Morduch, 2010). Therefore, the need to understand MFIs diverse sources of funding remains 
pertinent.   
The increasingly broad range of financing sources available to microfinance institutions creates 
greater funding diversification. According to Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (2010), there 
are three main sources of funding for MFIs, namely, deposits (for deposit-taking MFIs), debts 
(commercial debt, subsidized debts or bonds offering), and equity (Shareholder equity and donated 
equity). Some of this funding comes primarily with a social mission while others are commercially 
motivated (Helms, 2006). For example, Cull et al., (2009) illustrated the various classification of 
MFI funding instruments based on a sample of 289 MFIs. Savings by clients otherwise known as 
deposits and commercial funding seems to be the main source of funding for shareholder based 
MFIs, whereas donations and non-commercial borrowing are the main source of funding for MFIs 
registered as non-governmental organizations (NGO).  
The unique feature of that part of MFI funding that is subsidized, grants and subsidies in the sector 
remains present. Very few MFIs have been created without subsidies, and even commercially 
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oriented have regularly benefited from support from international donors. Microfinance 
institutions receive subsidized external funding usually in the form of subsidized debt or equity 
and sometimes as grants. Subsidized debt also known as concessionary borrowing or soft loans 
are funding contracted below market price or on a favourable contractual agreement (Tchuigoua, 
2014), whereas subsidized equity is part of MFIs equity that has returns below market rate. It is a 
financial instrument promoted by donors and channelled through micro investment vehicles 
(Hudon and Traca, 2011). Other forms of subsidized funding available to MFIs are cash, grants 
and donations. Multilateral banks, government organizations and apex foundations often provide 
these funds without necessarily demanding positive returns (Tchuigoua, 2014).   
Subsidized funds channelled through Microfinance Investment funds have been created with large 
inputs from International donor. It is estimated that donors commit more than US$2 billion every 
year to the microfinance sector globally as subsidy and grants (CGAP, 2010). Research show that 
majority of MFIs still depend on donations and subsidies to break even (Hermes and Linsink, 
2011; D’Espallier et al., 2013). The 2010 microfinance institutions benchmark report that only 
50% of the 1300 MFI’s studied have an average ratio of 1.03 in their operationally self-sufficiency 
level (MIX, 2012). Meaning to say, the remaining 50% still depend on grants and subsidies. 
D’Espallier, Hudon and Szafar (2013) show that only about 23% of the World’s MFIs survive 
without subsidies.  
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Source: Mix Market, 2004-2014. See data in Funding Structure Analysis 
Figure 1.1 shows the total amount of donated equity to MFIs from 2004 to 2014. Donated equity was high in the early 
stages but slightly degreasing to 3 billion USD in 2006. However, by 2007, donated equity shrank and volumes 
remained constant as donor agencies retreated due to the global financial crisis. Donated equity increased after the 
recovery in 2012. Figure 1.2 shows a steady increase in equity investment of MFIs from 2004 to 2014.  
However, microfinance institutions that rely solely on subsidies are financially constrained and to 
overcome this challenge, MFIs seek commercial sources of funding to actualise the microfinance 
project. The promoters of commercialisation advocate MFIs should be less reliant on subsidies 
and grants (Bogan, 2012). Armendariz and Morduch, (2010) argue that commercialisation may 
increase MFI’s capacity to expand and scale up their leveraging assets.  Deposits are a frequently 
used by MFIs as commercial instruments to fund their projects and to make loans (Cull et al., 2009. 
They consist of demand deposits (short-term) and time deposits (programmed savings) (CGAP, 
2011). Besides some deposit-taking MFIs consider savings as a prerequisite for borrowers to 
access loans, in other words, it is financial collateral used by borrowers to access MFIs loans 
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(Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). It reinforces MFIs’ contracts by serving as collateral for MFI 
borrowers. 
  
Source: Mix Market, 2004-2014. See data in Funding Structure Analysis 
Figure 1.3 illustrates the amount of deposits mobilized by MFIs in USD from 2004 to 2014. There is a steady increase 
in deposit mobilization to more than 8 billion USD in 2014. Figure 1.4 shows an increase in the rate of borrowings by 
MFIs to more than 30 billion USD in 2014.    
Many MFIs around the world are non-deposit-taken (Galema et al., 2011). With the lack of short-
term funding such as deposits and dwindling resources from donors, majority of non-deposit-taken 
MFIs seek commercial sources of funding, in order to meet the promise of microfinance to alleviate 
poverty. The proponents of commercialization have encouraged MFIs to be less dependent on 
subsidies and grant funding (Bogan, 2012; Hoque et al., 2011). The point is that moving towards 
commercialization may increase the ability of MFIs to expand their scale by leveraging assets 
(Armandariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2010). Commercialization of microfinance permits MFIs 
to diversify their funding sources and to be less dependent on subsidies. A recent survey suggests 
that cross-border funding enables MFIs to diversify their external funding sources. In 2010, local 
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Figure 1.4:   Total Borrowings
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lenders provided 60% of debt financing to MFIs and 40% was from external investors 
(MicroBanking Bulletin, 2010).  
A survey by MicroRate (2011), shows that debt-financing instruments have been the main source 
of funding for the microfinance sector for more than five years. They represent 82% of MIV’s total 
assets, while equity stands at 18%. Microfinance investment vehicles (MIVs) are the 
intermediaries between MFIs and investors. They facilitate access to capital markets by offering 
several types of financial instruments. However, the nature of MFIs is sometimes a constraint when 
accessing the capital market, but some MFIs successfully raise equity through the financial 
markets. For example, in 2007, Compartamos, a Mexican bank, became Latin America’s first 
microcredit bank to go public. SKS Microfinance, India’s largest MFI, raised $358 million in an 
initial public offering in 2010.   
Figure 1.5:  Funding Structure Evolution, 2004-2014 
 
Source: Mix Market, 2004-2014. See data in Funding Structure Analysis 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
B
il
li
o
n
s 
U
S
D
Fiscal Year
Donated Equity
Equity
Deposits
Borrowings
  
8 
 
Figure 1.5 illustrates the breakdown of funding structure of MFIs from 2004 to 2014. In 2004, donated equity comprise 
over one-fourth of the total funding to MFIs. However, the volume of donated equity shrank over the years. 
Borrowings comprise of over one-third of the total funding of MFIs, reaching a peak of 32 billion USD in 2014. 
Similarly, most MFIs rely on shareholder’s fund, as deposit mobilization is limited to deposit taking MFIs. The 
funding structure above calls for better understanding of MFIs capital structure decision-making processes in the face 
of these expanding financing options. 
Despite the array of funding choices available, tapping into these funds is proving to be a challenge. 
Microfinance access to funding depends on several factors. Anecdotal evidence suggest that firm 
level determinants play a greater role. For example, Mersland and Urgeghe (2013) provide 
evidence that commercial debts are related mainly to financial performance and the level of 
professionalization in the MFIs, whereas international subsidies are driven mainly by social 
performance. In the same vein, study by Tchuigoua (2014) shows that institutional factors are 
important when determining MFIs’ access to funding. It can therefore be assumed that capital 
structure of microfinance institutions depends on the internal structure (firm level) and the external 
environment (institutional environment) in which MFIs operate. Therefore, the impact of these 
factors on MFI capital structure has provided research opportunities that have inspired this thesis. 
1.2. Statement of the research problem 
This study focuses on the determinants of the capital structure of microfinance institutions. As 
MFIs around the world are expanding their outreach and assuming responsibility for increasingly 
large sums of funds, they face several challenges in the process. One important challenge is 
ensuring effective governance. Effective governance is often seen as the most challenging and 
important factor in establishing a strong foundation for the future that guides the management of 
MFIs in achieving its objectives in a sustainable manner. In 2012 Microfinance Banana Skin 
report, corporate governance was ranked as one of the topmost pressing risk facing the sector. The 
report recognized the need for increase input and involvement by the board to ensure effective 
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management and good governance practices. In order to achieve that, Conger et al., (1999) 
recognizes that the composition of the board most reflect the complex and unique characteristics 
of MFIs. The board through its members should possess the necessary knowledge and experience 
to address the strategic demands facing MFIs. 
In this regard, several studies have been conducted to determine how board composition improves 
corporate governance and its subsequent impact on capital structure using large and well developed 
firms. Only a fraction of the research on the topic has been devoted to models in which capital 
structure is determined by board gender diversity (Campbell and Vera, 2010; Alves et al., 2015). 
Thus, the aforementioned studies do not provide clear guidance in the case of MFI capital structure. 
In an industry largely catering for female customers, having female directors is likely to affect 
financing choices (Mersland and Urgeghe, 2013.  
Under the continued effects of global financial crisis where donor’s investment in microfinance 
has shrunk, how the economy wide institutional factors affects the financing structure of MFIs 
have become one of the key debates among practitioners and policy makers. The academic 
literature has focused on the link between institutional-specific factors and firms capital structure 
(La Porta et al., 1997; 1998; de Jong et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2012). These studies converge on the 
idea that better institutional environments reduce information asymmetry in the credit markets, 
which invariably affects firms’ capital structure. However, the impact of the various institutional-
specific factors on MFIs access to funding is not clear. Thus, Ahlin et al., (2011) argue that most 
MFIs operate in small, segmented local markets that are very sensitive to macroeconomic 
conditions. Understanding the institutional-specific impact on MFIs may also help a growing 
number of investment funds towards MFIs.  
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Going further, several studies in the banking sector have decomposed leverage into deposits and 
non-deposit (borrowings) liabilities. This is because financial firms capital structure fundamentally 
differs from non-financial firms since its includes deposits, a source of financing generally not 
available to non-financial firms. However, recent evidence in the banking sector shows 
substitution effect between deposits and non-deposits liabilities (Gropp and Heider, 2010). 
Whenever an estimated coefficient is significant, it has the opposite sign for deposit and non-
deposit liabilities. This seems to be the case in the microfinance literature (Tchuigoua, 2014). 
Therefore, examining deposits-borrowing substitutability relationship is warranted. 
The substitutability relationship between deposits and borrowing can be explained based on 
institutional characteristics. It has been documented that MFIs choice of financing is determined 
by the institutional environment in which they operate. For instance, it is observed that Eastern 
Europe, Central Asia and Latin American financial markets are characterized by relatively more 
conducive environment in promoting debt financing, whereas in Africa, the debt market is far less 
conducive (Galema et al., 2011; CGAP, 2011). However, in the absence of a conducive financial 
environment for either deposits or borrowings, one can expect that they could be an environment 
where MFIs are more likely to complement deposits with borrowings together. Therefore, it can 
be conjectured that there will be an interplay in the decision by MFIs to either undertake borrowing 
or mobilize deposits. We examine how the substitutability or complementarity relationships vary 
across different institutional environment. In this case, it is argued on whether MFIs are more 
likely to displace borrowing with deposits and vice-versa when the institutional environment is no 
longer favorable. 
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1.3. Objective of the study  
The main objective of the thesis is to examine the determinants of microfinance institutions capital 
structure around the world. Specific objectives of the study are as follows: 
1. To investigate the effect of board gender diversity on MFIs capital structure (Leverage, 
borrowings, deposits, equity and subsidies).  
2. To examine the impact of firm-specific factors on MFIs capital structure (Leverage and 
subsidies). 
3. To examine the impact of institutional-specific factors on MFIs capital structure (Leverage 
and subsidies).  
4. To examine the substitutability relationship between deposits and borrowing and analyse 
how this relationship can be explained by different institutional settings. 
1.4. Research questions 
With the above research objectives in mind, this study was set forward to answer the following 
main questions: What are the determinants of MFIs capital structure? From this main research 
question, the following specific question were addressed: 
1) Does board gender diversity affects MFIs capital structure (Leverage, borrowings, 
deposits, equity and subsidies)? 
2) Is the empirical relationship between board gender diversity and MFI capital structure 
(Leverage, borrowings, deposits, equity and subsidies) consistent with theoretical 
predictions? 
3) Do the standard firm-specific determinants affect MFIs capital structure (Leverage and 
Subsidies)? Is the impact of firm-specific determinants equal across countries? 
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4) Do institutional-specific determinants have significant direct influence on MFIs capital 
structure (Leverage and Subsidies)? 
5) Do institutional-specific determinants have significant indirect influence on MFIs capital 
structure (Leverage and Subsidies)? 
6) What is the empirical relationship between deposits and borrowings? Are they substitute 
or complements? 
7) Does the substitutability or complementarity relationship vary across institutional settings?   
1.5. Overview of sample selection, data and research method 
This thesis employs an empirical research method using panel data analysis technique. It examines 
the three identified issues of MFIs capital structure resulting in three studies. For practical reasons, 
all chapters’ employ about the same sample of MFIs, but different sampling periods. The data was 
limited to MFIs with reporting diamonds four and five disclosure ratings on the MIX dataset for 
reliability purpose. The study sets 2004 and 2014 as the beginning and end of the sample period. 
This decision is influenced by the fact that data from previous years are largely missing and 
fragmented. The implementation of these filters has provided two separate unbalanced panels. 
Therefore, Chapter 4 which examines the effect of board gender diversity on MFIs capital 
structure, has a sample of (2400) firm year observation for (584) MFIs across (79) countries 
covering the period of 2010 to 2014. Whereas Chapters 5 and 6 that investigates the impact of 
institutional specific environment on MFI capital structure and the joint determinants of capital 
structure contain a sample size of (5215) firm year observations for (645) MFIs across (56) 
countries for the period of 2004 to 2014.  
Following the approach of many prior studies (Cull et al., 2009; Ahlin et al., 2011; Imai et al., 
2012; Bogan, 2012; Tchuigoua, 2014) MFI level data were collected from Microfinance 
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Information eXchange (MIX). The Mix Market is a web-based platform that provides information 
on individual microfinance institutions. The Mix market platform is a publicly available platform 
that shares information relating to more than 1900 microfinance institutions, 200 partners and 
nearly 100 investors (mixmarket.org). The data that captures aspects of the institutional 
environment comes from three major sources. The first macroeconomic data were extracted from 
the World Development Indicators provided by the World Bank. Secondly, the Kaufman et al 
(2010) World Governance Indicators, and thirdly, a complementary approach that measures 
institutional characteristics, comes from the Doing business indicators of the World Bank.   
Data were analysed using (STATA) 13.1. Appropriate variables in our data were expressed in the 
natural logarithm of their initial values to adjust for non-normality of distribution. The study 
employed both univariate (pairwise correlation) and multivariate analysis. Different panel data 
method of estimation was used to test the research hypothesis. The Heckman instrumental variable 
model was used to examine the effect of board gender diversity on MFI capital structure. This 
method allows us to treat any endogeneity issues that may arise between female directors and 
capital structure variables as observed in prior studies (Alvez et al., 2015; Adams and Ferreira, 
2009).  
Secondly, weighted least squares regression method is used to determine the impact of 
institutional-specific factors on MFI capital structure. Following de Jong et al., (2008) regression 
framework, this method confronts the long held implicit assumption in the literature that firm-
specific determinants are uniform across countries. The method used country dummies as a 
potential solution in the analysis of institutional-specific influence on capital structure, in which 
case each country serve as a particular observation in the analysis, rather than pooling all MFIs in 
all countries.  
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Thirdly, generalised method of moments (GMM) technique developed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) was used to examine the relationship between capital 
structure variables (deposits and borrowings). This method allows us to examine the dynamic 
relationship between deposits and borrowing simultaneously using a lagged dependent variable in 
the equation (Baltagi, 2005). By examining deposits and borrowing simultaneously, the behaviour 
of the determinants in influencing the decisions can be better ascertained and also the extent to 
they are substitutes or complement is investigated. As part of robustness check, different variable 
specifications were used where appropriate. The variance inflation factor (VIF) was used to check 
for any multicollinearity problem.  
1.6. Significance of the study 
Given their increasingly important role in most developing countries, it is not surprising that the 
impact of microfinance in alleviating poverty and reducing financial exclusion remains 
controversial. Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2008) and Rai and Ravi (2011) show that MFIs improve 
the welfare of population and alleviate microbusiness financing constraints, whereas Duflo, 
Banerjee, Glennerster, and Kinnan (2013) find mixed effects of microfinance on poverty reduction 
and financial inclusion. However, for microfinance to expand outreach and provide sustainable 
financial services, MFIs need to be financially sustainable (Schreiner, 2000; Hollis and Sweetman, 
1998).  
Although there have been numerous studies on the sustainability of microfinance, very few have 
attempted to link capital structure to sustainability. For example, Earne and Sherk, (2013) argue 
that financing improves financial inclusion by increasing the number of clients and product 
diversification. Microfinance institutions that access cheap funding may in turn offer cheap loans 
to their borrowers and income generating activities that leads to sustainable development (Ghosh 
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& Van Tassel, 2011). Bogan (2012), show how different classes of funding affects MFIs 
sustainability. Thus capital structure of MFIs has become much more critical issues, understanding 
the determinants of MFIs capital structure is a major stepping stone to enlighten what should be 
done if sustainability is to be achieved.  
1.7. Major findings of the thesis 
The examination of the three issues on MFIs capital structure mentioned above provides some 
empirical evidence on the relevance of the two competing determinants of MFIs capital structure, 
namely, the firm level and the institutional level determinants. 
Firstly, prior microfinance research has argued that board gender diversity has positive impact on 
MFIs profitability (Strom et al., 2014; Mersland and Strom, 2009). However, female directors may 
have different influence on MFIs capital structure relative to MFI performance. To the best of my 
knowledge, the present study is the first to extend the literature that investigates the link between 
female board representation and capital structure for a cross-country sample of MFIs. in so doing, 
empirically investigating the role of female directors contributes to the existing scant literature on 
microfinance governance and MFIs capital structure.  
Empirical evidence on the effect of board gender diversity on MFIs capital structure shows that 
female directors tend to attract more deposits. This finding lends support to Becker’s (1973) 
matching trait hypothesis in the sense that female directors will improve MFIs savings due to better 
match with its female customers. Female directors marginally increase MFIs access to subsidies, 
supporting Pfeffer and Salanciks’ resource dependency argument, (1978), which posits that female 
board of directors seems to play a networking role between the MFI they represent and 
organizations that provide them with the most beneficial source of funding, in this case donor 
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agencies. However, the study also shows evidence of risk-taking attitude among female directors 
when MFIs have three or more of them on board. It also unveils the monitoring attribute of female 
directors, which leads to lower agency cost of debt.    
Secondly, this thesis supplements the existing scant literature on the impact of firm-specific and 
institutional-specific determinants of MFIs’ capital structure (Tchuigoua, 2014; Bogan, 2012). We 
find that the impact of firm-specific factors such as risk, profitability, liquidity and size on leverage 
is strong and consistent with standard capital structure theories across a large number of countries. 
However, determinants such as tangibility and age show unexpected signs. Considering the impact 
of firm-specific factors on subsidies, the study finds that the impact of tangibility and size on 
subsidies are consistent with our predictions. However, results from a few determinants remain 
mixed, and in some countries, some coefficients are significant with an unexpected sign. 
Furthermore, we find that firm-specific determinants of both leverage and subsidies differ across 
countries, thereby invalidating the implicit assumption these determinants are equal. 
The estimation reveals that institutional-specific factors determine MFIs’ capital structure directly 
and indirectly. In the direct impact, the study observes that higher credit information translates to 
lower leverage for MFIs, showing the presence of adverse selection in the credit market towards 
MFI. Higher credit information reveals the non-fully commercial nature of MFIs and the riskiness 
of the microfinance business. Similarly, the study observes that commercially related institutional-
specific factors as found in de Jong et al (2008) are not applicable in the case of MFIs non-
commercial capital structure variables such as subsidies. The study also finds the indirect impact 
of institutional-specific factors on MFI capital structure. The study reveals that strong creditors 
right mitigates the influence of MFI size in determining leverage. This finding reveals that strong 
creditors’ rights protection may force MFIs to abide by their debt contracts.  
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This study examines the relationship between deposit and borrowing. Chapter 6 supplements the 
literature on financial asset substitutability using microfinance evidence. The study makes deposit-
borrowing substitutability or complementarity its’ focus, and analyses, with the help of dynamic 
panel data model, the implication of institutional environment on this relationship. Evidence 
suggests that deposits and borrowings are substitutes rather than complementary. The degree of 
substitutability is more pronounced in MFI’s operating in a developed financial sector. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study that empirically analyses the substitutability or complementarity 
of MFIs’ financing structure.   
1.8. Outline of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters organised as follows: Chapter 2 provides the theoretical 
background and research evidence on capital structure determinants. Chapter 3 reviews the 
literature related to female directors and capital structure. A review of the impact of institutional-
specific factors on capital structure is presented in Chapter 4. The chapter discusses the joint 
determinants of deposits and borrowing. Chapter 5 describes the research methods adopted. The 
chapter describes the basic structure of the research design and the methodology used to conduct 
the study, including variable definitions and sample selection procedure. The findings of the study 
are presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. Chapters 6 and 7 report the findings of separate investigations 
of the determinants of the firm level and institutional level determinants of MFI capital structure, 
while the result of the joint determinants of MFI capital structure is presented in the later chapter. 
Finally, Chapter 9 presents an overall summary and conclusion of the thesis, and draws out the 
implications. The limitations of the thesis and the suggestions for future research are also 
presented.   
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review I: Theoretical framework 
2.0. Introduction  
This chapter presents one of the theoretical backgrounds guiding this study. The chapter presents 
a thorough review of existing literature of capital structure studies to provide the context for the 
present study. The next section starts by addressing the capital structure puzzle and tries to explain 
the traditional theories of capital structure with empirical evidences testing the theories in section 
2.2. Section 2.3 presents evidence on firm’s capital structure. Section 2.4 narrows the discussion 
of capital structure literature of microfinance institutions. Finally, Section 2.5 summarises the 
chapter.     
2.1. Capital structure theory  
The modern theory of capital structure started from the seminal work of (Modigliani and Miller, 
1958) who initiated an infamous proposition of capital structure irrelevance. They argue on the 
basis that under perfect capital market, zero taxes, homogenous expectations and zero bankruptcy 
and transaction cost, the value of firm is totally independent of its capital structure. However, many 
studies, for instance by Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Groosman and Hart, 1972) have discredited 
most of these assumptions and several theoretical frameworks have been developed to explain the 
existence of various financing instrument in firm’s capital structure. Rather than waiting for 
sufficient accumulated profits for financing purpose, firms use different financing instrument such 
as debt, equity or hybrid securities instead. Through this mechanism, the firm could finance its 
investment and projects which invariably increases the overall firms value.  
This study is focused on testing the implications of capital structure and corporate governance 
theories. Most of these theories have succeeded in explaining several broad patterns in observed 
capital structure, such as the association between leverage and several firm characteristics and the 
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aggregate use of different sources of capital. However, neither group of theories has succeeded in 
explaining much of the observed heterogeneity in capital structures of microfinance institutions.    
2.1.1. Trade-off theory  
The trade-off theory of capital structure entails that value- maximizing firms achieve an optimal 
capital structure by striking a balance between the corporate tax benefits of debt and the cost 
associated with that debt (Agency cost, bankruptcy cost and personal tax) (Kraus and Litzenberger, 
1973). In other words, firms dilute these various cost associated with debt with the corporate tax 
benefit they enjoy. The theory explains the capital structure of firms using leverage and gives a 
rationale on the various cost (Agency, bankruptcy and personal tax) associated with debt issue. 
Although, notable corporate finance papers provide empirical evidence to support the trade-off 
theory Ozkan (2001), Graham et al. (1998), Mackie-Mason, (1990), Bradley et al. (1984) and 
Schwartz and Aronson (1967). There are criticisms that the theory is not adequately descriptive of 
observed capital structure (Myers, 1984).  
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) argue that the tax advantage of debt is offset by increased expected 
bankruptcy costs. Firms with high level of leverage are faced with increasing probability of 
bankruptcy (i.e. default on interest payment and debt payment) and thus increase the expected 
bankruptcy costs. The cost may be of different types with varying degrees of damage, for example, 
firms with high debt in their capital structure would be forced to deal with creditors on less 
favourable terms which would result in higher financing cost. In this sense, it can be argued that a 
firm’s leverage level represents its degree of riskiness regarding bankruptcy. Therefore, creditors 
charge higher cost to cover or compensate any loss should the firm goes into liquidation. 
Consequently, these cost associated with bankruptcy may cause a substantial reduction in firm’s 
value that shareholders prefer not to suffer.  
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Although, several studies have advanced the argument that optimal capital structure could be 
achieved by balancing the tax advantage of debt with expected bankruptcy cost (Kraus and 
Litzenberger, 1973; Stiglitz, 1972). However, some empirical findings have criticized this notion 
by showing the effect of direct and indirect bankruptcy cost on firms (Warner, 1977). As 
documented by warner, the cumulative direct costs of bankruptcy are relatively small, at an average 
of 5.3% of firm’s market value. To some extent, the costs are smallest for the larger firms. 
Moreover, later evidence suggests that both direct and indirect cost of bankruptcy are significant, 
especially for certain industries (Litzenberger, 1986; Altman, 1984).     
2.1.2. Pecking order theory 
The pecking order theory was first conceived by Myers (1984) and Mayers and Majluf (1984). 
They propose a capital structure model based on the information asymmetry problem. The theory 
deals with the hierarchal structure of capital formation. The problem arises where firm managers 
are assumed to possess more information about the firm than the investors. As a result, firm’s 
equity may be mispriced by the investors due to lack of better information, thereby resulting in an 
inefficient investment decision by firms due to under-investment problem. Under-investment has 
a tendency to make firm managers to forego profitable project. Thus, in a situation where equity 
is under-priced, firms can capture the benefit of investing in a positive project by having new 
investors rather than the existing shareholders.  
Therefore, in order to mitigate these inefficiencies, it is suggested that firms should design their 
capital structure in a hierarchy of financial securities that is not severely under-priced by investors 
such as retained earnings or debts. So the pecking order theory predicts that due to asymmetric 
information, firms prefer internal source of funding than external. In a situation where external 
funding is necessary, firms prefer debt over equity because the information cost associated with 
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debt issue is lower compared to equity issues. The optimal capital structure of firms depends on 
the information available to investors and the investor’s ability to monitor and enforce compliance 
through institutions (Demirguc-kunt and maksimovic, 1999; Booth et al., 2001; Antoniou et al., 
2008; Li and Ferreira, 2011; Fan et al., 2012). 
2.1.3. Agency theory 
The agency theory paradigm was initiated in the early 1970s by Ross, (1973) and Jensen and 
Meckling, (1976). They study the agency relationship and the cost arising out of the conflict 
between an agent and his principal. The inherent conflict of interest can exist between either 
shareholders and managers or shareholders and debtholders. In the case of conflict between 
shareholders and managers, the theory suggests that managers may prefer to pursue their own 
personal objectives as against the interest of their shareholders, that is to maximize shareholder’s 
wealth. In order to reduce agency cost, firms therefore, introduce debt into their capital structure.  
The choice of using debt instrument starves managers of free cash, while on the other hand 
pressurizes them to generate cash flows used in settling interest expenses and full debt repayment 
upon maturity (Jensen,1986). Besides, Grossman and Hart (1982) argue that debt contracts 
encourage firm managers to be efficient in order to meet their debt commitment or otherwise risk 
losing their jobs and reputation in the event of firm liquidation. Because debt imposes constraints 
on managerial discretion, agency theory suggests that managers may be motivated to adopt sub-
optimal leverage that does not maximize shareholders' wealth. The extent to which managers can 
take on suboptimal leverage depends critically on the strength of corporate governance. Fama and 
Jensen (1983) suggest that strong corporate governance characterised by efficient board 
monitoring and guidance plays an essential role in mitigating agency conflicts.  
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2.1.4. Stakeholder theory  
Stakeholder theory suggest that a firm is characterized by relationships with many constituent 
groups and individuals (Stakeholders) each with the power to affect firm’s performance and 
decision making. The theory is concerned with the nature of these relationships in terms of both 
processes and outcomes for the firm and its stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). However, with more 
influence of stakeholders in firm activities, it is difficult to state the role of stakeholders in 
determining firms capital structure. Implicitly, Cornell and Shapiro (1987) suggest that the 
inclusion of the interest of other stakeholders in the action of the firm leads to “new interpretation 
of classic problems in finance”. A good example of such problem is financing decision.  
Titman (1984) was first to point out that the stakeholder’s incentives affects firms financing 
decision.  Titman & Wessels (1988) argue that the indirect costs of distress can be high when 
distress to a given firm would bring about difficulties for its customers (who are hesitant to 
purchase from a company that might default and not be around to service the product) or suppliers 
(who might not supply a product to a firm in or near distress).  Banerjee et al. (2008) use 
customer/supplier data from the Compustat Business Information File (which runs only through 
1999) and find that companies use less debt when their suppliers are “dedicated”. This behaviour 
is consistent with customers considering their own financial distress risk as a cost to the supplier 
(perhaps because dedicated suppliers will attempt to charge high-debt customers more). Leverage 
also increases risk for another important stakeholder: employees, who are exposed to 
unemployment risk in the event of bankruptcy. This (indirect) cost of financial distress is 
ultimately borne by the company in the form of higher wages (Berk et al. 2010) and thus 
discourages the use of debt in a trade-off sense. 
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2.1.5. Other corporate governance theories 
A number of different theoretical frameworks have evolved to explain and analyse the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm capital structure. Each of these theories approaches 
corporate governance in a slightly different way, using different terminology, and views corporate 
governance from a different perspective and discipline. Although there are clear differences 
between the various theoretical framework, however, they each attempt to analyse the same issue 
of board effectiveness. They sometimes provide the most convincing basis to analyse the effect of 
corporate governance on firm capital structure.  
Resource dependency theory originates from the study of external control of organizations by 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). The theory emphasizes the interdependence between organizations 
and entities in their external environment that control important resources. Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978) developed the idea that firms can form links with elements of its external environment upon 
which it depends. They argue that board of directors are important linkage mechanism for 
connecting a firm with sources of external dependency. By selecting a director with valuable skills, 
influence, or connections to external sources of dependency, the firm can reduce dependency and 
gain valuable resources. As environmental dependencies change, so do the resource needs for 
organizations and thus the needs for specific types of directors (e.g., Hillman et al., 2000).  
Empirical evidence has confirmed firms observe increase in leverage when they have more board 
members representing financial institutions (Pfeffer, 1972). Similarly, Booth and Deli (1999) find 
that the inclusion of commercial bankers on corporate boards to have positive relationship with 
short term and long term debt, and total bank debt of the firm. Other studies have as well studied 
the expertise of board directors. Moreover, the choice of having a particular director or balancing 
their expertise may determine the optimal capital structure of firms.  
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Similarly, the debate on critical mass theory can be traced back to the seminal work by Kanter, 
(1977), which analyse the experience of women who form small minorities in corporate boards 
and political spheres. Although the study is concerned with how women respond to dynamics of 
marginalization in minority situations and conclude with some speculation as to how these 
experiences will change as the number of women increases. The critical mass theory on board 
gender diversity hypothesises that “one is a token, two presences, and three is a voice” (Kristie, 
2011). Kramer et al (2007) point out that “the magic seems to occur when three or more women 
serve on board together. They find that having three or more female on board can create a critical 
mass where female directors are no longer seen as outsiders and are able to influence the content 
and process of board discussions more substantially”. It is clear that having three or more female 
directors on board improves board effectiveness and decision making. Therefore, linking this 
decision to firm capital structure decisions is subject to investigation. 
2.2. Capital structure evidence    
Capital structure research also takes the form of empirical research not only theoretical 
propositions. Empirical research is carried out to test the validity of theoretical predications which 
findings are often mixed and generally not consistent with the theoretical predictions. As a result, 
researchers have suggested that there no dominant theory that can explain the behaviour of firm’s 
capital structure mix (Beattie et al., 2006).  They argue that capital structure policies of firms are 
heterogeneous and   that some firms do not follow the capital structure theories when deciding on 
their capital structure mix. Therefore, the applicability of some of these theories in the finance 
world is debatable.  
There is considerable amount of literature on firm’s capital structure (Gungoraydinoglu and 
Oztekin, 2011; Gropp and Heider, 2010; de Jong et al., 2008; Frank and Goyal, 2004; Booth et al., 
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2001; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Rajan and Zingales, 1995) depending on the 
relevant theoretical considerations (Bankruptcy cost, agency cost, information asymmetry), one 
can point to two major determinants of firm’s capital structure, that is, firm-level and institutional 
specific determinants.    
An early study Marsh (1982) measures the probability of issuing debt based on firm’s 
characteristics. He finds that firm with high level of fixed assets and of large size is highly likely 
to issue debt, while an increase in bankruptcy probability will reduce the probability to issue debt. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) examine the determinants of firm capital structure in an international 
context. Overall, they find that tangibility of assets, firm size, profitability and growth 
opportunities are important determinants of firm capital structure. Recent study by Antoniou et al., 
(2008) supports the findings of Marsh (1982) on level of fixed assets and firm size and oppose 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) on profitability and growth.   
In the banking sector, Gropp and Heider (2010) find evidence that the standard cross-sectional 
determinants of non-financial firm’s capital structure are also applicable to financial firms such as 
banks. The sign and significance of the effect of most variables on bank leverage are identical 
when compared to the results found in Frank and Goyal (2004) for US firms and Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) for firms in G-7 countries. However, other interesting firm-level determinants 
appear to be closely related with capital structure decision. One recent area that has received much 
attention in the firm-level determinants of capital structure is the corporate governance issues.  
Several empirical studies have focus on the relationship between capital structure and corporate 
governance characteristics such as board size, board composition and management compensation 
(Haque et al., 2011; Ortiz-Molina, 2007; Wen et al., 2002; Berger et al., 1997; Mehran, 1992; 
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Friend and Lang, 1988; Jensen, 1986; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Rather recently, there is a 
reduced focus on board gender diversity and firm capital structure (Alvez et al. 2015; Campbell 
and Vera, 2010). These studies argue that gender diversified board to be more efficient and 
contribute to lower information asymmetries and increase the firm proportion of risky securities 
on its capital structure. Evidence show that boards with more women have greater level of public 
disclosure and better oversight of management reporting that enhances earnings quality (Gull et 
al., 2011).  
Similarly, women on corporate boards are found to improve monitoring and board quality (Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2010). However, Fama and Jensen (1983) and Lorca et al. (2011) 
argue that effective board monitoring and higher quality of board decision plays an important role 
in reducing agency cost of debt. They argue that board of directors monitoring role leads to a 
decrease in opportunistic behaviour of managers (agency cost) and information asymmetry. 
However, other behavioural and organizational theories may explain the effect of female board 
representation on firm capital structure choice (Jacobsen et al. 2014; Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 
1998; Pffer and Salancik, 1978; Kanter, 1977). 
Turning now to the role of institutional-specific factors in determining firm capital structure. It is 
observed that the choice of financing reflects actual and perceived transactions cost of resolving 
asymmetric information (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; 
Booth et al., 2001; Antoniou et al., 2008; Li and Ferreira, 2011; Fan et al., 2012). They converge 
on the idea that better institutional environment reduces asymmetric information problem between 
firms and investors.  
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2.3. Microfinance institutions capital structure evidence  
In relation to the microfinance sector, there has been arguments that the application of standard 
capital structure theories and models to lending institutions such as microfinance institutions is not 
that straightforward. Cohen (2004) argued that corporate finance principles is only applicable to 
lending institutions after accounting for differences in how they operate. For instance, 
microfinance institutions are unique type of lending institutions with risk and return characteristics 
different from corporate firms. As Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) observed, risk management 
greatly influences the capital structure of lending institutions. Therefore, the theoretical prediction 
behind the determinants of firm capital structure may not clearly explain the diverse nature of 
MFIs capital structure.   
Existing studies that examine the effect of capital structure on microfinance can at least be 
categorised into five different groups. The first category examines whether financing choice 
improves MFI financial sustainability and efficiency (Kyereboah-coleman, 2007: Hoque et al., 
2011; Hudon and Traca, 2011: Bogan, 2012). Kyereboah-Coleman, (2007) show that highly 
leveraged MFIs perform better socially and enjoy economies of scale by using panel data of 52 
MFIs in Ghana. On the contrary, Hoque et al., (2011) present a robust result that indicates negative 
relationship between leverage and MFIs outreach. Hudon and Traca, (2011), find that subsidies 
have a positive impact on MFIs efficiency. Furthermore, Bogan (2012) explores how changes in 
capital structure could improve MFI efficiency and financial sustainability using the life cycle 
theory. They find causal evidence that increased use of grants by large MFIs is negatively related 
to sustainability and drags down operational self-sufficiency.  
The second category explores the effect of rating on MFIs access to capital. Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak, (2008) show that the impact of rating agencies differs on MFIs ability to raise capital. 
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The result also suggests that subsidizing rating does not help MFI raise more capital. Garmaise 
and Natividad, (2010), show that rating cuts the cost of financing to MFIs while the impact of 
supply of credit is mixed. The third category examine the determinants of external funding and 
find evidence that financial performance and social performance variables are more likely to 
influence external funding to microfinance institutions (Mersland and Urgeghe, 2013). The fourth 
category draw inspiration from the life cycle theory and describes MFI funding choices to their 
stages of development (Fernando, 2004; de Sousa-Shields and Frankiewicz, 2004; Ledgerwood 
and White, 2006).    
Finally, the fifth category addresses the question of whether institutional frameworks affect capital 
structure of MFI. Tchuigoua, (2014), used a sample of 292 MFI’s across the world. Findings 
suggest that strength of legal rights drives MFI’s external debt and donated equity. MFIs in 
countries with developed banking sectors are more levered. This interesting result seems consistent 
with previous studies (de Jong et al., 2008). This might suggest the evidence of similarity of capital 
structure determinants between financial and non-financial firms as suggested by Gropp and 
Heider (2010). 
2.4. Summary 
The chapter provides the theoretical framework guiding this research. The chapter also reviews 
the literature on the present state of art of MFIs capital structure. Generally, it can be observed that 
the research evidence on the determinants of MFIs capital structure is mixed and far from 
conclusive. Nevertheless, the richness of the literature on capital structure determinants of firms 
highlights the importance of the issue in the microfinance context.  
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Chapter 3 - Literature Review II: Board gender diversity and capital structure of MFIs 
3.0. Introduction  
This chapter reviews the effect of board gender diversity on MFIs capital structure. We begin the 
chapter by explaining the conceptual framework for board gender diversity and MFIs capital 
structure in section 3.1. Section 3.2 presents related theory that explains how female directors 
affect microfinance institutions capital structure. Empirical evidence on female director’s effect 
on different firm outcomes is presented in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents prior evidences on 
other firm level determinants of MFI capital structure. The research question is presented in section 
3.5 and 3.6 summarises the chapter. 
3.1. Conceptual framework for board gender diversity and capital structure  
From the corporate governance theories presented in Chapter 2, we summarise the relationship 
between board gender diversity and microfinance institutions capital structure in the following 
conceptual framework.  
Figure 3.1: Conceptual framework on the effect of board gender diversity and MFIs capital 
structure 
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The conceptual framework in Figure 3.1 indicates two-way relationship between board gender 
diversity and MFI capital structure. Several empirical studies have argued that female directors 
and capital structure are jointly endogenous (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Farrell and Hersch, 
2005; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2010; Sila et al., 2016). While female directors 
could affect capital structure of microfinance institutions, the capital structure influences board 
gender diversity as well. This relationship can be explained in four distinct ways. First, is the 
resource dependence argument that seeks to link firm board of directors to the most beneficial 
resources in their environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Second, the critical mass perspective, 
where female directors have influence on corporate board decisions and those influence should be 
more pronounced when critical mass of three or more female directors is reached (Kramer et al., 
2007; Konrad et al., 2008; Joeks et al., 2013). Third, reducing agency problems due to female 
director’s partial substitute effect on weak corporate governance (Gull et al., 2011). Finally, the 
implication of risk aversion attitude of female directors towards financing choice (Sila et al., 2016; 
Chen et al., 2016).     
According to corporate governance literature, the definition of female director is sensitive to firm 
outcomes. The following definitions are necessary; indicator variable being one for the presence 
of female directors on board, fraction of female directors, absolute number of female directors and 
indicator variable being one if the number of female directors is equal or larger than three. Other 
firm level variables that may control for the effect of board gender diversity are; return on assets 
(ROA), board size, MFI-size, age and risk. The empirical theory indicating the relationship 
between board gender diversity and MFI capital structure is presented in next section.  
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3.2. Board gender diversity and corporate financing  
In relation to the firm level determinants of capital structure, this section extends the discussion of 
the effect of board characteristics on corporate financing. It deserves special mention because the 
present study considers board gender diversity as one of the bases for explaining the determinants 
of capital structure. Although the latest evidence from the field shows that female directors has 
importance influence in firm capital structure decisions (Alvez et al., 2015; Campbell and Vera, 
2010). An empirical finding by Campbell and Vera (2010) examine the effect of legislative 
changes in Spain on positive discrimination in favour of female board appointment and gender 
equality act. They find that stock market reacts positively in the short-term to the announcement 
of female board appointments, suggesting that investors on average believe that female directors 
add value. Similarly, Alves et al., (2015) studied 2427 firms in 33 countries and found that more 
gender diversified board leads to a capital structure composed with more long term funding. To 
our knowledge, these are the first studies that establish link between board gender diversity and 
capital structure. 
There is little or no attempt to find empirical evidence linking board gender diversity and 
microfinance institutions capital structure. A substantial amount of literature links female 
leadership to observable MFIs outcomes. This study contributes to this literature by examining 
whether female board of directors affects MFIs capital structure. This is an important research 
question. Recently, firms in various industries have come under intense public pressure to increase 
female representation on boards1, and number of European countries (among them France, Norway 
and Italy) have passed legislation mandating more female board representation for certain firms. 
                                                          
1The recently launched Bloomberg Financial Services Gender-Equality Index (BFGEI), which was developed in collaboration with the Women’s 
World Banking, helps to facilitate the benchmarking and comparative tracking that is critical to measuring performance. 
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The microfinance industry is particularly suited for studying the impact of female directors because 
of its mission orientation and high percentage of female leaders. This is because, the representation 
of female directors on boards is higher in microfinance industry compared to corresponding figures 
in other industries2. However, the economic consequence of more female directors on boards is 
not well understood. 
3.2.1. Resource dependency theory and board gender diversity  
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that board of directors seeks to link organization to other 
external organization in order to address environmental dependencies. They advocate four 
important benefits for these linkages which include: (1) provision of external resources such as 
information and critical expertise (2) creation of communication channels with other important 
stakeholders to the organization; (3) Provision of commitments of support from external 
organizations; and finally (4) provides legitimacy for the firm in their external environment. 
Hillman et al (2000) develop these four benefits derived from the theory into a classification of 
various director types that sought to attract various beneficial resources to the firm. Therefore, a 
more diverse corporate board is expected to offer resources that are more valuable to the firm.  
Moreover, the type of board diversity seems to be very important. For example, Pfeffer (1972) 
finds a positive relationship between the percentage of board members representing financial 
institutions and leverage. This result advocates the notion that financial institutions that provide 
capital to firms hold back their funds, unless firms allocate a position to them on their boards. 
Similarly, Booth and Deli (1999) find that the inclusion of commercial bankers on corporate boards 
                                                          
2 For example, in our sample, 30% of all board of directors are women 
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to have positive relationship with short term and long term debt, and total bank debt of the firm. 
They also find that commercial bankers create links and supply expertise to the bank debt market. 
In another interesting study, Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) find that politically experienced outside 
directors are more likely to be on the corporate boards where sales to government is greater. 
Similarly, they find that female directors bring different benefits and resources, but find little 
evidence that female directors play any political role. Siciliano (1996) show that boards with 
increased female directors is more likely to enjoy high level of social achievements, but less likely 
to achieve fundraising goals. Hillman et al (2007) find that female representation on board is 
always related to firm diversification strategy, type of industry and the network of linkages to 
female directors in other boards.  
Resource dependency theory may provide the foundation for some of the most convincing and 
interesting theoretical arguments for a gender diversified corporate boards. As Carter et al., (2010) 
suggest that diversity holds the potential to improve the quality of information between the board 
of directors and managers due to the uniqueness of information held by diverse directors. It is 
assumed that gender diversity will likely produce unique and important information that can help 
management to make better decision. Female directors may provide access to the most important 
organizations in the external environment. For instance, female directors may seek linkages with 
the most beneficial resources in their environment. Some may seek to maintain good relationship 
with female customers or employees.  
Some firms may require female perspective in board decision making such as financing decisions. 
Other firms may add female directors to their board in order to seek legitimacy from external 
organizations. However, the creation of this link is important in the microfinance sector, since 
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microfinance is largely a female business. Hence, female directors in the microfinance sector may 
send an important signal to product market, labour market and sometimes the capital market. In 
sum, the theory point to the beneficial linkages of female led MFIs to resources in its surrounding. 
We therefore, hypothesize to test the effect of female directors in attracting a particular class of 
funding.  
3.2.2. Critical mass theory and board gender diversity  
The critical mass theory on board gender diversity hypothesises that “one is a token, two presences, 
and three is a voice” (Kristie, 2011). Kramer et al (2007) point out that “the magic seems to occur 
when three or more women serve on board together. We find that having three or more female on 
board can create a critical mass where female directors are no longer seen as outsiders and are able 
to influence the content and process of board discussions more substantially”. Konrad et al (2008) 
interviewed 50 women about their experience as fortune 1000 directors and drew the same 
conclusion. Similarly, Joeks et al (2013) find evidence that female directors at first negatively 
affect firm performance but reverses to higher performance only after a critical mass of 30% has 
been reached or absolute number of about three female directors in their sample. Hence, they 
support recent studies on a corresponding “magic number” of female directors in the boardroom. 
Therefore, if female directors should have any impact on corporate decisions making, such impacts 
could be more strong and pronounced when the critical mass is reached. 
3.2.3. Agency theory and board gender diversity 
In corporate settings, firms suffer from an incentive problem, simply because those who run the 
firm are not the same as those who own the firm (Jensen and Meckiling, 1976). One solution is to 
enhance monitoring by corporate board. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that improved board 
monitoring and guidance reduces opportunistic behaviour and conflict of interest. Empirical 
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evidence from corporate boards suggest that female directors tend to be more active in monitoring 
activities. For example, Carter et al. (2010) show that gender diversified boards can improve its 
monitoring efficiency. Adams and Ferreira (2009) document that female directors attend more 
board meetings. In a similar view, Gul et al (2008) and Alvez et al (2015) show that firms with 
more female directors have high monitoring, greater level of public disclosure and better 
managerial accountability. 
The other effect of female directors on corporate decision is subject to firm’s governance quality. 
Adams and Ferreira, (2009) argue that in a well governed firms, female directors can negatively 
affect firm value due to excessive over-monitoring. On the contrary, Gull et al., (2011) suggest 
that firms can to some extent remedy their weak governance by having high female directors on 
board. This seems to be the case with MFI’s.  Strom et al (2014) find a negative relationship 
between female leadership and governance mechanisms. This means that MFI’s with more female 
directors perform better with less monitoring and oversight because female leadership is decisive 
in the microfinance sector and may substitute for weak governance. Hence, female directors may 
have beneficial effects on microfinance decision making due to the aforementioned partial 
substitute effect. A more gender diversified board remedies MFIs weak governance, which may 
invariably lower their agency cost. 
3.2.4. Risk aversion and board gender diversity 
Prior studies in both behavioural and financial economics have shown that increasing 
representation of women in the boardroom is a way to reduce risk. Numerous empirical evidence 
has shown that women are found to be more risk averse than men (Barsky et al., 1997; 
Jianakopolos and Bernasek 1998; Bernasek and Shwiff, 2001; Sila et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2016). 
For example, Byrnes et al., (1999) conduct a meta- analysis of 150 studies on risk taking behaviour 
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between men and women. They show that men are more likely to be involved in ‘risky 
experiment’, ‘gambling’ and ‘intellectual risk taking’ than women. Furthermore, women are found 
to be more conservative in investment decision-making (Sunden and Surette, 1998). Croson and 
Gneezy (2009) provide more evidence in this area by reviewing literatures on gender difference 
using an economic experiment, they show a robust finding that women are more risk averse than 
men.     
Recent studies on risk attitude of women in the general population show that men are more 
overconfident than women are. While men tend to believe the precision of their knowledge about 
risk higher than it is, women exhibit less overconfidence and thus are less likely to take extreme 
positions (Ray, 2005). Similarly, Huang and Kisgen, (2013) find evidence that suggests men 
exhibit relative overconfidence in significant corporate decision-making compared with women. 
Contrary to these views, Deaves et al., (2009) do not find women to be less overconfident than 
men in a sample of economics, finance and business students. They hypothesize that women who 
are engaged in predominantly male disciplines may behave differently from other women in the 
general population. In situation like this, female director’s characteristics play a great role in 
helping them climb the corporate ladder and becoming a director. For instance, Adams and Funk 
(2012) suggest that the level of risk aversion in female directors may disappear once they have 
broken through the glass ceiling and have adapted to a male male-dominated culture. They 
performed an asset market experiment to investigate how gender influences trading activity 
through overconfidence on Swedish sample. They find female directors are more risk seeking than 
male directors.  
This behavioural gender difference in equity holding is often attributed to women being risk averse 
to financial risk in the literature. Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) document that single women 
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invest on average 40 percent of their wealth in risky assets, which is less than the 46 percent than 
men do. Similarly, in a cross-sectional sample of boards of directors of 1024 publicly traded firms, 
Adams and Ferreira (2004) find that firms facing more variability in their stock returns have less 
female representation on their boards. Wilson and Altanlar (2011) find insolvency risk to be 
negatively related to the proportion of female directors on boards.  
More recently, Jacobsen et al., (2014) investigate why men hold more stock than women using the 
hypothesis that gender differences in either optimism or perceived risk of financial market may 
cause men to hold riskier assets. They find that women on average believe that stocks are riskier 
than men do. Contrary to those findings, Sila et al (2016) show that most findings of a negative 
relationship between women and equity risk are spurious and driven by unobserved between firm 
heterogeneous factors. Using a dynamic model, they find no evidence that the presence of female 
directors in the boardroom influences equity risk.  
A recent study on risk measurement using U.S. sample show that board with more female directors 
reduce the positive relation between R&D risk and earnings/returns volatility. In addition, they 
find that the adverse effect of R&D risk on cost of debt is less severe when more female directors 
are on the board (Chen et al., 2016). As might be expected, Khaw et al., (2016) show that having 
male-only boards increases corporate risk taking behaviour significantly. However, Sila et al., 
(2016) show that a board with a higher percentage of female directors is no more or less risk-taking 
than a more male-dominated board. It is evident that, studies on the impact of female on financial 
behaviour shows varied results. Moreover, the consensus is that risk attitude varies between 
genders and that board gender diversity can explain firm outcomes. 
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However, none of these studies has established the relationship between risk behaviour of female 
directors and capital structure. Overall, the results of (Adams and Ferreira, 2004; Farrell and 
Hersch, 2005; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Liu et al., 2014; Sila et al., 2016) confirm that female 
directors on board are not exogenous random variables and that endogeneity problem is likely an 
issue when investigating the impact of female directors on firm’s outcome. Studies by Mersland 
and Strom (2009) and Strom et al., (2014) both encounter two endogeneity issues when 
investigating the impact of female directors on microfinance settings. We expect the same potential 
endogeneity problems when investigating the impact of female directors on MFI’s capital 
structure. 
3.3. Other empirical evidence on female directors  
Compared to their male counterparts, female possess many favourable traits that adds value to 
their firm. As a result, female directors are capable of playing a better monitoring and advisory 
role in the board that can lead to positive outcomes (Adams and Ferreira, 2004). Academic research 
has provided supportive evidence in this regard. For example, Adams and Ferreira (2009) examine 
the relationship between female directors and governance on one hand and performance on the 
other. They find positive relationship between female directors and performance, only when firms 
show weak corporate governance structure. Furthermore, Smith et al., (2006), and Francoeur et 
al., (2008) show that female on top management tend to have positive effect on firm performance. 
Welbourne et al., (2007) find that short and long-term financial performance improves when 
women are in the top management when firms issue an initial public offering (IPO).  
More recently, Liu eta al., (2014) document a positive and significant relationship between board 
gender diversity and firm performance in China’s listed firms. Female directors have stronger 
positive effect on firm performance than female independent directors do. Gulamhussen and Santa 
  
39 
 
(2015) assess the role of female directors in banks boardroom in a sample of 461 large banks from 
OECD countries. They find a positive influence of women in boardrooms measured by presence 
and percentage with financial performance variables (return on assets, return on equity and 
operating income ratio). 
Other studies report contradictory findings. For instance, Shrader et al. (1997) find negative 
relationship between percentage of female directors and firms performance measured by 
ROA/ROE. Similarly, Farrell and Hersch (2005) show that appointing a director is not gender 
neutral and that the market does not significantly reacts to the appointment of a female director. 
Recently, Gregory-Smith et al., (2014) use UK data to examine the issues regarding the scarcity 
of representations in boardrooms.  However, they find no support to the arguments that female 
representation in boards enhances corporate performance. Performance is measured by return on 
assets (ROA); return on equity (ROE), total shareholder returns (TSR) and the logarithm of the 
price-to-book ratio (LnPTOB) used as a proxy to Tobin’s Q. However, these studies cited above 
used data from diverse industries and mostly in developed countries. 
When it comes to studying the impact of female directors on microfinance institutions, most 
studies are limited within the framework of microfinance performance model and focus on testing 
the hypothesis of association between performance and female leadership. Mersland and Strom, 
(2009), report that financial performance improves with female CEO, local directors and internal 
board auditors. Similarly, Strom et al., (2014) investigate the relationship between female 
leadership and firm performance using a global panel of 329 MFIs in 73 countries. They find 
female leadership to be positively related to MFI performance, but not driven by improved 
governance.  
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Other studies examine microfinance institutions performance and the main characteristics of 
corporate governance. Hartarska, (2005), find that performance based compensation does not 
improve MFIs performance. The results also identify trade-off between MFI’s social and financial 
performance depending on stakeholder representation on boards. Furthermore, using stochastic 
cost frontier estimation, Hartarska and Mersland, (2012) find that efficiency increases with board 
size, whereas MFIs in which the CEO chairs the board decreases efficiency. These identified 
studies seem to overlook the impact of female directors on MFIs capital structure and this 
relationship has not yet been subject of investigation in the microfinance field. Our study intends 
to fill the gap by examining weather female on boards determines for MFI financing decisions. 
3.4. Other firm-level determinants of capital structure  
Prior empirical studies on microfinance institutions have identified several MFI-level determinants 
that explains MFI outcomes based on various theoretical considrations. For instance,  board size 
has been identified as an important firm level determinant of corporate financing decisions. Jensen 
(1986) finds that larger board size is positively related to higher leverage. On the contrary, Berger 
et al (1997) show a consistent negative relationship between board size and leverage across all 
their six regression models. Meaning to say leverage measured by total debt divided by total assets 
is lower when board size is larger. Wen et al (2002) show a positive though statistically 
insignificant relationship between board size and financial leverage of 60 Chinese listed firms for 
the period of 1996 to 1998. Anderson et al., (2004) and Lorca et al., (2010) find that cost of debt 
financing is negatively associated with board size, suggesting that larger boards are synonymous 
to high level of managerial monitoring, increased decision making time and poor communication. 
More recently, Alves et al (2015) empirically analyse the association between board size and 
capital 8 different capital structure measures. They find statistically significant relationship 
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between market and book values of short term debt and long term debt. This means firms with 
larger boards have more long-term debt and less short-term debt. Meaning to say larger boards 
reduces information asymmetry. 
The relationship between financial and social performance and MFIs access to funding was first 
investigated by Mersland and Urgeghe (2013) using data from 319 MFIs in 68 developing 
countries. Financial performance (measured as ROA) increases MFIs access to international 
commercial debt. Consistent with this view, Bogan (2012) find that commercial investors target 
more robust and profitable MFIs. This also confirms the observation made by many that 
Microfinance Investment Vehicles (MIV) target the “niche” of financially profitable MFIs (De 
Schrevel et al., 2009; Wiesner and Quien, 2010). This supports the view commercially funded 
MFIs respond to the profit incentive, working to increase revenues and decrease expenses so that 
they can have revenues sufﬁcient to cover all operating expenses. Regarding social performance, 
Mersland and Urgeghe (2013) find a significant negative relationship between the presence of 
commercial funding and the targeting of women by the MFI. Thus, commercial MIVs do not 
consider reaching women a priority. However, they find positive relationship between subsidized 
international debt and MFIs social performance (measured by female bias).     
Size is another important firm level determinants of capital structure. Studies on firm capital 
structure (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; de Jong et al., 2008) argue that large firms have low 
bankruptcy cost and more diversified portfolio with less probability of bankruptcy than small 
firms. This is seems to be the case in microfinance literature (Bogan, 2012; Tchuigoua, 2014). 
Existing research on the impact of MFI age on financing pattern is centered within the context of 
life cycle theory (de Sousa-Shields, 2004; Bogan, 2012). Generally, the life cycle theory 
hypothesize that MFI sources of financing are linked to their stages of development. Subsidies 
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such as grants and donations comprise the bulk of funding in the early formative stage of MFIs 
(Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). Debt funding becomes available as MFIs mature, 
while equity financing becomes available when MFIs are in their last stage of evolution (Fehr and 
Hishigsuren, 2004). Risk is mostly measured by outstanding loans portfolio in the microfinance 
sector. MFIs with high risk means higher volatility of earnings and higher probability of 
bankruptcy. According to Tchigoua (2015), the quality of MFIs loan portfolio provides 
information on the effectiveness of the devices for credit risk management implemented by the 
MFIs. Thus, we infer that MFIs with low portfolio risk are considered as less risky by creditors 
and donors.  
3.5. Research questions 
This chapter links board gender diversity to MFIs capital structure. The reviewed emperical 
literature in this chapter provides mixed results on the effect of female directors on firms capital 
structure. Some firm level determinants where found to be significantly affecting firm capital 
structure in one economy or applicable to a set of MFIs in some studies and were not significant 
in other studies. Thus making it unclear about the impact of firm level determinants, particularly 
female directors on MFIs capital structure. In an attempt to fill this knowledge gap the data analysis 
and the discussion of the findings in this chapter are focused to answer the following specific 
research questions as introduced in Chapter 1: 
1) Does board gender diversity affect the capital structure of microfinance institutions? 
2) Is the empirical relationship between board gender diversity and MFI capital structure 
consistent with theoretical predictions? 
  
43 
 
3.6. Summary 
This chapter has presented a comprehensive literature on the impact of firm level determinants of 
capital structure with special emphasis on the role of female director on firm capital structure. 
Generally, it can be observed that the research evidence on female director’s effect on capital 
structure is somewhat little, with mixed findings and far from conclusive. Overall the literature 
suggests that capital structure models that ignore governance features are incomplete. We take a 
step further to analyse the relationship between female board representation and MFI capital 
structure. 
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Chapter 4 - Literature Review III: The impact of firm-specific and institutional-specific 
determinants on MFIs capital structure 
4.0. Introduction 
This chapter extends the study of MFIs capital structure. Utilizing a different regression 
framework, the impact of firm-specific factors and institutional-specific factors on MFIs capital 
structure is investigated. The chapter begins by explaining the conceptual framework of these 
impacts in section 4.1. Section 4.2 presents the empirical evidence on the impact of firm-specific 
factors on MFIs capital structure around the world. Section 4.3 presents evidence on the impact of 
institutional-specific factors on MFIs capital structure. More specifically, the section reviews the 
direct and indirect impact of institutional-specific factors. Section 4.4 extends the discussion on 
the joint determinants of deposits and borrowings. Specifically, the section presents the conceptual 
framework explaining this relationship. Research question are presented in section 4.4. Evaluation, 
critique and gaps of the existing literature is given in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 summarises the 
chapter.  
4.1. Impact of firm-specific and institutional-specific determinants: Conceptual framework 
According to existing literature in corporate finance, firm financing decision is not only 
determined by firm-specific factors but also by institutional environment in which the firm 
operates (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Booth et al., 2001; de Jong et al., 2008). The 
firm-specific factors are internal to the MFI, and therefore are controllable within the MFI. These 
factors include: tangibility, profitability, liquidity, portfolio at risk, MFI size and age of MFI. The 
impact of firm-specific factors on capital structure may vary from one country to the another. The 
institutional-specific factors are external factors that are beyond MFIs control. Example of the 
external factors are where government through its regulating body sets capital control beyond 
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which MFIs are not allowed to access; and where the government give licence for MFIs to mobilise 
deposits. Some of the institutional factors are; strength of creditors right, presence of credit 
registry, financial sector development, country legal origin, Political stability, Prudential 
regulation and GDP growth.  
In this chapter, we cover the impact of firm-specific factors on MFI capital structure, indicating 
whether they differ across countries. Similarly, we cover the direct and indirect impact of 
institutional-specific factors on MFI capital structure. Figure 6.1 depicts the relationship capital 
structure and both firm-specific and institutional-specific factors. It indicates that, firm-specific 
factors influence MFIs capital structure (leverage and subsidies). Similarly, MFI operating in a 
better institutional environment may benefit from easier access to funding. The main argument is 
that better institutional environments can overcome information asymmetries in the credit market 
and consequently affect MFIs capital structure. The framework depicts institutional factors directly 
affects capital structure and indirect impact capital structure through their impacts on the effect of 
firm-specific factors.             
Figure 4.1: Conceptual Framework on the impact of firm-specific and institutional-specific 
factors on MFI capital structure 
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4.2. Firm-specific factors and capital structure 
Several empirical studies have ultimately observed that the capital structure of financial and non-
financial firms are determined by various firm specific variables arising out of static trade-off 
theory, pecking order theory, agency theory and profit incentive framework (Gropp and Heider, 
2010; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Booth et al., 2001). The theories have suggested several variables 
as possible determinants of firm financing choice, including profitability, tangibility, liquidity, 
risk, size and age.  
In a static trade-off framework, a firm chooses how much debt finance and how much equity to 
use by balancing the cost and benefits. In particular, the firms capital structure moves towards 
offsetting the cost of debt, that is the bankruptcy costs against the benefits of debt, that is tax 
advantages. Using the bankruptcy cost framework, variables such as tangibility, risk and size can 
be used as proxies (de Jong et al., 2008). With respect to tangibility, creditors in general demand 
more tangible asset in exchange for financing. Higher tangibility of assets means lower risk to 
creditors and reduce the cost of bankruptcy. Many empirical evidence report a significant positive 
relation between tangibility and firms ability to leverage (Gropp and Heider, 2010; Frank and 
Goyal, 2009; de Jong et al., 2008; Rajan and Zingales, 1995).  
Given that MFIs are asscociated with high risk and information asymmetry problems, we expect 
tangible assets to mitigate contract problems, therefore, MFIs with more tangible assets can access 
more leverage. We also expect MFIs with high tangible assets to have a positive association with 
subsidies. As previous findings highlights a positive significant relation between tangibility and 
subsidies (Tchuigoua, 2015). This points out that donor agencies care about risk when they decide 
to fund MFIs.      
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When it comes to firm risk, many empirical literatures are not clear on its impact on firms capital 
structure. For example, Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Frank and Goyal (2009) find that risk is 
not an importnant determinants of firms capital structure. Unlike Lemmon et al. (2008) that report 
a significant negative correlation between firm risk and leverage. Similar results are reported in 
the banking industry where risk is found to significantly reduce leverage (Gropp and Heider, 
2010). Moreover, the risk of default for MFIs can be importnant if the quality of their loan portfolio 
is bad. Outstanding loans portfolio represents a significant portion of MFIs assets. As a result, 
MFIs with high risk means higher volatility of earnings and higher probability of bankruptcy. 
According to Tchigoua (2015), the quality of MFIs loan portfolio provides information on the 
effectiveness of the devices for credit risk management implemented by the MFIs. Thus, we infer 
that MFIs with low portfolio risk are considered as less risky by creditors and donors. For this 
reason, we assume that leverage and subsidies are negatively associated with MFIs portfolio 
quality. We expect higher portfolio risk to have negative impact on both leverage and subsidies. 
However, MFIs that exhibit low portfolio risk might be more leverage and benefit more from 
subsidies.   
In the information asymmetry or pecking order framework, firms generating profit will retain 
earnings inorder to avoid asymmetric information cost. The theory suggest that firms follow a 
specific hierarchy of financing by choosing internal financing followed by external financing. 
When the need for external financing arises, firms choose debt over equity. The rationale for this 
is that firm managers are better informed about their firms than ousiders and thus issue less equity 
when they feel the firm is undervalued. So  in order to minimize asymmetric information cost, we 
expect profitable MFIs to prefer internal finance than external finance. Empirical results on the 
relationship between profitability and leverage seems to confirm the hypothesis that negative 
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relation exist between profitability and leverage (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; 
Fan et al.,2012; de Jong et al., 2008). In microfinance, Tchuigoua, (2014) find significant negative 
relationship between profitability and leverage. Profitable MFIs are thus expected to have lower 
leverage. In microfinance industry however, subsidised funding plays a vital role, we expect 
profitable MFIs to be negatively associated with subsidy. This relationship is meaningful given 
that it supports the profit incentive-view that profitable MFIs should rely less on subsidised 
funding such as grants and donations.   
Following the pecking order framework, liquidity otherwise known as accumulated cash and other 
liquid assets serves as internal source of funds and will be used first to settle shor-term obligations 
and finance growth instead of debt. A firm holding a high proportion of its assets in liquid form is 
less exposed to sudden changes in its balance sheet (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999). High liquidity 
therefore reduces exposure to the risk of being unable to meet short-term financial commitments 
and the appetite for raising debt. Thus, we expect liquidity to have negative impact on MFIs 
leverage. de Jong et al (2008) finds high liquidity to be an importnant determinants of leverage in 
advanced economies. Subsidised funding may top the pecking order hierarchy since MFIs access 
such funds at no cost. However we cannot tell the direction of relationship beween liquidity and 
subsidies.  
Size is expected to have positive impact on leverage. The most reasonable argument that explains 
such relationship is the bankruptcy costs (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). That is, large firms have low 
bankruptcy cost and in principle have more diversified potfolio with less probability of bankruptcy 
than smaller firms. Financial institutions spend more resources in monitoring small firms  because 
they tend to have less information. Although majority of research on firms capital structure shows 
a positive association between size and leverage (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; de Jong et al., 2008), 
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this seems to be the case in the microfinance litereture (Bogan, 2012; Tchuigoua, 2014). In the 
case of subsidized funding, we expect a negative relationship between size and subsidies. The 
larger the MFI the less subsidies it attracts. The reason been that smaller MFIs are mostly the 
targets of donor agencies (CGAP, 2008). This argument is reinforced by Tchugoua (2014), which 
find a significant negative relatonship between MFI size and subsidies.    
Existing research on the impact of MFI age on financing pattern is centered within the context of 
life cycle theory of MFI development (de Sousa-Shields, 2004; Bogan, 2012). Generally, the life 
cycle theory hypothesize that MFI sources of financing are linked to their stages of development. 
Subsidies such as grants and donations comprise the bulk of funding in the early formative stage 
of MFIs (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). Debt funding becomes available as MFIs 
mature, while equity financing becomes available when MFIs are in their last stage of evolution 
(Fehr and Hishigsuren, 2004). With that in mind, we assume that mature MFIs to have postive 
relationship with leverage. As new or young MFIs are mostly the target of donor agencies for 
subsidized funding. Therefore we expect a negative relationship between mature MFIs and 
subsidies. 
4.3. Institutional-specific factors and capital structure  
The role of institutional environment has assumed an important dimension in the corporate finance 
literature (La Porta et al., 1997; 1998). Studies that compare capital structure differences in both 
developed and developing countries started to appear only during the last decade. For example, an 
early investigation of seven developed countries by Rajan and Zingales (1995) argued that 
although there is a uniqueness of firm specific factors that significantly influence the capital 
structure of firms across these countries, several institutional specific factors play an important 
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role in determining firm’s capital structure. Similarly, Wald (1999) lend support the view that 
institutional features are significant determinants of capital structure.   
We also have quite a number of empirical studies that focus mainly in analysing the effect of 
institutional factors on firm’s capital structure in developing countries.  Pioneers in this strand of 
study are, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996), who studied the impact of stock market 
development on corporate capital structure in thirty developing countries and concluded that the 
size of capital market significantly influences the use of long-term debt and acknowledge the 
importance of institutional factors in determining cross-country financing choice of firms. 
Similarly, Booth et al. (2001) examined capital structure of firms in ten developing countries and 
found the need to study the influence of institutional factors on capital structure in developing 
countries. However, they find that institutional factors such as GDP growth and capital market 
development affects leverage differently.  
Furthermore, some studies take a comparative view on the effect of institutional factors in both 
developed and developing countries. Study in this regard by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1999) compared the capital structure of firms in 19 developed countries and 11 developing 
countries. They find that institutional differences between developed and developing countries 
explain a large portion of the variation in the use of long-term debt. They also observe that some 
institutional factors in developing countries influence the leverage of large and small firms 
directly. In addition, Fan et al. (2012) analyse a larger sample of 39 developed and developing 
countries. They find a significant impact of a few additional institutional factors such as degree of 
development in banking sector, and equity and bond markets.  In the same line of reasoning, 
Antoniou et al. (2008) concluded that capitals structure choice of firms depends on the surrounding 
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economic environment such as economic condition, existence of stock market as well as the size 
of the banking sector.  
However, Giannetti (2003) argues that the difficulty to establish a significant relationship between 
most institutional variables and leverage is due to sample selection bias induced in many previous 
studies that include only large listed firms. Using a large sample of unlisted firms, Giannetti (2003) 
examines how firm and institutional characteristics affect corporate financing decisions and found 
that leverage is significantly related to stock market development, creditor protection and legal 
enforcement. Similarly, Hall et al (2004) examines a large sample of unlisted firms from eight 
European countries and found a cross-country variation in the determinants of capital structure 
that is due to institutional differences.  
Nevertheless, the literatures reviewed above specifically examine the direct impact of institutional 
factors on firm’s capital structure and they converge on the idea that firm financing decision are 
affected by the same variables in both developing and developed countries. They show that better 
institutional environment has positive impact on firm’s capital structure. This seems to be the case 
in the microfinance sector, as Tchuigoua (2014) argued that microfinance sector and formal 
banking sector are complimentary. The literature on country-specific factors and MFIs capital 
structure is still in its infant stage. Existing literature on the impact of institutional factors on 
microfinance institutions looked at three broad areas in analysing the outcome of MFIs.  
The first category looked at the effect of macro institutional factors on MFIs performance model. 
One major study in this line of research was by McGuire and Conroy (1998) who examined 
microfinance financial performance and the macroeconomic conditions using a survey data that 
observe the effect of the Asian financial crisis on MFIs. They examine the percentage changes in 
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loans, savings, total assets, and capital stocks of MFIs from 1996 to 1998. They found that MFIs 
were able to maintain relatively strong financial success during the Asian financial crisis.  
Furthermore, Ahlin et al (2011, 2006) investigates how MFIs performance depends on macro-
institutional outcome. They merge institutional-level data with MFI-level data of 373 MFIs. They 
found that performance measured by operational self-sufficiency and loan portfolio growth to be 
significantly and positively affected by the macroeconomic and institutional environment in which 
an MFI is situated.  
The second line of research that has received much attention in the literature is the relationship 
between institutional environment and poverty. Recent study by Imai et al (2012) tested the 
hypothesis that microfinance reduces poverty at the macro-level using a cross-country data for 
2007 and a panel data for 2003 and 2007. Their econometric results confirm that microfinance 
loans per capita are significantly and negatively associated with poverty, that is, a country with 
higher MFI gross loan portfolio per capita tends to have lower poverty. There are however, 
literatures that try to establish a reverse proposition in which microfinance drives institutional 
factors (Levine, 2005). This is much less believable that microfinance drives economic growth in 
the short run (Ahlin and Jiang, 2005). 
The third category of research deals with the impact of institutional factors on MFIs funding 
choices. Tchuigoua (2014) conducted a pioneering work in this area. The study addresses the 
question of whether institutional features matter in the capital structure of MFIs using a sample of 
292 MFIs between 2004 and 2009. Findings suggest that country’s legal tradition, creditor’s right 
and the level of financial development are significantly related to MFIs capital structure. However, 
most of these studies suffer from erroneous assumptions, weak results and more importantly some 
econometric problems. 
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In the analysis of institutional-specific determinants of MFIs capital structure, we utilize an 
alternative regression framework where we use to determine the indirect impact of institutional 
factors on MFIs capital structure. Studies examining the indirect impact of institutional factors on 
firm’s capital structure have started to appear recently. de Jong et al., (2008) were first to examine 
and argue on the premise that institutional factors have direct and indirect effect on firm’s capital 
structure. Although they agree with the conventional direct impact of country-specific factors on 
capital structure of firms, they as well show that there is an indirect impact of institutional factors 
as these factors influence the role of firms-specific determinants of capital structure. Furthermore, 
Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin, (2011) analyse the determinants of capital structure across 37 
countries. They find a 22% variation in leverage due to the direct impact of institutional factors. 
An indirect impact of institutional factors explains 12% variation in leverage through the effect of 
firm specific factors.  
In this study, we follow de Jong et al., (2008) approach in testing for the direct and indirect impact 
of institutional factors on MFIs capital structure. Their methodology is sequential, starting by 
testing the firm-specific determinants across countries, followed by testing the equality of 
coefficients across countries. They use weighted least square regression model where a single 
average capital structure for each country is used as an observation to determine the direct and 
indirect impact of institutional factors on firm’s leverage. This studies without altering the model 
will provide us with a more reliable estimate that determines the impact of both firm-specific and 
institutional factors on MFIs capital structure decision. 
4.3.1. Institutional-specific factors and Information asymmetry  
The role of information asymmetry in a firms financing decision can be traced back to the work of 
Myers and Majluf (1984). Information asymmetry problem between firm insiders and outside 
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investors creates conflict of interest and can therefore determine firm’s choice of capital. Corporate 
finance literatures suggest that the optimal capital structure of firms depends on the information 
available to investors and the investor’s ability to monitor and enforce compliance through 
institutions (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Booth et al., 2001; Antoniou et al., 2008; Li 
and Ferreira, 2011; Fan et al., 2012). For example, strong legal enforcement can reduce 
information asymmetry problems and mitigate agency conflicts (La Porta et al, 1998). 
Prior empirical studies on the impact of institutional factors on firm capital structure converges on 
the idea that firms operating in countries with strong and better institutional environment may have 
easy access to finance on attractive terms (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; de Jong et al., 
2008; Li and Ferreira, 2011; Gao and Zhu, 2015). These studies argue on the basis that a strong 
institutional environment can reduce information asymmetry between firms and investors and 
consequently affect firms financing decision. This seems to be the case in the microfinance sector. 
As Garmaise and Natividad (2010) argue that, information asymmetry seems to contribute to the 
rising cost of capital in developing and less developed markets where MFIs operate. In countries 
with weaker institutions, information asymmetry problems will make it difficult and expensive for 
MFIs to raise capital and may even hinder their growth and development (Garmaise and Natividad, 
2010).  
The most recent empirical approach on information asymmetries that deals with microfinance 
funding is the work of Garmaise and Natividad (2010) that measures plausible exogenous shock 
to MFI information environment. Asymmetric Information was found to have negative effect on 
MFI cost of financing and its impact on supply of capital is mixed. Similarly, Tang (2009) show 
that firms with decreasing information asymmetry, experience additional decrease in borrowing 
cost and increase in capital supply. Moreover, the effect of information asymmetry can be found 
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on other non-commercial source of funding to MFI. Gosh and Tassel (2013) model predicts the 
quantity of capital supplied by donors under asymmetric information determines the choice of 
charging interest rate or not. Non-commercial funders of MFI face the dilemma of issuing funding 
as grant or grant based.  
Tchuigoua (2014) was the first to study institutional framework and MFI funding policy using the 
asymmetric information assumptions. The study finds that better institutions environment such as 
creditor’s right, country’s legal tradition and the level of financial sector development reduces 
information asymmetry in MFIs credit market and consequently affects MFI level of external 
finance.  Thus, there is a consensus for the presence of information asymmetry in MFI credit 
market as discussed earlier. There is as well empirical evidence on the effect of institutional 
environment on MFI funding policies. Therefore, our study assumes that better institutional factors 
can overcome information asymmetry and consequently affect the capital structure of MFIs.  
The novelty of this work is that, apart from analysing direct impact of institutional factors, we 
looked at the indirect impact of institutional factors on MFIs capital structure as in de Jong et al 
(2008) and Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin (2011). We specifically argue that the capital structure 
of MFIs is directly and indirectly determined by institutional-specific factors. For example, de 
Jong et al (2008) find that with better creditor’s right and contract enforcement, the effect of 
tangibility or MFI size are diminished as the institutional structure provides protection for both 
parties in a contract.  In this case, the relevant institutional-specific factors that could possibly 
explain the direct and indirect impact on MFI capital structure under the information asymmetry 
framework were selected from the literature.  
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4.3.1.1. Direct impact of institutional factors on MFIs capital structure  
Direct impact means institutional-specific factors directly influence MFIs capital structure. For 
example, several studies on firm financing decisions have shown strong evidence that the degree 
of creditor’s right plays an important role in financial contracts. Early study by Aghion and Bolton 
(1992) used theories based on transaction cost and contractual incompleteness. They find that 
firm’s choice of capital structure is explained by the strength of control rights attached to either 
debt or equity. This finding suggests that lenders should enjoy from bargaining power that would 
allow them to seize collateral or takeover borrower’s firms in the event of default. Therefore, 
countries with strong creditor’s right that allows lenders to seize borrower’s collateral or take 
control of their firms in order to force repayment may assist firms in that country to get financing 
on favourable terms.  
A study by Giannetti (2003) using a sample of unlisted firms found that strengthening creditors 
right to be associated with leverage. Similarly, Gonzalez and Gonzalez (2008) show that strong 
creditor’s right reduces agency cost of debt, making it difficult for firms to access financing in 
countries with weak creditors right. Hence, firms resort to internal funding than costly external 
finance. Qian and Strahan (2007) show that countries with strong creditor’s rights encourage banks 
to charge lower interest rate, thereby making credit available. Thus, availability of cheap credit 
means more leverage to firms. However, Rajan and Zingales, (1995) argue that strict enforcement 
of creditor’s right may be associated with lower leverage for firms. Consistent with this view, de 
Jong et al., (2008) find a significant negative relationship between creditor’s right protection and 
leverage level of firms. The possible explanation for this is that higher creditor’s right makes debt 
riskier because managers fear losing their jobs or where creditor’s right involves forceful 
bankruptcy in times of distress.  
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Variation in creditor’s right matters a great deal, on how loan are structured and priced. This 
relationship is put to test by Bae and Goyal, (2009), they show that variation in countries creditors 
right seems to reduce loan spreads, but do not matter for loan size and maturity. Advocates of 
strong creditor’s right protection claim that if the right to repossess collateral is not strictly 
protected, the use of collateral to solve information asymmetry will be lost. This can lead to 
underinvestment and credit rationing in the economy. Therefore, creditor’s right to seize collateral 
can help reduce problems that arise when information asymmetries between borrower and investor 
are present.    
Thus, we expect MFI capital structure to matter in countries where creditor’s right is well 
protected. As expected Tchuigoua (2014) find a significant positive relationship between strength 
of creditor’s right with both external debt and donated equity in the Microfinance sector. Better 
creditor’s protection seems to reduce information asymmetry and consequently attracts more 
external financing in the form of debt or subsidies.  
Another important institutional-specific factor that may affect the capital structure of MFIs is credit 
information bureau. Credit information bureau or credit registry, which provides a numerical 
ranking of borrower credit quality have become a central part of the credit decision used in a 
growing number of credit markets. Micro businesses credit market is perhaps one of the segments 
of credit market where problems of asymmetric information are most pronounced. Independent 
third party analysis such as rating agencies or stock prices of most small businesses like 
Microfinance institutions are usually not available. They are also very diverse, which makes it 
difficult to identify clear predictors of success. These problems are greater in developing countries 
due to poor accounting standards and frequent economic volatility.  
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Recent research in the development of credit markets across countries shows that institutions 
facilitating sharing of credit information (such as public and private credit registries) foster the 
growth of private credit markets (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002). Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer 
(2007) find that higher levels of information sharing among creditors and stronger creditor rights 
are associated with a larger private credit market relative to gross domestic product. The analysis 
suggests that credit registry benefit private credit markets in developing countries with weaker 
legal systems. In other words, both ex ante better information for creditors and ex post stronger 
creditor rights contribute to credit market expansion.  
Kallberg and Udell (2003) use data from Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) to evaluate whether credit 
registries containing firm-level data are important predictors of firm’s loan quality. They find that 
the credit information produced by D&B has substantially greater predictive power than the data 
contained in financial statements. They find that exchange generated information provides 
significant explanatory power in failure prediction models. Their study compliment study by 
Jappelli and Pagano (2002), who find in cross-country macro level test that credit information 
bureau, adds value to credit markets.  
Previous theoretical and empirical studies provide strong evidence that credit registry reduce 
information asymmetry in the credit market. For instance, Sorge and Zang (2010) find that higher 
levels of information sharing (as proxied by the existence and coverage of private and public credit 
registries as well as the depth of credit information) are associated with a higher share of long-
term debt as a proportion of total corporate debt in both developed and developing countries. Ex-
ante better credit information acts as a substitute for ex-post stronger creditor’s protection in the 
credit market. It reduces both the risk of moral hazard and adverse selection in the credit market. 
Microfinance institutions existing in countries with efficient credit registry may tend to attract 
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more debt compared to those with weak credit information bureau. Therefore, our key prediction 
is that the presence of credit information bureau in a country reduces information asymmetry 
between borrowers and lenders, which has a larger impact on MFIs capital structure.   
The financial sector development of a country expressed as the domestic credit provided by private 
sector as a percentage of GDP can also be a key institutional-specific variable. Numerous studies 
document the importance of financial sector development on firms financing choices (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Booth et al., 2001; Giannetti, 2003; Antoniou et al., 2008; Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2008). In the banking literature, Diamond, (1984) suggest that 
banks overcome information asymmetry by investigating borrower worthiness and use the 
information gathered to allocate capital. Since the banking sector uses information to monitor 
borrowers, the development of the sector means firms can have easy access to external finance. 
For instance, Gianetti (2003), find that firms have more leverage in countries with developed 
financial sector. However, Fan et al., (2012) find no significant relationship between the level of 
financial sectors development and firms leverage, which is measured by the ratio of total deposits 
over the GDP of a country.   
Studies on the effect of financial sector development on MFIs started appearing recently. Vanroose 
and D’Espallier (2013) note that MFIs are affected by the level of banking sector development. 
They investigate the substitutability of microfinance sector and commercial banking sector. They 
find that MFIs succeeds where commercial banking sector fails. Similarly, Tchuigoua (2014) find 
that financial sector development increases MFIs level of borrowings. The study concludes that 
microfinance sector and the conventional banking sector are complimentary. In line with this 
argument, we assume that developed financial sector enables MFIs to access commercial funding 
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and reduces their dependence on subsidized funding. Since MFIs are usually small and non-listed, 
we can assume that financial sector development can affect MFIs capital structure decision.  
Differences in legal system might help explain why firms are financed differently across countries 
(Demirgüc¸ -Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996, 1998; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). A variety of papers 
have analysed the adoption of different legal systems and their impact on capital structure.  La 
Porta et al., (1997, 1998) show that differences in legal system plays an important role in capital 
market development, simply because it affects the accounting standards and legal protection of 
investors in a country. They specify that common-law countries have good accounting standards 
and stronger investor protection. Similarly, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2001), show that 
common-law system creates incentives for market-based system that can easily create wealth. 
However, civil-law system tends to have underdeveloped financial systems.    
Similarly, using a partial adjustment model, Oztekin and Flannery (2012) show that firms in 
common-law countries adjust to optimal capital structure faster than firms situated in civil-law 
countries. However, Fan et al (2012) find that firms operating under common-law system are 
associated with lower debt ratios. This is not the case in the microfinance sector, as Tchuigoua 
(2014) finds that MFI in common-law countries are more leveraged. They also find that a countries 
legal origin is not associated with donated equity. This is expected, as there are no legal binding 
contracts in such type of funding. It is established that common law countries are more business 
friendly, have transparent laws and encourage disclosure (La Porta et al., 1998). We expect firms 
in such countries have low information asymmetry problem and can access funding external 
sources on favourable terms. Therefore, we assume MFIs to have positive relationship with 
leverage in common law countries. However, since subsidies are not legal binding instruments, we 
cannot assume the direction of our relationship. 
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Several empirical studies provide strong evidence that a country’s level of corruption determines 
firms capital structure.  Alves and Ferreira (2011) and Fan et al. (2012) show that countries level 
of corruption explains firms capital structure. Fan et al (2012), report that firms in countries with 
high level of corruption are less likely to raise equity. This is because it is easier to expropriate 
outside equity holders than debt-holders. Similarly, Alves and Francisco (2015) find that firms 
issue more debt and less equity in countries with high level of corruption because there is high 
level of information asymmetry between firms and investors, damaging the issuance of riskier 
assets.  
It is expected that corruption may have effect on microfinance institutions simply because MFIs 
are relatively small and non-listed. Corruption taxes their operations and creates barriers to their 
expansion. It may make it easier for MFIs to avoid regulations or push them out of the formal 
credit market (Ahlin et al., 2011). In view of that, Tchuigoua (2014) find significant relationship 
between level of corruption and MFIs funding policies. They show that in countries with high level 
of corruption, subsidies from donor agencies decreases. We expect that leverage and the amount 
of subsidies will be more important in MFIs that operate in countries with high level of corruption.  
Other important institutional-specific variables that are studied in many capital structure literatures 
include country’s political stability, Regulatory framework and gross domestic product growth 
rate. Since majority of MFIs in our sample are based in developing or emerging economies, there 
is a need to capture the effect of political instability because it contributes to the uncertainty of 
returns to investors or in the other way round, it may contribute to increase in subsidies to unstable 
countries. We expect politically stable countries to attract more leverage and less of subsidies. 
Regulatory framework is another important control variable. Countries with regulatory framework 
that controls the activity of MFIs may tend to attract more leverage and less of subsidies. This is 
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consistent with the findings of Tchuigoua (2014). Furthermore, GDP growth rate is included in 
our analysis as a control variable to capture the effect of economy wide growth. Higher GDP 
growth rate in a country implies more option for future growth for all firms in an economy. Booth 
et al., (2001) suggest that firms are more likely to borrow against real option for growth, hence 
leverage tend to rise with GDP growth.    
4.3.1.2. Indirect impact of institutional factors on MFIs capital structure  
We argue that institutional-specific factors do not only impact MFIs capital structure directly but 
also indirectly. This suggests that the institutional-specific variables influence the way in which 
firm-specific factors determine firms capital structure. To achieve this, we group our firm-specific 
variables in two theoretical perspectives as described above. The first group is the bankruptcy cost 
variables that include tangibility, risk and size, and the second is the pecking-order variables, 
namely profitability and liquidity. The study expects indirect impact relationship across four 
institutional variables other than the control variables.    
Considering the bankruptcy cost variables, namely tangibility, risk and size, it is expected that with 
better creditors right and good legal origin, bankruptcy cost can be mitigated because these 
structures provides protection for both the creditors and borrowers. For instance, creditor’s rights 
help promote the development of credit market by reducing business risk and forcing borrowers 
to abide by their contracts, thereby making tangibility and size factors relatively less important in 
the credit market. Using similar assumption, de Jong et al. (2008) observe that country’s legal 
system of enforcement indirectly influences firm’s capital structure. They find a negative 
relationship between contract enforcement and firm size coefficients. This indicates that better 
enforcement reduces the relative importance of firm size on firm’s access to leverage.  
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The study therefore expects a negative indirect relationship between the following institutional-
specific variables (Creditor’s right and Legal Origin) and leverage via the set of firm-specific 
coefficients (tangibility, risk and MFI size). With respect to the indirect effect of creditors and 
legal origin on MFIs subsidies via firm-specific factors, we expect no relationship since subsidies 
such as donated equity are not legal binding instrument that can be accessed in the credit market.  
Institutional specific variables can have an indirect effect on pecking order financing variables 
namely, profitability and liquidity. It is expected that credit information bureau has an impact in 
mitigating the role of pecking order financing variables because higher level of information sharing 
among creditors are associated with a larger private credit market, and less asymmetric information 
problems (Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer, 2007; Sorge and Zhang, 2010) which can facilitate 
MFIs access to external finance irrespective of the level of profitability or liquidity. With less level 
of asymmetric information problem in the credit market, high profitability and liquidity is 
relatively less important and further increase the use of debt.  
To capture this relationship better, this study assumes that debt is used as disciplinary mechanism 
in order to force MFI managers to pay out profits or advance loans that can generate returns, rather 
than engage in empire-building activities as described by (Jensen, 1986). With respect to the 
impact of credit information bureau on MFIs subsidies via pecking order variables (Profitability 
and liquidity), we expect no relationship because subsidy as a financial instrument is not covered 
in credit information registries. The role of pecking order variables cannot be inferred in this case.  
Finally, considering the bankruptcy cost variables, namely tangibility, risk and size, it is expected 
that when financial sector is further developed, the risk of bankruptcy cost can be mitigated 
because the need for these variables (tangibility, risk and size) is greatly reduced in a well-
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developed financial sector. Thus, the study assumes a negative indirect impact of financial sector 
development variable on leverage via a set of bankruptcy cost variables (tangibility, risk and size). 
In the case of subsidies, we expect that the role of bankruptcy cost variables is mitigated because 
with more available external financing, MFIs are less dependent on subsidies. When financial 
sector is well developed, bankruptcy cost variables are less an issue.  
4.4. The joint determinants of the use of deposits and borrowings 
4.4.1. Conceptual Framework of the use of deposits and borrowings 
The extent of MFIs borrowings has been argued as relatively dependent on the financial 
environment in the countries themselves. For instance, it is observed that Eastern Europe, Central 
Asia and Latin American financial markets are characterised by relatively more conducive 
environment in promoting debt financing, whereas in Africa, the debt market is far less conducive 
(Galema et al., 2011; CGAP, 2011). However, in the absence of a conducive financial environment 
for either deposits or borrowings, one can expect that they could be an environment where MFIs 
are more likely to use deposits and borrowings together. Therefore, it can be conjectured that there 
will be an interplay in the decision by MFIs to either undertake borrowing or mobilize deposits.  
Prior studies on MFIs capital structure treat deposits and borrowings independently (Bogan, 2012; 
Tchuigoua, 2014), i.e., the decision to mobilize deposits is independent of the decision to borrow 
by MFIs. This Chapter, covers the empirical relationship between deposits and borrowings to the 
extent whether they are substitutes or complement. Figure 4.2 depicts how the substitutability or 
complementarity relationships between deposits and borrowings vary across different institutional 
environment. In this case, it is argued on whether MFIs are more likely to displace borrowing with 
deposits and vice-versa using the asymmetric information framework.  
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Figure 4.2: Conceptual Framework of deposits-borrowings relationship 
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4.3.1. Deposits-borrowing substitutability theory 
According to CGAP (2010), deposits (for deposit taking MFIs) are similar to borrowing in terms 
of claims and security, except for a few minor differences. Deposits often have shorter maturities 
than borrowings and adjust to current market rates faster than borrowings. In practice, both 
deposits and borrowings are usually quite stable source of funding, with long holding periods and 
frequent rollovers (Earne and Sherk, 2013). However, it is puzzling that the use of deposits has 
been largely ignored in MFIs decision to borrow and vice-versa. Prior studies of microfinance 
institutions implicitly assume that the decision to mobilize deposits is independent of the decision 
to borrow by MFIs (Bogan, 2010; Tchuigoua, 2014). This assumption seems implausible, given 
the similarity of commitments between deposits and borrowing. It can be assumed that an increase 
in deposits would require less use of borrowings and vice-versa. 
Similarly, factors affecting MFIs willingness to substitute deposits and borrowing financing are 
familiar enough at the qualitative level, but the actually prevailing deposits-borrowing 
substitutability and its consequences for important issues of economic behaviour remains question 
that can only be resolved empirically. It is simply not possible, based on priori considerations 
alone, to say which financing sources or other factors are foremost to MFIs under any economic 
condition or institutional environment. Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that the cost of finance 
Deposits Borrowings 
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may be high if the firm suffers from asymmetric information problem. Although the influence of 
information asymmetry on firm’s capital structure is well documented. Few papers study how the 
change from deposits to borrowings are related to information asymmetry. Here I argue that in an 
institutional environment with high asymmetric information, the marginal cost of borrowings will 
be affected to a larger degree by an extra amount of fixed claim obligations. A firm would 
therefore, substitute borrowings to deposits which has lower cost.   
The intuition is as follows, consider a MFI that plans to finance its operation with borrowing from 
the capital market. If there is a greater degree of information asymmetry in the market towards 
MFIs, investors would be more concerned about the MFIs increased risk of financial bankruptcy 
associated with fixed claim obligations. As a result, the risk premium demanded by the market will 
increase more rapidly when the MFIs borrows more new funds. To this end, we argue on the 
premise that MFIs tend to borrow when the institutional environment (creditor’s right, credit 
information index and financial sector development) is conducive (less information asymmetry in 
the market) and thereafter substitute to deposits financing when institutional environment is no 
longer favourable, that is, high information asymmetry in the credit market. 
4.3.2. Empirical evidence  
Some of the empirical work on financial asset substitutability has received much debate since 
1970’s. Most of the studies investigating the substitutability of firm financing choices concentrate 
on debt-lease financing framework. While some early studies find complementary relationship 
between lease and debts (Bowman, 1980; Ang and Peterson, 1984). Others find strong empirical 
evidence against the complementarity relationship between lease and debts (Beattie et al., 2000; 
Yan, 2006; Minhat and Dzolkarnaini, 2016). Similarly, Friedman (1985) and Aivazian et al., 
(1990) report a substitutability relationship between long-term debts and equity.  
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On the impact of institutional environment on corporate liabilities, different types of 
substitutability relationship become more important. Almeida and Masetti (2014) examine the 
corporate debt substitution during the financial crisis using a novel firm-level dataset on syndicated 
loan and bond issuances by listed non-financial firms in the euro zone area between 2003 and 
2013. They show that firms are more likely to issue bond instead of a loan at times of bank credit 
supply contractions. 
Similarly, Becker and Ivashina (2014) find strong evidence of firms switching from bank loans to 
bonds at times that are characterized by tight lending standards, depressed aggregate lending, poor 
bank performance, and tight monetary policy. They show that this substitution behaviour has 
strong predictive power for bank borrowing and investments by small firms. However, the varying 
findings from these studies show that substitutability relationship is an unresolved puzzle in the 
finance literature, especially when it involves different class of financial instruments or certain 
specialised sector of the economy such as the microfinance sector.      
The reduced focus on deposits and borrowing in the microfinance literature could be explained by 
the nature financial firms such as banks capital structure. Banks capital structure fundamentally 
differs from the one of non-financial firms since it includes deposits, a source of financing 
generally not available to firm. Gropp and Heider (2010) investigate the capital structure of large 
US and European banks during 1991 to 2004. They show that banks have substituted non-deposit 
borrowings for deposits during their sample period. The share of non-deposit liabilities in total 
book assets increases from around 20% in the early 90s to 29% in 2004. The share of deposits 
declines correspondingly from 73% in the early 90s to 64% in 2004. They find that whenever an 
estimated coefficient is significant, it has the opposite sign for deposits and for non-deposit 
liabilities. 
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Similarly, Tchuigoua (2014) studied the impact of institutional factors on deposits and borrowing 
independently. Findings show that the coefficient of each institutional variable for both deposits 
and borrowings are in the opposite direction. This can be assumed to be a case of partial substitute, 
where the use of one financing choices displaces the other. However, this assumption is not yet 
subject to empirical estimation. Hence, this study intends to investigate the relationship between 
deposits and borrowings. 
4.4. Research question 
In light of the above discussions on the empirical literature review on how institutional-specific 
factors affect MFIs capital structure and its impact on the joint determinants of MFIs capital 
structure. The data analysis and discussions of the findings in chapter 7 and 8 were focused to 
answer the following research questions as introduced in chapter 1.  
1) Do the standard firm-specific determinants affect MFIs capital structure? Is the impact of 
firm-specific determinants equal across countries? 
2) Do institutional-specific determinants have significant direct influence on MFIs capital 
structure (Leverage and Subsidies)? 
3) Do institutional-specific determinants have significant indirect influence on MFIs capital 
structure (Leverage and Subsidies)? 
4) What is the empirical relationship between deposits and borrowings? Are they substitute 
or complements? 
5) Does the substitutability or complementarity relationship vary across institutional settings?    
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4.5. Evaluation, critique and gaps in the existing literature  
Previous studies on firm capital structure has established the competing determinants of firm 
capital structure, that is, firm-specific determinants and institutional-specific determinants. In the 
firm specific determinants, recent studies have focused in analysing the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms such as board of directors and firm capital structure. However, 
the directors in most studies are treated as a homogenous group without controlling for personal 
characteristics such as gender. Variations in these characteristics, and gender in particular, may be 
able to explain the difference financing choices among firms (Alves et al., 2015; Campbell and 
Vera, 2010).  
Most of the research in the area of gender diversity on boards of directors focuses on profitability 
and, so far, there is no consensus in the literature on the relationship between female board 
representation and performance. Some studies find that board diversity leads to better performance 
while others find no such relationship (e.g., Carter et al., 2003; Huang and Kisgen, 2013; Gregory-
Smith et al., 2014; Gulamhussen and Santa, 2015; Sila et al., 2016). Another strand of the literature 
looks at the determinants of boards appointing female directors. Firm risk is found to be one of the 
determinants of female board appointments. Adams and Ferreira (2004) find that firms with more 
volatile stock returns tend to have fewer female directors on their board. The authors explain these 
results with reference to Kanter's (1977) argument that group homogeneity (i.e., a male-dominated 
board) is essential in environments where uncertainty is high.  
Similarly, Farrell and Hersch (2005) find that the probability of female director appointments is 
higher in less risky and better performing firms. The authors argue that female directors self-select 
into these firms due to demand for gender diversity. Farrell and Hersch (2005) also find that female 
directors are more likely to be appointed to boards with fewer female directors or to replace female 
  
70 
 
directors on the board. Gregory-Smith et al. (2014) find similar results for UK firms. However, 
they cannot establish a relation between firm capital structure and the gender of directors being 
appointed. Overall, the results of both Farrell and Hersch (2005) and Gregory-Smith et al. (2014) 
confirm that neither a director's gender nor the proportion of female directors on the board are 
exogenous random variables, and that reverse causality is likely to be an issue when investigating 
the impact of gender diversity of non-financial firms. 
Not only are the findings in sectors other than the microfinance sector inconclusive, Adam and 
Mehran, (2003) argue that financial firms differ from non-financial firms, and that the conclusion 
drawn for other sectors cannot be generalized for financial firms such as MFIs. Unlike non-
financial firms, microfinance institutions nature of regulation, manner in which revenues are 
generated and risk management objectives generates novel challenges for corporate governance 
that justify focused attention (Strom et al., 2014; Mersland and Strom, 2009). Using the 
microfinance experience, we try to examine the effect of female directors on MFIs capital 
structure. 
In the microfinance sector, results tend to show positive relationship between female directors and 
financial performance (Strom et al., 2014; Mersland and Strom, 2009).  However, these studies 
are restricted to MFIs performance model. Little is known about the influence of female directors 
on MFIs capital structure. In fact, Tchuigoua (2014), investigates MFIs capital structure mix from 
an institutional perspective, but fail to cover the governance perspective. The study has highlighted 
that MFIs source their funding from various channels such as deposits, borrowings, equities and 
subsidies. This is where the role of female directors could have been very pertinent in attracting a 
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particular type of funding3. Female directors on board could therefore be important determinants 
of MFI capital structure. To our knowledge, there is no study that links board gender diversity to 
capital structure in the microfinance sector.  
Research on the institutional-specific determinants of MFIs capital structure across countries 
points to an important role factors such as creditor’s right and financial sector development in 
influencing MFIs capital structure (Tchuigoua, 2014, 2015; Bogan, 2012). Although this research 
has identified several empirical regularities, it suffers from erroneous assumptions, weak results 
and more importantly some econometric problems. For instance, study by Tchuigoua (2014) used 
a cross-country MFIs data from 66 countries and find that institutional factors affect MFIs capital 
structure. However, this study implicitly assumes that the impact of firm-specific factors on MFIs 
capital structure are the same across countries as observed in many previous non-MFI capital 
structure studies (Booth et al., 2001; Giannetti, 2003; Fan et al., 2012).  The procedure of pooling 
firms from different countries into single regression model that contains both firm-specific and 
institutional-specific variables while the assuming that there are no differences across country. 
With a large number of observations, this process is more likely to produce a statistically 
significant result for most of their institutional-specific variables. 
As an additional contribution to the paper by Tchuigoua (2014), we go a step further by 
decomposing our analysis into stages. In the first, we start by analysing the impact of firm-specific 
factors on MFIs capital structure on a country-by-country basis. Several empirical studies on non-
MFIs have reported the estimated coefficients for firm-specific determinants of capital structure 
per country and have acknowledge the fact that firm-level determinants on capital structure does 
                                                          
3 An anecdotal evidence suggest that female directors are instruments through which investors, donor agencies and other capital providers ensure 
that their funds are channelled to the right purpose (Hartarska, 2005). 
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differ in terms of signs, magnitude and significance levels across countries (Booth et al., 2001; 
Gianetti, 2003; Fan et al., 2012). Most recently, de Jong et al., (2008), find that firm-level 
determinants of leverage do differ across countries.   We build on this implicit assumption to show 
whether the impact of firm-specific factors on capital structure of MFIs does differ across 
countries. 
Furthermore, the link between deposits and borrowing decision has not been investigated in the 
past. The joint determinants of deposit and borrowings is examined owing to the fact that they are 
examined independently in previous microfinance literatures (Tchuigoua, 2014; Bogan, 2012). 
While empirical studies on substitutability of financial asset employ the least squares method to 
analyse data (Mehran et al., 1999), a recent US study by Yan (2006) uses generalised method of 
moments (GMM) technique. With this method in place, a re-examination of Tchuigoua (2014) in 
presenting the microfinance evidence on the extent of deposit-borrowing substitutability 
relationship is warranted.   
4.6. Summary 
Based on the theoretical framework reviewed in chapter 2, this chapter presents a comprehensive 
literature review on the impact of institutional-specific determinants on MFI capital structure, 
including specific discussion on the direct and indirect impact of institutional-specific 
determinants. Detailed discussion on the joint determinants of MFI capital structure and the extent 
to which these financing choices (deposits and borrowings) are substitute or complement is 
presented. In the next chapter we present the research methodology used in this study.  
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Chapter 5 - Research methodology and data 
5.0. Introduction  
This chapter presents the basic research design and methodology used in conducting the research. 
It starts by summarizing the key research focus and justifying the reason for choosing the empirical 
research method in carrying out the study. Next, Section 5.2 discusses the methodologies used in 
previous studies. Section 5.3 shows the method techniques used in this study. Research design is 
discussed in section 5.4. The sample selection procedure is discussed in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 
presents the conceptual model. The empirical research method employed to analyse the data. The 
models, assumptions and rationales behind the selected techniques are explained in section 5.7. 
Section 5.8 describes the variable definitions and measurements. The rationales behind the choice 
are explained. The final section concludes this chapter.  
5.1. Research focus  
The focus of the research is to investigate the determinants of microfinance institutions capital 
structure around the world using a comprehensive measure of capital structure, and recognising 
the link between deposits and borrowings financing. The factors being examined are of the firm-
specific and institutional-specific factors that have been tested in many prior capital structure 
studies. Despite such vast amount of literature, empirically testing the theoretical propositions on 
lending institutions such as microfinance has proved challenging, with evidence documented so 
far not clear. As Myers (1984) once pointed out that “we know very little about capital structure” 
(p.575). While in recent years, significant progress has been made in understanding the 
determinants of corporate capital structure, our understanding remains incomplete particularly in 
respect of lending institutions such as microfinance institutions. 
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5.2. Methodologies used in previous studies 
Several empirical studies have attempted to assess the determinants of firm’s capital structure. All 
studies in the reviewed literature used quantitative data analysis to investigate the firm-level such 
as board gender diversity and institutional level determinants on capital structure. For example, 
Campbell and Vera (2010) conducted a study on quoted Spanish firms using GMM models with 
408 observations. This study however, was biased because it examined only firms listed in the 
Spanish stock exchange. The capital structure definition is limited (market value of stock and the 
book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets). The number of observations was also 
too small to achieve statistically reliable conclusions and, therefore, generalizability is 
questionable. Huang and Kisgen (2013) examine corporate financial and investment decision made 
by female executive compared with male executives using the difference-in-differences 
framework to control for endogeneity. Although this method is intended to mitigate the effect of 
extraneous factors and selection bias, it may still be subject to biases such as reverse causality and 
omitted variable bias.  
Alvez et al., (2015) studied the composition of board of directors and capital structure of non-
financial firms from 33 countries. The methodological weakness of this study is that, they assume 
that board gender diversity and financing sources variables are unlikely to be endogenously 
determined which is against prior evidences suggesting that capital structure shocks cause changes 
in governance mechanisms in microfinance sector (Strom et al., 2014). Moreover, conclusions 
drawn from non-financial firms cannot be generalized to financial firms. Unlike non-financial 
firms, financial firms call for distinctive regulatory treatment and this generates novel challenges 
for corporate governance (Gulanhussen and Santa, 2015).  
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Mersland and Urgeghe (2013), examined the determinants of MFI financing using data from 319 
MFIs in 68 developing countries. The dataset has a certain sample selection bias as only rated 
MFIs are included. This study used simple pooled probit regression in which the coefficient of the 
explicative variables cannot be interpreted as marginal effects on the dependent variable, and their 
signs only show whether the corresponding variables influences the likelihood for the dependent 
variable to equal 1. However, binary outcome variable does not contain any direct information a 
non-constant variance. For example, the variance of capital structure is tied directly to the 
probability of board composition. This implies that any inference about changes in this variable 
must come from observed changes in the probability of a board composition.  
The study by Adams and Ferreira (2009) was set to explain the significant impact of female 
directors on firm outcomes. Specifically, the study was meant to show how female directors 
improve governance quality and firm performance. Their study was built on many previous works 
Farrell and Hersch (2005) which fail to address the endogeneity problems that arise because of 
differences in unobservable characteristics across firms or reverse causality. Instead of a single 
method analysis, they introduced comprehensive analysis of the consequences of gender diversity 
of boards. Their study was based on data obtained mainly from Investor Responsibility Research 
Centre which does not cover microfinance institutions.  
Mersland and Strom (2009) and Strom et al., (2014), have used multiple regression models with a 
relatively moderate sample compared to previous studies. Using self-constructed global dataset of 
MFIs collected from third party rating agencies, Mersland and Strom (2009) employ random effect 
panel data estimation without consideration for endogeneity issues. Following this trend, Strom et 
al (2014) expand the gender diversity variables to three female leadership categories. This study 
used Heckman endogenous dummy variable model to control for any possible endogeneity 
  
76 
 
problem. This study however, focused only on the effect of board gender diversity on governance 
and performance. Thus, the role of female directors on MFIs capital structure is not covered in this 
study.  
On the impact of institutional specific factors on capital structure, prior studies by (Booth et al., 
2001; Giannetti, 2003; Fan et al., 2012) use simple multivariate analysis for cross-section of firms 
in different countries and sectors excluding MFIs. Although this research has identified several 
empirical regularities, it suffers from erroneous assumptions, weak results and more importantly 
some econometric problems. By reporting the estimated coefficients for firm-level determinants 
of leverage per country, these studies, on the one hand, acknowledge that the impact of firm-level 
determinants does differ in terms of significance levels across countries. On the other hand, in the 
analysis of institutional-specific determinants of corporate leverage, these studies also make use 
of country dummies in pooled firm-year regressions, thus forcing the firm-specific coefficients to 
have the same value. With an extremely large number of firm-year observations, it is more likely 
for this procedure to produce statistically significant results for many country-specific variables. 
However, de Jong et al., (2008) utilizes an alternative regression framework where a single average 
capital structure for each country is used as an observation, they hardly find strong evidence on 
this issue.  
Therefore, as an additional contribution of this study, we show the invalidity of this implicit 
assumption as examined by Tcuigoua (2014) in the microfinance settings.  This study adopts de 
Jong et al (2008) regression framework by decomposing the analysis into stages. In the first stage, 
comparative analyses using simple ordinary least square regression is run to determine the impact 
of firm-specific factors on MFIs capital structure on a country-by-country basis. A simple 
statistical analysis was run to test whether the coefficient of firm level determinants is equal across 
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countries. In the second stage, the use of country dummies can be a potential solution in the 
analysis of the impact of institutional factors on capital structure, where each country should serve 
as a particular observation in the second stage weighted least square regression, rather than pooling 
samples from all firm across countries. 
In the joint determinants of capital structure variables of deposit and borrowing. This study 
borrows from Yan (2006) and Dzolkarnaini (2009) methodology. They examine the firm-specific 
joint determinants of leases and debt using the generalised method of moments (GMM) technique 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). This study however, 
focus most on firm-level joint determinants of leases and debts. Thus, other institutional factors 
that could jointly determine deposits and borrowing were not covered in this study. With this 
method in place, a re-examination of joint determinants of deposits and borrowing using 
microfinance experience is necessary. In the next section we present the methodologies used in 
our study.  
5.3. Methodology used in this study          
In this study, we tested the applicability of existing theories (what is already known as found in 
other studies) to MFIs capital structure, by analysing cause and effect relationships between 
variables. The study followed a quantitative research approach. The quantitative research approach 
is useful where quantitative data are generated from large samples to test applicability of existing 
theory using statistical analysis (Collis and Hussey 2003). A regression based research is chosen 
for the present study, it builds on contributions from prior studies using different research methods 
(Yan, 2006; de Jong et al., 2008; Dzolkarnaini, 2009; Strom et al., 2014). Building on Strom, 
D’Espallier and Mersland’s study, this study links board gender diversity to capital structure of 
MFIs. The study also extends on the study of Tchuigoua (2014). We use measures board gender 
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diversity as in Strom et al., (2014) to examine their effect on of capital structure variables as in 
Tchuigoua (2014). This is done in chapter 6. Chapter 7, which links institutional factors and MFI 
capital structure builds on the methodology used in de Jong et al., (2008). The examination of joint 
determinants of MFI capital structure variables builds on the methodology of Yan (2006) and 
Dzolkarnaini (2009). 
Building from previous microfinance studies (Strom et al., 2014; Tchugoua, 2014), this study 
added more explanatory variables and used a larger number of observation, which is expected to 
add explanatory power to the equations. The study used capital structure and governance theories 
to study the determinants of MFIs capital structure. It also adopted the unique decomposition of 
MFIs capital structure. The decomposition was meant to provide a clear explanation of the 
determinants of MFIs capital structure. The selection of methodology that was used in this study 
followed Thomas Kuhn’s assertion that devising new approaches and methodologies, and changes 
in the perception on evaluation of familiar data could lead to discovery of new knowledge (Kuhn, 
1996). Although this study does not bring about a paradigm shift, the Kuhn’s assertion was useful 
to enlighten the design of this study.  
5.4. Research design 
This study attempts to determine the factors affecting capital structure decision of MFIs. It will 
also establish whether factors found to be significantly determining capital structure of firms in 
developed and developing are also equally significant to MFIs. We use quantitative data analysis 
approaches to establish the cause-effect relationships based on factors reported in previous studies 
as explained in theoretical background (Chapter 2) and empirical theory (Chapters 3 and 4). 
Theoretical-based studies provide the fundamental framework to develop the research questions. 
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The evidence from the empirical based studies helps to give a clearer indication of the expected 
empirical relationship between variables under investigation.  
The study makes use of a quasi-experimental research design (Panel study or Longitudinal survey) 
that involves repeated observations of the same variables over long periods of time. The prime aim 
of the quasi-experiment is to analyse causal relationships between independent and dependent 
variables (Gill and Johnson, 2010). The use of longitudinal data (panel data) enhances tracking 
changes in measured variables and relationships overtime (Hair et al, 2006). It allows us to control 
for certain unobserved characteristics of individual firms (MFIs) and facilitates causal inference 
in situations where inferring causality would be very difficult in case we had only one year (single 
cross section) observation. Moreover, the use of panel data allows us to study the importance of 
lags in behaviour or the results of decision making, as in longitudinal or panel data, both the values 
and the ordering of the data points have meaning (Wooldridge, 2010; Verbeek, 2004). By studying 
the repeated cross-section of observations, panel data are better suited to studying dynamic 
changes (Gujarat, 2003). 
5.5. Sample selection procedures  
5.5.1. Sampling source 
Microfinance institutions firm level data was collected from the Microfinance Information 
eXchange (MIX) database. The Mix Market is a web-based platform that provides information on 
individual microfinance institutions. The MIX database aims to promote transparency and 
information flow by providing reliable and comparable information on microfinance practicality, 
both financially and socially. Many studies in the field of microfinance use the Mix database (Cull 
et al., 2009; Ahlin et al., 2011; Imai et al., 2012; Bogan, 2012, Tchuigoua, 2014).       
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The Mix market platform is publicly available platform that discloses information of more than 
1,900 microfinance institutions, 200 partners and nearly 100 investors (mixmarket.org). Mix 
market is a self-reporting database, for this reason, Mix market has classified reporting MFIs into 
five categories (diamonds) for reliability purpose. It is important to note that Mix market data is 
less reliable compared to data collected by third parties such as rating agencies (Mersland and 
Strom, 2009; Hudon and Traca, 2011). In order to address data reliability problems, we include 
only MFIs that are categorised in diamonds four and five in our studies. These categories of MFIs 
have audited financial statements by a third party auditing firm, while some are also rated by a 
third party rating agencies. This however, seems to be a reasonable benchmark for reliable and 
comparable data in our studies.  
Institutional-specific data were collected from different sources. Data on macroeconomic 
environment and the level of financial sector development were extracted from the World 
Development Indicators provided by World Bank. The data that captures aspect of institutional 
environment came from two major sources. First, the Kaufman et al (2010) World Governance 
Indicators (“WGI”) construct aggregate indicators from six broad dimensions of governance that 
measures institutional outcomes. Data on voice of accountability, political stability/lack of 
violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of corruption and rule of law are 
produced in annual series, in which a higher index number represents a better institutional 
outcome. From these indicators the data for control of corruption and political were extracted. The 
index is available in World Bank website. Secondly, a complementary approach that measures 
institutional-specific factors comes from the Doing business indicators of the World Bank. Data 
on creditor’s right index and credit information index were obtained from the Doing Business 
website. Data on human development index was extracted from the United Nations Development 
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programme website. Countries with insufficient institutional-specific data were dropped from the 
study. 
5.5.2. Initial sample selection and time period of the study 
Our initial sample consists of 17,947 firm year observations between 1995 and 2014. Data was 
limited to MFIs with reporting diamonds four and five and we ended up with 8,080 firm year 
observations. We require that firm year observation must correspond to a calendar fiscal year. 
Therefore, all quarterly reported observations are excluded from our analysis. MFIs with 
duplicated firm year observation were eliminated from our data after verification. It was required 
that MFIs in our sample have at least two years’ observations over the study period. This will allow 
us to control for certain unobserved characteristics of individual firm and can facilitate causal 
inference in situations where inferring causality would be very difficult if only a single cross 
section were available (Wooldridge, 2010).  
MFIs that lack sufficient capital structure data required for our analysis were excluded. The study 
sets 2004 and 2014 as the beginning and end of the sample period. This decision is influenced by 
the fact that data from previous years are largely missing and fragmented. The implementation of 
these filters has rendered us with two separate unbalanced panels. Therefore, the study that 
examines the effect of female directors on MFIs capital structure have a sample of (2400) firm 
year observation for (584) MFIs across (79) countries covering the period of 2010 to 2014. The 
chapter is limited to five years because of unavailability of governance information such as female 
directors and board size. The chapters that examine the impact of institutional-specific factors and 
the joint determinants of deposits and borrowings contain a sample size of (5215) firm year 
observations for (645) MFIs across (56) countries for the period of 2004 to 2014. 
  
82 
 
5.6. The conceptual model 
The study makes use of panel data models to explain the relationship between dependent and 
independent (explanatory) variables. Panel data or longitudinal data are data sets containing 
repeated observations of the same individuals (MFIs) collected over a number of periods 
(Wooldridge, 2010). In essence, panel data is a combination of cross-section and time series data 
(Gujarat, 2003). That is, cross-section data collected from the same individuals over a time. Panel 
data relates to individuals (MFIs) over time, and, therefore, is bound to be heterogeneous in these 
individuals. One of the major advantages of panel data analysis according to Matyas and Sevestre 
(1995) is that it enables us to account for unobservable factors as long as they can be considered 
fixed over time. Unobserved heterogeneity, are factors that cannot be explicitly specified, because 
the relevant statistical information is not accessible or does not exist. 
Bevan and Danbolt (2004) argue that the empirical evidence on capital structure determinants 
based on pooled cross-sectional regression may be biased due to the failure to control for firm-
specific, time invariant heterogeneity. In response to this, the analysis of panel data method is more 
appropriate for this study. The panel data method uses one-way error component model for 
disturbance, 𝑢𝑖𝑡, with  
    𝒖𝒊𝒕  = 𝜶𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕                                               
Where: 
𝒖𝒊𝒕= Disturbances 
𝜶𝒊 = Firms fixed effect, accounting for unobserved factors 
𝜺𝒊𝒕 = other variables influencing y 
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Equation (5.1) takes into account the firms fixed effect. Intimately related to the problem of 
efficient use of the panel data is the assumption of disturbances 𝑢𝑖𝑡 that involves fixed effects or 
random effects inference. When unobserved heterogeneity can be viewed as random from a 
common population, and then it is more appropriate to postulate a random effect model. If the 
unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with explanatory variables or comes from heterogeneous 
population, then it is more appropriate to postulate a fixed effect model (Hsiao, 2003). The choice 
of which depends on Hausman specification test.   
5.7. Econometric analysis approaches  
This section presents the econometric analysis approaches used to analyse the relationship between 
firm level determinants such as board gender diversity and MFI capital structure in chapter 6, the 
impact of institutional specific factors on MFI capital structure in chapter 7, and the joint 
determinants of MFI capital structure in chapter 8,  
5.7.1. Board gender diversity and MFIs capital structure 
To answer the first two research questions of whether firm level determinants such as female 
directors affects the capital structure of microfinance institutions, we use the panel data approach, 
controlling for MFIs specific and country specific variables. There were two main reasons we 
chose the panel data method of estimation. The first relates to the structure of our data, which 
mainly consist of repeated observations of a cross-section of 584 microfinance institutions for the 
period of five years (2010-2014), with missing years for at least some cross-sectional units. 
Secondly, panel data enables us to account for unobservable factors as long as they can be 
considered fixed over time. This section covers the correlation and variable selection and the model 
specification.  
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5.7.1.1. Correlation analysis and variable specification 
Before running the regression analysis, we performed pairwise correlation analysis. The analysis 
was meant to first, indicate whether variables were correlated or not. If variables were not 
correlated, then using several simple regressions or one multiple regression model could give the 
same results (Dougherty, 2006). Second, the correlation analysis helped to determine variables 
which are highly correlated and that could cause multicollinearity problem in our model. 
Multicollinearity condition exists where there is high, but not perfect, correlation between two or 
more explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2010). According to Churchill and Iacobucci (2005) 
when there is multicollinearity, the amount of information about the effect of explanatory variables 
on dependent variables decreases. As a result, many of the explanatory variables could be judged 
as not related to the dependent variables when in fact they are. Thus, as Churchill and Iacobucci 
(2005) have argued, multicollinearity condition reduces the efficiency of the estimates. How much 
correlation causes multicollinearity however, is not clearly defined. While Hair et al (2006) argue 
that correlation coefficient below 0.9 may not cause serious multicollinearity problem, Kennedy 
(2008) suggests that any correlation coefficient above 0.7 could cause a serious multicollinearity 
problem leading to inefficient estimation and less reliable results. 
We further computed the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each coefficient as diagnostic statistics 
test to indicate how serious the multicollinearity problem could be. The VIF shows the increase in 
variance that can be attributed to multicollinearity (Greene, 2003). Again, there seems to be no 
consensus about how much VIF is harmful. For example, while Greene (2003) claims that the VIF 
values in excess of 20 suggest existence of multicollinearity problem, Hair et al (2006) and Gujarat 
(2003) suggest that VIF above 10 indicates the existence of multicollinearity problem. 
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5.7.1.2. Model Specification 
Multiple regressions are based on a set of assumptions that have to be met before running the 
regression analysis and some tests have been done before interpretation of the result is made. This 
is required to ensure that the results are what they appear to be. In this section we explain how the 
model was constructed and specified. The assumptions underlying the multiple regression are: 
normality, referring to the shape of the data distribution; homoskedasticity, which requires that 
dependent variables exhibit equal levels of variance across the range of explanatory variables; 
linearity association between variables (Hair et al, 2006). 
Test for normality we tested the distribution of each of the variables in our study using visual plot 
for each variable. From the visual plot it was evident that the distribution of some variables was 
not normal. It was skewed. These are: board size and MFI size. To remedy this problem, we 
adopted variable transformation suggested in the econometric literature (Wooldridge, 2010; Hair 
et al, 2006; Verbeek, 2004; Greene, 2003). We transformed the variables to their natural log. The 
log transformed variables also help to attain linearity in parameter which is a requirement for 
regression analysis. To treat heteroscedasticity, we run our regression with MFI clustered standard 
errors to correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Using this method alone controls for 
most of the MFI level heterogeneity according to Petersen, (2009). 
5.7.1.3. Empirical model 
The baseline specification contains year and individual firm fixed effect to explain unobserved 
heterogeneity at the MFI level. The following is our main regression model:    
(Capital structure) it. = 𝛽0 +𝛽1(Female directors) it + 𝛽2(MFI controls) it + 𝛽4(Country 
controls) ijt.+𝜖it.         (5.1)                                                                                                                                                                
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Where index i denotes individual MFIs, j indexes country, and t year, capital Structure is one of 
the five measures of capital structure used by the firm (Leverage, borrowing, deposits, equity and 
subsidies).  Female directors are measured by the indicator variable of female on boards or the set 
of other female director definitions (D_female director≥1, % female directors, # female directors 
and D_3female directors≥3). MFI controls comprises of MFI characteristics such as board size, 
performance variables, size, age, risk and regulation. Country control variables comprise of 
economic growth and HDI. 𝝐 it is the homokedastic error.  
We begin by estimating an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. A usual problem in cross-
country panel-data studies is the existence of unobserved heterogeneity that can make OLS 
estimates problematic. Since any unobserved heterogeneity problem can be, induced by 
independent variables that are not observable or unobservable (i.e., not included in the regression 
model). Therefore, the estimators provided by these regressions may be inconsistent or biased 
since we assume that individual fixed effects are uncorrelated with our MFI level explanatory 
variables.  
Since OLS estimators would yield bias estimates, we also estimate the random effects model by 
assuming that the unobserved effect is uncorrelated with all explanatory variables, but exploits the 
serial correlation in the composite error in a generalised least squared (GLS) framework 
(Wooldridge, 2010). Compared to fixed effect model, random effect is better fit to deal with time-
invariant explanatory variables. Our key explanatory variable (female director variable) is constant 
over time, making it difficult to employ fixed effect estimators. For this reason, all variables that 
are constant over time are swept away by the fixed effect transformation. Random-effects model 
is better suited for our data because it controls for potential correlation that could exist between 
regressors and for unobservable individual country effects. Random effect estimates may not be 
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consistent if the true model is fixed effect. However, both OLS and random effect estimators would 
yield biased estimates if there were a presence of endogeneity issue such as reverse causality.  
5.7.1.4. Endogeneity issues in estimating the relationship between female directors and MFIs 
capital structure 
When analysing the effect of female directors on MFIs capital structure, endogeneity problems 
may arise. Several empirical studies have argued that female directors and firm outcomes are 
jointly endogenous (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Farrell and Hersch, 2005; Adams and Ferreira, 
2009; Carter et al., 2010; Strom et al., 2014; Sila et al., 2016). They argue that the inclusion of 
female directors on boards is a choice that firms have to make to in order to suit their own operating 
environments and use it as the bargaining power among the various stakeholders of the firm. 
Therefore, it is important to consider these when estimating the relationship between female 
director and capital structure of MFIs. To accurately test whether female directors affect MFIs 
capital structure, at least two alternative explanations are considered. That is, the relationship is 
driven either by reverse causality or by sample selection bias. 
The first explanation is that capital structure variables may be direct causes of changes in the board 
gender diversity. Rather than proportion of female directors affecting capital structure, MFIs 
financing choice may affect the proportion of female director on boards. Farrell and Hersch (2005) 
argue that although boards may have internal tastes for diversity they also appear to respond to 
outside pressure to add women directors. If this is the case in MFIs where access to a particular 
type of funding requires MFIs to have more female directors on boards, MFIs may decide to 
increase female representation on boards in order to have access to that particular class of funding. 
One cannot rule out the possibility that capital providers are more likely to choose MFIs that are 
gender bias in their board composition. The second endogeneity issue is the sample selection bias. 
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Sample selectivity may affect both the selection of female directors and MFIs capital structure. 
For example, MFIs that give emphasis to social performance may select of female directors or 
female directors may tend to self-select with MFIs with good social performance. However, the 
outcome of this selectivity may affect the capital structure of MFIs.    
To explain this better, sample selectivity may influence both the demand and supply of female 
directors by MFIs. On the demand side, the selection of female director might be related to the 
emphasized focus on social performance, that is, MFIs appoint female directors because they 
induce higher social performance. Therefore, MFIs hire female directors to show their level of 
social performance as may be required by investors and not because of the female director’s 
qualification. On the supply side, MFIs with good social performance record may tend to attract 
more female directors as evidence show from non-financial literature that female directors may 
identify better with and offer their services to socially responsible firms (Adams and Funk, 2012). 
Therefore, examining the effect of female directors on MFI financing choice in a single equation-
context without addressing the selectivity issue may bias our estimate of female directors.  
To address this endogeneity, we use an instrumental variable approach similar to the approach of 
Strom et al., (2014). They study the effect of female leadership (female CEO, female chair and 
female director) on microfinance institutions financial performance and governance, where female 
leaders endogenously determine MFI performance and governance. To address the issue of reverse 
causation, they use the Heckman (1978) model for an endogenous dummy variable. We follow 
their approach and use two-stage endogenous dummy variable model to capture exogenous 
variation of female directors on MFI capital structure. Furthermore, we handle sample selection 
problem by the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) test.  
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5.7.1.5. Treatment strategy 
To measure the influence of female directors on MFIs capital structure, we require an empirical 
model that takes into account the issues of reverse causation and selection bias. In this section, we 
introduce an Instrumental variable (IV) model that considers these issues. We then argue that the 
commonly used ordinary least squares (OLS) and random effects estimators cannot produce 
reliable inferences for models of this type. Finally, we propose the Heckman (1978) endogenous 
dummy variable model as an appropriate estimator. We have established in the previous section 
that MFIs characteristics and other stakeholders can influence the proportion of female directors 
on boards.  We follow the two-step procedure laid down by Wooldridge (2010).  
In the first step, we use a straightforward probit method to predict the likelihood of a female 
director choice. Thus, in the case of female director variable that is dichotomous, we run a probit 
regression: 
Pr(D_female director) = ƒ (Social mission + Institutions + Controls + Errors)         (5.2)   
This relation is important in our second regression where female director may be endogenously 
determined. Therefore, when the capital structure variable is the dependent variable, our estimating 
relation is presented as follows for the case of leverage: 
LEV = ƒ (Female directors + MFI controls + Country control + Errors).                (5.3) 
In the second step, the predicted likelihood is used in a random effect model as an instrument for 
female director. The two-step method has an advantage whereby female director is regressed on 
variables that are possibly a proxy for the match with female directors. This involves gender bias 
and social mission variables, such as the percentage of female managers, percentage of female 
borrowers and loan balance, but also institutional variables, such as the MFIs legal status. The 
  
90 
 
generated instrument, that is, the given probability of female director, is likely to be highly 
correlated with the female director, but not with any measure of capital structure. According to 
Wooldridge (2010), the generating regression in Equation (5.2) does not need to be correctly 
specified in order to generate a useful instrument.  
Thus far, the study has not considered any potential self-selection bias that may arise from the fact 
that MFIs self-select female directors. One cannot rule out the possibility, however, that socially 
responsible MFIs may tend to appoint more female directors or attract more female directors. In 
such case, the two-step method can be easily used to device an Inverse Mills ratio to test for sample 
selection bias. Following the general test for sample selection proposed by Wooldridge (2010. pp. 
937-945). Specifically, we compute the inverse Mills ratio, denoted by Lambda, from the first-step 
probit estimate of Equation (5.2) as before, and then include the Lambda in the second-step 
regressions. If the Lambda is significant, then there is a case for sample selection bias.  
The study includes a number of controls variables in our capital structure regressions in order to 
reduce MFI specific heterogeneity problem as much as possible. In the first instance, the regression 
estimate was run with MFI clustered standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation. Using this method alone controls for most of the MFI level heterogeneity 
according to Petersen, (2009). Additionally, the MFI level and country level variables included in 
the regression control for country heterogeneity among MFIs. Lastly, our regression includes time 
indicator variables and main world regions indicator variables in order to control for market wide 
impacts in our capital structure regression. By implementing methods such as panel data, 
instruments and a wide range of control variables. The estimate should at least show a reliable 
correlation, with causality only reported in our capital structure regression, after taking account of 
the endogeneity of female directors.   
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Robustness checks using various estimation methods is conducted.  The study uses a different IV 
method for the capital structure estimation, where the instruments are variables that are 
significantly to related to female directors in Equation (5.2). Adams and Ferreira (2009), Carter et 
al (2010), Liu et al (2014), and Strom et al (2014) also show that the firm outcomes may be 
sensitive to the definition of female director. We perform regression with different definitions. In 
particular, we examine the Konrad et al (2008) critical mass theory with an indicator variable being 
one if the number of female directors is equal or larger than three. Other important female director 
measures put to the test are the fraction of female directors and the absolute number of female 
directors. Social performance variables are included in the Heckman model to account for its 
impact on MFIs capital structure. Furthermore, lagged financial and social performance variables 
were added on the right hand side variables and the Heckman model was rerun.   
5.7.2. The impact of firm-specific and institutional-specific factors on MFIs capital structure 
5.7.2.1. The impact of firm-specific factors 
To answer the third resarch question which seeks to analyse the impact of firm-level determinants 
on MFIs capital structure, by testing the conventional theoretical framewok on capital structure 
choice of firms. The study run an ordinary least-squares regressions with the two different capital 
structure variables of MFIs (leverage and subsidies) as dependent variables and firm-specific 
factors as explanatory variables for each of the 56 countries (leverage) and 54 countries (subsidies) 
in the sample as follows. Take leverage for example. 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡=  𝛽0𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽1𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑖𝑡 + + 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽6𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + Ɛ𝑖𝑡  (5.4) 
Where 𝑖̇ denotes an individual MFI and 𝑡 denotes time. It is important to note that observed 
countries in slightly lower when the dependent variable is subsidies. This is due to the fact MFIs 
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in some countries have not benefited from subsidized funding over the sample period. Next, the 
study conduct a few statistical test. First, it test whether the coefficients of Firm-specific 
determinants are equal across countries. The procedure includes six diffrent test to examine 
whether one or more of the six firm-specific coefficients, namely, tangibility, risk, profitability, 
liquidity, size and age have the same value for all countries in the sample. To test that each 
explanatory factor is same across countries, the study first conduct an unrestricted regression and 
then calculate the average coefficients across observations to find the mean value. The observed 
explanatory factor is further deducted from the average coefficient to examine how far it is from 
the mean value. Then  test whether it is significantly different from zero. If it is statistically and 
significantly different from zero, then the coefficients are not same across countries otherwise it 
is.  
Second, the study use a different approach to test whether the coefficients of all Firm-specific 
determinants are equal across all the 56 countries for both models. The study make use of the joint 
test of significance of regression coefficients proposed by Verbeek (2004, p.27), where a single 
ristricted regression model imposes that all the 6 Firm-specific coefficients are the same across all 
countries. This test can help in deciding whether it is appropriate to use a single model for MFIs 
in all countries. Where the research question is not rejected, it is asumed that Firm-specific 
coefiicients are same across countries. The foregoing test conducted on the equality of Firm-
specific coefficients are meant to provide additional evidence to either reject or accept the second 
approach. However, in the case of rejection, it helps identify which Firm-specific variables 
determines such a rejection. The statistics of joint test of significance of regression coeffcients is 
defined as follows; 
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𝑓 =
(𝑆𝑅 − 𝑆𝑈𝑅)/𝐽
𝑆𝑈𝑅/(𝑁 − 𝐾)
 
(5.5) 
Where 𝑆𝑅 is the sum squared residuals of the restricted model, and 𝑆𝑈𝑅 is the sum squared residuals 
of the unrestricted models. 𝑁 is the number of observations, 𝐽 is the number of regressors omitted 
in the restricted models (It shows the difference in degree of freedom df between restricted and 
unrestricted models). 𝐾 is the number of regressors remaining in the restricted  model including 
the intercept. Using the Seemingly Unreleted Regression (SUR) estimation method, the study 
obtains 𝑆𝑈𝑅 by adding all the SSR generated from the 56 and 54 equations of Firm-specific 
determinants of leverage and subsidies respectively as in Equation (5.4). Furthermore, the study 
obtain the 𝑆𝑅 using the SUR method as well. The SSR added to the system was derived from a 
single restricted equation that assumes Firm-specific coefficients are the same across countries. 
The value of the f-statistics determines whether to reject or accept the equality of Firm-specific 
coefficients across countries in both leverage and subsidies model  respectively.     
5.7.2.2. The impact of institutional-specific factors 
Turning to the fourth and fifth research question (i.e., do the institutional-specific determinants 
affects MFIs capital structure directly and indirectly).This study used a procedure similar to de 
Jong et al (2008) who estimate the direct and indirect impact of country specific factors on firms 
financing choices. MFI capital structure variables can be described as leverage and subsidies.  In 
the first step, we run a pooled OLS regression for all MFIs in all countries, for each fiscal year, 
considering cross-country diffreneces through country dummies. The equation can be described as 
follows, for example leverage.  
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𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡=∑𝑡=1
11 ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑡56𝑗=1 𝑑𝑗𝑡+∑𝑡=1
11 ∑ 𝛽₁56𝑗=1 𝑑𝑗𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑡+∑𝑡=1
11 ∑ 𝛽₂ 56𝑗=1 𝑑𝑗𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑡+
∑𝑡=1
11 ∑ 𝛽₃56𝑗=1 𝑑𝑗𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡+∑𝑡=1
11 ∑ 𝛽₄56𝑗=1 𝑑𝑗𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡+∑𝑡=1
11 ∑ 𝛽₅56𝑗=1 𝑑𝑗𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡+
∑𝑡=1
11 ∑ 𝛽₆56𝑗=1 𝑑𝑗𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡+ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡                                  (5.6) 
Where 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡 is one of the capital strucure variable of MFIs.  𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡, 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 are Firm-specific variables of MFI 𝑖̇ in country  𝑗̇ and time t: 𝑑𝑗 
represents the country dummies. The equation yields results for each of the Firm-specific variables 
and cross country dummies. The country dummy coefficients represent the capital structure (which 
are the countries leverages and subsidies after correcting for the impact of Firm-specific factors). 
For example, The country dummy coefficients of leverage is the overall measure of indebtedness 
of MFIs in a particular country for a particular year . In other words, it measures the level of 
intensity of capital strcture undertakings in a particular country.   
The analyses the impact of intitutional-specific variables on MFI capital structure using the 
Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regressions. Weighted Least Squares can often be used to 
maximize the efficiency of parameter estimation. This is done by attempting to give each data 
point its proper amount of influence over the parameter estimates (Wooldridge, 2010). As Gujarati 
(2003) argued that any procedure that estimate data equally would probably give less precise 
measured points more influence than they should have and would give highly precise points too 
little influence. Compared to other least squares method, weighted least squares is an effcient 
method that makes use of small data sets (Wooldridge, 2010). Therefore, weighted Least squares 
is an estimator used to adjust for a known form of heteroskedasticity, where each squared residual 
is weighted by the inverse of the (estimated) variance of the error (Wooldridge, 2010) 
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In the second stage, the study first examine the direct impact of institutional factors in explaining 
the values of country dummy coefficients 𝛼𝑗𝑡 generated in Equation (5.6). The value of the country 
dummy coefficients represents the countries capital structure variables (in this case leverage) after 
correcting for the impact of Firm-specific factors.  We apply the Weighted Least Squares 
regression where the weight used is the inverse standard errors of the corresponding countries 
dummies. The weight is inversely proportional to the variance of the observation. These weights 
ensures that MFIs in each country are given the proper amount of influence over the parameter of 
estimates. The regression specification in the case of leverage is writen as follows: 
𝛼𝑗𝑡= 𝛾0+ 𝛾1𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑗𝑡 +𝛾2𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑗𝑡+ 𝛾3𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑗𝑡+ 𝛾4𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑗𝑡+ 𝛾5𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑗𝑡+ 
𝛾1𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑈𝐿𝑗𝑡+ 𝛾1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡+ 𝑤𝑗𝑡                            (5.7) 
Where the dependent variable is the estimated values of country dummy coefficients (𝛼𝑗𝑡) in the 
Equation (5.6).  𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑗𝑡, 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑗𝑡 , 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑗𝑡 , 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑗𝑡, 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑗𝑡, 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑗𝑡, 
𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑈𝐿𝑗𝑡, and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 are institutional-specific variables defined in Table 3.5. Unlike de Jong et al., 
(2008) etimation that used single capital structure for each country, the estimation in Equation 
(5.7) was able to capture a single capital structure (leverage and subsidies) for each year in each 
country, allowing for the fact that Firm-specific coefficients are different across countries. The 
study test various reduced forms of this equation.    
Similarly, in the spirit of de Jong et al (2008) the study analyse the indirect impact of intitutional 
specific variables on MFI capital structure using the Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regressions. 
Due to data limitations, the study use a single capital structure for each country as observation4. 
                                                          
4 For example, Countries like Nigeria and Jordan have 6 and 1 data point in a particular year. Therefore, applying the method in Equation (3.3) to 
the indirect impact would render us with fewer observations that make it impossible to run a regression. 
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We determine the indirect impact of institutional factors by estimating its effect on Firm-specific 
variables. This procedure is straight forward and simple, we first estimate the regression 
coefficients of all our Firm-specific variables as in Equation (5.4) for each country in our sample. 
The values of the generated coefficients of Firm-specific variables is then regressed against our 
institutional variables using the weighted least square regression discussed above. The weight used 
in Equation (5.8) is the inverse standard errors of the corresponding Firm-specific coefficients. 
Typically, the observation represent averages and the weight are the number of elements that gave 
rise to the average.The equation can be described as follows;        
𝛽𝑘𝑗= 𝜆0+ 𝜆1𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑗 +𝜆2𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑗+ 𝜆3𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑗+ 𝜆4𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑗+𝜆1𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑗 + 𝜆1𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑗 + 
𝜆1𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑈𝐿𝑗 + 𝜆1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗+ ℯ𝑘                                             (5.8) 
Where k  denotes the estimated betas  (𝛽𝑘𝑗, j= 1, 2, ..., 6) in Equation (5.4). 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑗, 
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑗, 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑗 , 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑗, 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑗, 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑗, 𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑈𝐿𝑗 and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗  are institutional
5 
characteristics defined in Table 3. Various reduced form of this equation is tested as well. This 
analysis is the second stage of a two-stage procedure.  
To test the reliability of our results, the study use annual average data from the inception. In the 
first instance, we take the average of all the Firm-specific data for each particular country. This 
leaves us with an average single observation for each country. However, due to data limitations, 
some countries were dropped after implementing this approach. For example, Jordan has one MFI 
with eleven firm year observations. After taking an average of these observations, we are left with 
one observation for Jordan which is not enough to run the first stage of the regression on Jordan. 
                                                          
5 The analysis of both the direct and indirect impact of institutional variables is second stage of a two-stage procedure. 
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Therefore, countries with insufficient data were eliminated, leaving the study with 30 countries 
from the original 56 countries as presented in Figure 5.1 below.  
 
Figure 5.1. Differences in the composition of sample based on full data and annual average data. 
  
Figure 5.1 shows the differences in spread of MFIs across regions. In the full data, MFIs are spread 
across all the six regions, with the highest concentration in Latin America and the lowest in East 
Asia. However, in the annual average data, Latin America is still the region with the highest 
concentration of MFIs, folllowed by Eastern Europe. Middle East is having zero observation while 
Africa has the lowest concentration of MFIs.  
In the first stage, the study run a pooled OLS regression as in Equation (5.6) conisdering cross-
country differences through country dummies. The values of the dummy coefficients 𝛼𝑗 generated 
in the first step is run against the institutional specific factors in Equation (5.7). The equation can 
be described as follows, for instance leverage. 
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𝛼𝑗= 𝛾0+ 𝛾1𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑗 +𝛾2𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑗+ 𝛾3𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑗+ 𝛾4𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑗+ 𝛾5𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑗+ 𝛾1𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑗 + 
𝛾1𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑈𝐿𝑗+ 𝛾1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗+ 𝑤𝑗                            (5.9) 
Where the dependent variable is the estimated values of country dummy coefficients for each 
country (𝛼𝑗).  𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑗, 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑗 , 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑗 , 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑗, 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑗, 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑗, 𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑈𝐿𝑗, and 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗  are institutional-specific variables defined in Table 3.5. Using the annual average data in the 
first stage, the estimation in Equation (5.9) was able to capture a single capital structure (leverage 
and subsidies) for each country, allowing for the fact that Firm-specific coefficients are different 
across countries. Note that, the study runs the first and second stage regression using average 
country values for the sample period. The study test various reduced forms of this equation.  
5.7.3. Empirical relationship between deposits and borrowings  
Turning to the sixth research question (i.e., what is the empirical relationship between deposits and 
borrowings? Are they substitutes or complement? The link between borrowing and deposits is 
examined using the dynamic panel data method. Generally, Equation (5.10) is modified so that 
borrowing measure becomes explanatory variable in the deposit equation and vice-versa. Gujarati 
(2003) argues that, in many economic situations, it is not uncommon for the dependent and 
independent variables to be determined simultaneously, rendering a one-way or unidirectional 
cause-and-effect relationship less meaningful. Moreover, Baltagi (2005) suggests that many 
economic relationships are dynamic in nature in which the dynamic relationships are characterised 
by the presence of a lagged dependent variable among the regressors. By examining deposits and 
borrowing simultaneously, the behaviour of the determinants in influencing the decisions can be 
better ascertained and also the extent to which borrowing and deposits are substitutes or 
complement are investigated in this present study.  
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Principally, the dynamic panel data method involves the two-step generalised method of moments 
(GMM) technique developed in Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). This 
technique has been used by Yan (2006) in examining lease-debt substitutability issue in the US. 
Arguably, the technique is advantageous in terms of simultaneously controlling for endogeneity 
problems and firms fixed effects. Following Dzolkarnaini (2009), the present study uses the 
dynamic panel method to apply the GMM technique. Examining GMM using panel data method 
is advantageous since it “allows the researcher to better understand the dynamics of adjustment” 
(Baltagi, 2005, p. 135). More formally, the following dynamic panel models are estimated: 
𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡=  𝛼0+ 𝛼1𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑡,𝑘  + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  (5.11) 
𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡=  𝛼0+ 𝛼1𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑡,𝑘  + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  (5.12) 
Where 𝑖̇ denotes an individual MFI and 𝑡 denotes time. 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 denotes deposits ratio and 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 
represents one-period lag of deposit ratio. 𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡 represent borrowing, 𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 one period lag 
of borrowing ratio.  𝑣𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑡,𝑘 is the vector of all explanatory variables affecting capital structure 
decisions, 𝜶𝟎 constant term and 𝒖𝒊𝒕 disturbance term. The disturbance term is specified as a two-
way error component model as follows: 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = µ𝑖 + 𝜏𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡       (5.13) 
Where µ𝑖 denotes MFIs fixed effects, 𝜏𝑖 represent year fixed effects and 𝛾𝑖𝑡 remainder 
disturbances. In the GMM estimator, the MFI fixed effects µ𝑖 are removed from Equations (5.11) 
and (5.12) by means of a differencing transformation, producing equations that can be estimated 
using instrumental variables. Interesting, STATA 13.1 command “xtabond” automatically does 
the lagging of dependent variable, first-difference transformation of the original equation and 
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chooses the appropriate instrumental variables in the estimation. Thus, the manual tasks of first-
difference transformation and instrumental variables selection as in Yan (2006) can be avoided. 
The Sargan test is used to test the joint null hypothesis that the model is correctly specified and 
that the instruments used in the estimation are valid. The consistency of the GMM estimator is 
indicated by a serially uncorrelated disturbance term. If the disturbance is serially uncorrelated, 
there should be evidence of negative and significant first-order serial corrrelaion in the differenced 
residual, but no evidence of second-order serial correlation. 
The asessment of deposit-borrowing substitutability is indicated by the sign of  𝛼2 in Equations 
(5.11) and (5.12). The assumption that borrowing and deposits are complements is rejected if 𝛼2 
negative. Following Yan (2006) and Dzolkarnaini (2009), the variation in the 
substitutability/complemetarity between deposits and borrowing under different institutional 
environment is also investigated (i.e., seventh research question). In so doing, three institutional 
characteristics are examined, namely credit right index, credit information index and financial 
sector development. These institutional characteristics are selected to determine the extent to 
which the substitutability/complementarity relationship between borrowing and depsosits is 
sensitive against the degree of information asymmetry. To investigate the relationship, the two-
step GMM technique is used to estimate the following dynamic panel model: 
𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡=  𝛼0+ 𝛼1𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡* 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑡,𝑘 + µ𝑖 + 𝜏𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡  (5.14) 
Where 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of deposits, 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 represents one-period lag of the deposits ratio, 
𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡 denotes the borrowings ratio. 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 is the institutional characteristics for the interaction 
(credit right index, credit information index and financial sector developement). 𝑣𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑡,𝑘 is the 
  
101 
 
vector of all explanatory variables affecting MFIs capital structure decisions. 𝛼0 constant term, µ𝑖 
denotes MFIs fixed effects, 𝜏𝑖 represent year fixed effects and 𝛾𝑖𝑡 remainder disturbances. 
Notice that the sensitivity is examined based on the coefficients of the interactive variable 
𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡* 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡. Contrary to Yan (2006), the institutional variables for the interaction are 
measured in the original form rather than using dummy variable approach.6 The use of dummy 
variable is being criticised for reduced information content of the variable. Similarly, the firms 
fixed effects µ𝒊, are removed from Equation (5.14) by means of a differencing tranformation, 
producing an equation that can be estimated using instrumental variables. The Sargan test and the 
second-order serial correlation are also checked to ensure that the model is correctly specified, the 
instrument used in the estimation are valid and the GMM estimator is consisent.  
5.8. Variable definitions and measurements  
The selection of variables for this study is mainly based on the theoretical propositions of capital 
structure theories and the findings of many prior empirical studies. Although a model that could 
best explain the majority of the observed capital structure variation is desirable (indicated by a 
higher value of adjusted R2). Extra precaution was taken in the model specification, such that the 
practice of adding more explanatory variables to increase the adjusted R2 value (Dougherty, 2002, 
p. 146) was avoided. Therefore, the practice of randomly selecting variables that could boost the 
adjusted R2 of a model is considered as an inefficient modelling strategy.  
On this note, the study specifically focuses on the determinants of microfinance institutions capital 
structure within the established theories of capital structure. Hence, the selected explanatory 
                                                          
6 For each firm characteristics, Yan (2006) separately construct dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the particular firm characteristics is above 
average and 0 if otherwise.   
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variables are those that seem plausible on a priori grounds and could explain the capital structure 
of MFIs. Given the fact that many prior studies have used various measures and proxies in defining 
the variables, for example, the capital structure literature usually measures financing choice 
variables either by their book value or by market value. However, in the case of MFIs that are 
typically small and non-listed, getting their market based capital structure value seems very 
impossible. Therefore, accounting indicators is the only proper measure that can be used to 
evaluate the capital structure and other firm level variables of MFIs. This study outlines each 
variable measure and the rationale for selecting it. 
5.8.1. Dependent variables   
Following Tchuigoua, (2014) and Bogan (2012), the value of borrowed funds (short or long-term) 
and equity funds (stockholder or donated equity) are employed as the primary measure of capital 
structure in their analysis. We use four main measures of capital structure which are readily 
available or computed from the information provided by the MIX database. The first measure is 
leverage. Following Tchuigoua (2014), we measure leverage as the ratio of total liabilities divided 
by total asset (LEV). It therefore, includes both debt and non-debt liabilities such as deposits. The 
argument for using leverage rather than debt, is that, leverage unlike debt is well defined (Welch, 
2007).  When referring to theory for an interpretation of the basic capital structure regression, the 
corporate finance literature typically does not explicitly distinguish between debt and non-debt 
liabilities. Moreover, since leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, the dependent 
variable can be directly linked to the regulatory view of banks’ capital structure (Gropp and Heider, 
2010). But a financial firms capital structure is different from non-financial firms’ capital structure 
since it includes deposits. We therefore decompose MFIs leverage into deposits and non-deposit 
liabilities. 
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Given that, the MIX market database decomposes liabilities into deposits for deposit taking MFIs 
and borrowings otherwise known as non-deposit liabilities.  It is however difficult to determine 
the exact amount of debt contracted by various MFIs. This information is not yet available in the 
MIX market database. Consistent with Bogan (2012) and Tchuigoua (2014), we decompose the 
leverage measure into two, which is, Borrowings (non-deposit liabilities) divided by total assets 
(BORR) and deposits divided by total assets (DEP), in order to estimate the effect of the 
determinants on each of the components.  
The second measure is the equity capital. Following Bogan (2012) we normalize total equity share 
with the book value of total assets (EQUI). The third measure of capital structure used in this study 
is donated equity divided by total assets (SUBS). Donated is a contributory or subsidized equity 
capital received by MFIs in the form of cash donations and grants. Previous literatures have either 
measured donated equity as a ratio of total equity (Hudon, 2010; Hudon and Traca, 2011), or 
donated equity as a ratio of total assets (Bogan, 2012; Tchuigoua, 2014). In this study, we follow 
the later approach of (Bogan, 2012; Tchuigoua, 2014) to normalize donated equity with the book 
value of assets. However, it is important to note that the measure of donated equity alone seems to 
underestimate the scale of subsidies accruing to MFIs, given that donations received by MFIs for 
operating and non-operating expenses are not included to microfinance donated equity (Hudon 
and Traca, 2011). 
5.8.2. Explanatory variables  
5.8.2.1. Firm-specific variables 
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5.8.2.1.1. Female directors (D_Female directors) 
The key variable of interest in this study is the female directors on boards. Many previous studies 
have used percentage of female directors on board as a measure of board gender diversity (Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). Other studies employ number of female directors 
or a dummy variable to weigh the influence of women directors based on the critical mass idea 
(Konrad et al, 2008; Simpson et al, 2010; Strom et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2014). We follow Strom et 
al., (2014) four different definitions to measure female director’s influence on corporate board. A 
dummy variable for the presence of one or more female directors, a percentage of female directors 
of all directors, number of female directors and a dummy to measure three or more female directors 
on a corporate board. 
5.8.2.1.2. Board size (Board size) 
The second explanatory variable is the board size, which is measured in log specification in most 
studies (Yermack, 1996; Wen et al., 2002; Mersland and Strom, 2009; Liu et al., 2014;). We follow 
Wen et al (2002) and Liu et al., (2014) board size measurement criteria that is, the natural logarithm 
of the number of board of directors in our regression. 
5.8.2.1.3. Financial performance (ROA) 
Following recent literatures on MFIs performances, (Hermes at al., 2011; Quayes, 2012; Bogan, 
2012; Strom et al., 2014). We group our performance variables into two categories, namely, 
financial performance and social performance. This study used return on assets (ROA) as the 
financial performance variables. Return on assets is measured by adjusted net operating income 
divided by adjusted average total assets. It is assumed that firms with high return on assets will 
prefer internal sources of funding. Thus, return on asset is added to the model in order to extract 
any of these potential effects. 
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5.8.2.1.4. Social performance (Female borrowers and Loan balance/GNI) 
The second category is the social performance group. As far as MFIs are concerned, the standard 
way of focusing on their social performance is through the measures of outreach in various forms 
(Gutierrez-Nieto et al., 2009). Following the Mix Market standard definition, social performance 
is measured as the average loan size divided by GNI per capita that measures the depth of outreach. 
While number of active women borrowers divided by the adjusted number of active borrowers 
measures the breadth of outreach. This is wholly or partially consistent with many prior studies 
(Louis et al., 2013; Hermes at al., 2011; Gutierrez-Nieto et al., 2009; Cull et al., 2009). 
5.8.2.1.5. Tangibility (TANG)  
Following Tchuigoua (2014), tangibility is defined as the ratio of net fixed assets divided by MFIs 
total assets. Prior studies have found that asset specificity of firms determines the best type of 
capital structure choice firms employ (Williamson, 1987). This variable measures the MFIs 
collateral level.  Alves and Ferreira (2011), and Campello and Giambona (2013) empirically 
observe a strong positive relationship between firm’s tangibility and capital structure. This is due 
to firm’s larger asset base, which makes them to have more capacity to issue debt since assets 
could be used as collateral. However, firm’s that either are unable to provide collateral will have 
to pay higher interest rate or will be forced to issue equity capital (Scott, 1977). Therefore, 
tangibility as firm-specific variable is measured as a ratio of net fixed assets divided by MFIs total 
assets. 
5.8.2.1.6. Risk (RISK) 
Risk is defined as the outstanding balance of portfolio on arrears over 30 days plus total gross 
outstanding renegotiated portfolio divided by adjusted gross loan portfolio. This information is 
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provided in the MIX database and is consistent with prior studies on MFIs (Ahlin et al., 2011; 
Tchuigoua, 2014).  
5.8.2.1.7. Profitability (PROF)  
Profitability is defined as the net operating income divided by total assets. It measures MFIs 
capacity to use its assets to generate returns. Unlike the general capital structure literature that 
measures profitability using ROA (Booth et al., 2001; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002; 
Gianetti, 2003). This study follow the measure of profitability proposed in the literature of 
microfinance, for example, Tchuigoua (2014).  
5.8.2.1.8. Liquidity (LIQUI)  
Liquidity is the total cash and cash equivalent divided by total assets. Unlike previous capital 
structure literature (de Jong et al., 2008; Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin, 2011), that define liquidity 
as total current asset as a proportion of total current liabilities. Our definition is consistent with 
prior microfinance literature (Tchuigoua, 2014).  
5.8.2.1.9. MFI-size (SIZE)  
The natural logarithm of MFIs total assets is used as a proxy for size, given that it is the easiest 
way to control for outlier’s bias. Size has been identified by the corporate finance literature as an 
important determinant of capital structure decisions (Frank and Goyal, 2009). Du and Dai (2005) 
find a positive relationship between firm size and leverage. Larger firms tend to have less 
possibility of default risk, easier access to the capital market, and stronger negotiating power. This 
is applicable in the microfinance settings, where larger MFI tend to have the advantage of 
economies of scale compared to smaller MFIs.  
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5.8.2.1.10. MFI-age (AGE) 
This study classifies MFIs into three age categories (new, young and mature) based on the maturity 
of their microfinance operations given by the Mix Market database. It is calculated as the 
difference between the year they started their microfinance operations and the year of data 
submitted by the institutions. 
5.8.2.2. Institutional-specific variables  
In the analysis of international capital structure of MFIs, this study employs different types of 
institutional-specific variables to test their impact on MFIs capital structure. The study makes use 
a number of variables characterizing legal, financial sector development and macro-economic of 
countries. All the institutional-specific variables are averaged over the study period. The selections 
of the institutional-specific variables were based on the previous microfinance literatures and are 
defined as follows. 
5.8.2.2.1. Creditors rights index (CREDRIGHT)  
The strenght of creditor’s rights index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy 
laws protect borrower and lender rights and thus faclitate lending. Unlike previous studies by (Qian 
and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009), which used the five-point-scale built by La Porta (1997) 
and further extended by Djankov et al (2007). This study follow Ahlin et al (2011) and Tchugoua 
(2014) which used the new version of the index that ranges from 0 to 10 as provided by the Doing 
Business database. The choice of creditors right provided by Doing Businness is justified by the 
fact that the La Porta et al (1997) and Djankov et al. (2007) score is available only from 1978 to 
2003 and is, therefore, unavailable for the period covered in this study (2004–2014). 
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5.8.2.2.2. Creditors information index (CREDINFO) 
The credit information index measures rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and 
accessibility of credit information available through either a credit bureau or a credit registry. A 
good credit registry may aid MFIs to access a qualitative credit information in the market. This 
study follows Ahlin et al (2011) and use the new version of this index that ranges from 0 to 8, with 
higher values indicating the availability of more credit information, from either a credit bureau or 
a credit registry, to facilitate financing decisions. This information is provided by the Doing 
Business database. 
5.8.2.2.3. Financial sector development (FINDEV)  
Given that domestic credit market seems to be a funding source for MFIs, the level of development 
in country’s financial sector may facilitate access to funding sources. Following recent studies on 
microfinance (Vanroose and D'Espallier, 2013; Tchuigoua, 2014), this study uses domestic credit 
provided by the private sector percentage of GDP to measure the financial sector development, 
that is taken from World Development Indicators provided by the World Bank. 
5.8.2.2.4. Legal origin (LEGAL)  
Consistent with prior studies in microfinance (Tchuigoua, 2014), this study measures country legal 
tradition by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country legal origin is common-law 
system and 0 otherwise. This variable is gotten from La Porta et al. (1997) and Djankov et al. 
(2007). 
5.8.2.2.5. Corruption (CORRUP) 
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including 
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private 
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interests. In the case of microfinance, corruption may affects their operations and create barriers 
to their expansion. Unlike previous studies by Alves and Ferreira (2011) and Fan et al. (2012) 
which used transparency international corruption index, this study follows Ahlin et al (2011) and 
Tchuigoua (2014) which used the Kauffman et al (2009) governance indicators index that ranges 
between -2.5 to 2.5. A positive number reflects an ideal institutional outcome, meaning to say less 
level of corruption and vice-versa. This information is provided by the World Governance 
Indicator provide by the World Bank database. 
5.8.2.2.6. Political stability (POLSTAT)  
Political stability and absence of violence measures the perception of the likelihood of political 
instability and/ or politically motivated violence, including terrorism. Instability contributes to the 
uncertainty of returns for external investors, hence investors may reduce the likelihood and cost of 
any subsequent exposures by reducing the amount investments in that particular country. MFIs 
operating in a stable country may attrack external financing that can be channeled to higher-growth 
endevours. This study follow Ahlin et al (2011) to measure political stability provided by the 
Kaufmann et al., (2009) governance indicators.   
5.8.2.2.7. Regulation (REG)  
Similar to other financial institutions, most deposit taking MFIs are subject to prudential 
regulations (REG). It is therefore important to account for MFIs regulatory activities, which is 
consistent with prior studies of MFIs financing policies (Bogan, 2012; Tchugoua, 2014). A dummy 
variable of 1 is created for countries with regulatory framework for MFIs in place and 0 otherwise.  
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5.8.2.2.8. Economic growth (GDP)  
The study finally controls for differences in growth opportunities across countries using economy-
wide growth rates in gross domestic product (GDP). Following recent studies on microfinance 
(Ahlin et al., 2011; Tchuigoua, 2014), this study focus on real per capita growth as arguably the 
most informative single indicator of economic progress. It can be considered as an approximate 
summary statistic for the various institutional, technological and factor accumulation related 
ingredients of development. 
5.8.2.2.9. Human development index (HDI) 
Aguilera and Jackson (2010) show that country specific tradition and institutions plays an 
important role in corporate finance studies. Cultural and economic differences are likely to be 
found between countries. The institutional variable that controls for gender inequality and other 
cultural differences in our regression is human development Index gotten from UN’s development 
programme. 
5.9. Summary 
This chapter presents details of the research design and focus of the present study. In particular, 
the chapter has outlined in details the models and empirical research technique employed in the 
analysis. The variables used were broadly defined and measured while the sample selection 
procedure was justified. Without these design, the present study could not be realised in its current 
form.   
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Chapter 6 - Results I: The effect of board gender diversity on MFI capital structure 
6.0. Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the investigation of the effect of female directors on MFIs 
capital structure. While the literature on microfinance female leadership is voluminous (Perilleux 
and Szafarz, 2015; Strom et al., 2014; Boehe and Cruz, 2013; Mersland and Strom, 2009; 
Hartarska, 2005), our understanding remains incomplete, particularly in respect of its effect on 
MFIs capital structure. Using a comprehensive capital structure measure, this chapter investigates 
the impact of female board representation on MFIs capital structure.  
An unbalance sample of MFIs over the period from 2010 through 2014 is used in the investigation. 
The final sample contains an unbalance panel of 584 MFIs or 2400 firm-year observations. The 
chapter proceeds as follows; Section 6.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the key variables, 
followed by a brief description of the univariate results in Section 6.2. The main results based on 
the multivariate analysis are discussed in Section 6.3. The robustness checks and regression 
diagnosis are described in Section 6.4. A brief discussion of key most recent papers presented in 
Section 6.5. Contributions which are new addition to literature are presented in Section 6.6. Section 
6.7 summarises the chapter.  
6.1. Descriptive statistics  
Variable description is presented in Table 6.1. Descriptive statistics for the key variables are also 
presented in Table 6.2. Panel A of Table 6.2 provides summary statistics of the overall sample. 
The mean value of the leverage is 0.68. Equity capital and Subsidies represents 31% and 6% of 
the total assets respectively. The average deposit ratio for the whole sample is 19%. Borrowings 
represent 44% of MFI assets. 30 percent of the board members are women. This is a very high 
percentage compared to other non-MFI sectors. This may reflect the high percentage of female 
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borrowers (65%). On average, the loan balance divided by gross national income is 47%. MFIs 
are on average profitable. The average value of returns on assets is 0.02. This is close to studies 
that use data provided by rating agencies. For example, Strom et al., (2014) report an average ROA 
(0.01). Majority of MFIs (67%) in our sample are subject to prudential regulations. The average 
portfolio at risk is 0.05, which is below the 0.1 cut-off (Bruett, 2005) and consistent with what 
other studies (Strom et al., 2014; Tchuigoua, 2014) have reported. This shows that the average 
loan portfolio in our sample is healthy. GDP per capita and inflation are 4% and 6% respectively 
over the period.  
Panel B provides descriptive statistics of MFIs distribution across the six main regions of the world 
and the average value of MFI level variables in each of these regions. We observe some fascinating 
differences across regions. Majority of MFIs in our sample come from Latin America (213 MFIs). 
The main source of funding for MFIs in Africa is deposits, whereas subsidies is slightly 
predominant in the Middle East and North Africa. Borrowing is less in Africa compared to other 
regions. This may not be unconnected to the fact that MFIs in these regions are less attractive to 
microfinance investments (CGAP, 2011). Equity is the main source of funding for MFIs in the 
Middle East and North Africa compared to the other regions. On average, Africa has less female 
board of directors in MFIs, whereas Middle East and North Africa has the highest board size.  
Panel C provides detailed mean values of capital structure and MFIs level variables by country. 
MFIs in Congo Republic and Samoa have the highest leverage ratio of 95% and 94% respectively. 
While Palestine and Chile have the lowest leverage of 18% and 22%. Contries with the highest 
female board representations are East Timor (71%) and Serbia (67%). Togo and Poland have the 
lowest female board representation of 5%.   
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Table 6.1. Variables definition  
Variable   Definition  
      
Capital structure     
Leverage (LEV)   Total liabilities/total assets 
Borrowings (BOR)  Borrowings (non-deposit liabilities)/total assets 
Deposits (DEP)   Deposits/total assets 
Equity capital 
(EQUI)  Equity capital/total assets 
Subsidies (SUBS)  Donated equity/total assets 
   Donated equity is the accumulated historical donations to the MFI 
Female director     
D_female director  Binary: 1 # female director is 1 or more 
% Female directors  Female directors as fraction of all directors 
# Female directors Number of female directors 
D_female director≥3 Binary: 1 if # female director is 3 or more 
 
Financial performance    
ROA   Return on assets  
 
Social performance     
% Female borrowers Number of active women borrowers/Adjusted Number of Active Borrowers 
Loan balance/GNI  Adjusted Average Loan Balance per Borrower/GNI per Capita 
 
MFI and country controls     
Board size  Number of directors 
Size   Natural logarithm of total assets 
Risk   
Outstanding balance of portfolio on arears over 30 days + Total Gross Outstanding 
Renegotiated portfolio / Adjusted Gross Loan Portfolio 
Age 
Regulation  
Number of years in operation 
Binary variable: 1 if the MFI is subject to prudential regulation, 0 otherwise 
GDP  Annual growth rate of the GDP per capita of a country 
HDI   Human development Index 
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Table 6.2 
Summary statistics       
Panel A: Overall sample description      
Variables  Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Obs 
Leverage  0.68 0.76 0.25 0.00 1.93 2268 
Borrowings 0.44 0.48 0.27 0.00 1.70 2340 
Deposits  0.19 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.95 2246 
Equity capital 0.31 0.24 0.23 -0.93 1.05 2359 
Subsidies 0.06 0.00 0.16 0.00 1.62 1687 
D_Female directors 0.79 1.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 1995 
% Female director 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.00 1.00 1993 
# Female directors 2.03 1.00 2.23 1.00 28.00 2095 
D_Female directors>3 0.28 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 2147 
Board Size 7.03 7.00 3.65 1.00 33.00 2103 
% Female Borrowers 0.65 0.61 0.26 0.00 1.00 2121 
Loan balance/GNI 0.47 0.26 0.54 0.00 2.99 2264 
ROA  0.02 0.02 0.08 -0.93 0.45 2260 
Size  16.42 16.31 1.92 9.11 22.18 2378 
Age  2.69 3.00 0.61 1.00 3.00 2383 
Risk  0.05 0.03 0.09 0.00 1.00 2153 
Regulations 0.67 1.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 2396 
GDP 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.07 0.16 2397 
HDI  0.64 0.65 0.09 0.32 0.84 2380 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 584 MFI’s during the periods 2010-2014, which were found from the MIxMarket database.  All 
variables are defined in Table 1 above.  
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Panel B: Capital structure and Firm Level data: mean by region    
Region Africa 
East 
Asia 
and the 
pacific 
Eastern 
Europe 
and 
central 
Asia 
Latin 
America and 
the 
Caribbean 
Middle east 
and north 
Africa South Asia Sample mean 
 
MFIs 50 49 106 213 11 154 - 
 
Leverage (LEV) 0.70 0.69 0.63 0.68 0.49 0.76 0.68 
 
Borrowings (BORR) 0.22 0.39 0.49 0.40 0.47 0.55 0.44 
 
Deposits (DEP) 0.43 0.26 0.11 0.20 0.00 0.16 0.19 
 
Equity (EQUI) 0.29 0.26 0.37 0.32 0.51 0.23 0.31 
 
Subsidies (SUBS) 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.26 0.05 0.06 
 
% Female directors 0.24 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.28 0.28 0.30 
 
Board Size 7.08 5.95 4.57 7.72 8.08 7.75 6.97 
 
% Female Borrowers 0.63 0.79 0.43 0.59 0.62 0.88 0.65 
 
Loan bal/GNI 0.72 0.50 0.71 0.48 0.21 0.23 0.47 
 
ROA 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.02 
 
Size 15.99 16.09 16.52 16.64 17.07 16.16 16.42 
 
Risk 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 
 
Regulations 0.84 0.74 0.94 0.43 0.54 0.79 0.67 
 
GDP 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.04 
 
HDI 0.49 0.62 0.71 0.69 0.68 0.57 0.64 
 
Panel C: Capital structure and Firm level data: mean by country   
   
Country  N LEV BORR DEP EQUI  SUBS % Female directors Board Size 
         
Afghanistan 5 0.72 0.51 0.20 0.31 0.33 0.32 5.10 
Albania 2 0.66 0.61 0.00 0.34 0.01 0.23 4.29 
Argentina 9 0.63 0.55 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.29 5.20 
Armenia 8 0.65 0.56 0.04 0.35 0.03 0.17 4.07 
Azerbaijan 20 0.55 0.46 0.09 0.43 0.05 0.19 3.87 
Bangladesh 17 0.82 0.45 0.31 0.17 0.04 0.38 10.62 
Benin 7 0.80 0.34 0.46 0.19 0.02 0.34 6.39 
Bhutan 1 - 0.22 0.50 0.26 - 0.11 - 
Bolivia 18 0.79 0.49 0.22 0.21 0.04 0.29 6.66 
Bosnia and Herze         10 0.56 0.48 0.00 0.44 0.13 0.35 4.80 
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Panel C: Capital structure and Firm level data: mean by country   
   
Country  N LEV BORR DEP EQUI  SUBS % Female directors Board Size 
Brazil 11. 0.50 0.38 0.00 0.50 0.12 0.33 3.69 
Bulgaria 4 0.34 0.25 0.01 0.66 0.15 0.42 4.43 
Cambodia 17 0.61 0.53 0.13 0.27 0.01 0.17 6.21 
Cameroon 2 0.91 0.34 0.51 0.09 0.01 0.10 6.67 
Chile 2 0.22 0.19 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.12 6.00 
China 3 0.90 0.53 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.08 6.36 
Congo, Democratic 3 0.44 0.16 0.23 0.56 0.27 0.19 5.60 
Congo, Republic          1    0.95 0.00 0.83 0.05 0.06 0.20 15.00 
Colombia 19 0.65 0.40 0.15 0.33 0.02 0.35 9.32 
Costa Rica 11 0.64 0.60 0.00 0.35 0.08 0.35 5.41 
Dominican Republic 8 0.71 0.41 0.22 0.29 0.07 0.27 8.63 
East Timor 1 0.62 0.20 0.34 0.38 0.00 0.71 4.80 
Ecuador 42 0.80 0.27 0.50 0.20 0.03 0.37 9.79 
Egypt 3 0.33 0.30 0.00 0.67 0.28 0.08 10.42 
El Salvador 10 0.61 0.44 0.07 0.39 0.15 0.29 9.05 
Gambia, The 1 0.91 0.01 0.81 0.09 - 0.20 5.00 
Georgia 10 0.68 0.68 0.01 0.26 0.00 0.29 4.59 
Ghana 2 0.62 0.40 0.21 0.20 0.08 0.42 7.00 
Guatemala 16 0.46 0.37 0.01 0.54 0.03 0.31 6.12 
Haiti 3 0.62 0.40 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.23 4.71 
Honduras 18 0.57 0.41 0.11 0.42 0.05 0.37 7.81 
India 86 0.74 0.63 0.05 0.25 0.02 0.24 7.23 
Indonesia 11 0.67 0.38 0.26 0.30 0.07 0.33 3.32 
Jamaica 1 0.40 0.34 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 5.00 
Jordan 1 0.52 0.51 0.00 0.48 0.16 0.33 6.00 
Kazakhstan 6 0.56 0.48 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.48 4.13 
Kenya 7 0.86 0.33 0.46 0.15 0.09 0.33 8.38 
Kosovo 5 0.69 0.64 0.00 0.31 0.05 0.15 4.83 
Kyrgyzstan 8 0.73 0.59 0.10 0.27 0.02 0.48 4.66 
Laos 5 0.55 0.03 0.48 0.42 0.15 0.38 9.22 
Lebanon 1 0.44 0.38 0.00 0.56 0.30 0.17 6.00 
Macedonia 2 0.72 0.30 0.40 0.28 0.00 0.18 6.57 
Madagascar 2 0.54 0.16 0.29 0.46 0.13 0.06 9.25 
Mexico 4 0.60 0.38 0.12 0.41 0.00 0.07 12.00 
Moldova 1 0.71 0.70 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 7.00 
Mongolia 4 0.76 0.39 0.34 0.24 0.03 0.23 6.47 
Montenegro 1 0.54 0.52 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.33 3.00 
Morocco 3 0.76 0.67 0.00 0.24 0.20 0.26 7.00 
Mozambique 2 0.55 0.08 0.38 0.45 0.03 0.07 5.67 
Nepal 21 0.89 0.39 0.46 0.11 0.00 0.29 8.62 
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Panel C: Capital structure and Firm level data: mean by country   
   
Country  N LEV BORR DEP EQUI  SUBS % Female directors Board Size 
Nicaragua 18 0.71 0.55 0.04 0.29 0.08 0.34 6.94 
Nigeria 11 0.71 0.07 0.54 0.29 0.00 0.21 6.14 
Pakistan 16 0.71 0.43 0.22 0.29 0.11 0.34 8.40 
Palestine 2 0.18 0.28 0.00 0.82 0.56 0.54 9.40 
Panama 4 0.57 0.35 0.13 0.43 0.10 0.25 7.20 
Papua New Guinea 1 0.90 0.00 0.88 0.10 0.00 0.15 4.75 
Paraguay 6 0.83 0.27 0.52 0.17 0.00 0.21 7.84 
Peru 13 0.72 0.38 0.34 0.28 0.04 0.31 7.02 
Philippines 7 0.93 0.35 0.40 0.10 0.01 0.46 7.62 
Poland 1 0.89 0.00 0.85 0.11 0.00 0.05 4.80 
Romania 2 0.85 0.75 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.38 5.57 
Russia 5 0.55 0.26 0.25 0.48 0.13 0.29 4.08 
Rwanda 2 0.63 0.30 0.21 0.39 0.24 0.41 8.00 
Samoa 1 0.94 0.75 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.00 3.25 
Senegal 2 0.68 0.36 0.54 0.22 0.08 0.19 9.43 
Serbia 2 0.46 0.16 0.29 0.54 0.33 0.67 1.20 
South Africa 2 0.49 0.21 0.20 0.59 0.00 0.22 10.00 
Sri Lanka 8 0.65 0.37 0.13 0.35 0.23 0.30 5.91 
Tajikistan 11 0.73 0.54 0.15 0.27 0.02 0.38 4.91 
Tanzania 2 0.82 0.16 0.57 0.22 0.00 0.26 7.00 
Togo 2 0.72 0.02 0.68 0.28 0.08 0.05 6.71 
Tonga 1 0.78 0.62 0.11 0.22 . 0.50 2.00 
Tunisia 1 0.76 0.72 0.00 0.24 0.04 0.32 6.60 
Turkey 1 0.36 0.16 0.13 0.64 0.27 0.36 5.50 
Uganda 1 0.70 0.53 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.00 3.00 
Ukraine 1 0.46 0.54 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.00 3.00 
Uzbekistan 2 0.77 0.21 0.52 0.22 0.00 0.12 7.17 
Vietnam 2 0.34 0.11 0.25 0.55 0.11 0.47 4.38 
Zambia 2 0.40 0.23 0.01 0.60 0.00 0.26 5.67 
Sample Mean  0.68 0.44 0.19 0.31 0.06 0.30 6.97 
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6.2. Univariate results 
In running a multivariate regression analysis, there is always the danger of multicollinearity in 
such settings. In regression, “multicollinearity” refers to explanatory variables that are correlated 
with other explanatory variables. It occurs when there is a perfect linear relationship between two 
or more explanatory variables. In other words, multicollinearity arises when a model has factors 
that are a bit redundant. It overinflates the standard error of coefficients, which results in making 
some explanatory variables statistically insignificant when they should naturally be significant 
(Wooldridge, 2010). One way to measure multicollinearity is the Pearson correlation matrix. We 
run a correlation analysis among all our explanatory variables. As a rule of thumb, Kennedy (2008) 
puts a correlation value of 0.8 or higher as an absolute value, that shows a clear case of 
multicollinearity issue. None of our variables reported in (Table 6.3) reaches this level. The highest 
level is found between Board size and ln (Size) (0.25). Since the remaining correlations are 
relatively low, our explanatory variables are considered independent from each other on a 
satisfactory level.  
Another way to measure multicollinearity is the variance inflation factor (VIF). Variance inflation 
factor measures the degree of variance of an estimated regression coefficient. The coefficient rises 
if the models predictors are correlated (Wooldridge, 2010). The VIF will be 1 if no factors are 
correlated. A VIF above 5 indicates high correlation that may be problematic.  The evaluation of 
all our explanatory variables show a variance inflation factor (VIF) below 5.  The average is 1.28, 
whereas the minimum and maximum are 1.02 and 1.77 respectively. This result is in line with 
Tchuigoua, (2014) who find similar values. This indicates that our explanatory variables may be 
run independently. 
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Table 6.3 
Pearson correlation matrix between all explanatory variables       
            
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
            
D_female directors  1.00         
ROA   -0.07 1.00        
Board size  0.19 -0.03 1.00       
Size   -0.08 0.11 0.25 1.00      
Age   0.14 0.14 0.21 0.25 1.00     
Risk   0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.02 1.00    
Regulation  -0.08 -0.03 0.09 0.24 -0.10 0.00 1.00   
GDP  -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.05 -0.12 -0.07 0.12 1.00  
HDI   0.00 0.12 -0.15 0.09 0.14 0.01 -0.18 -0.02 1.00 
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6.2.1. MFIs with female directors: are they different? 
In Table 6.4, we compare the means of various MFIs characteristics across firm-years in which 
MFIs have at least one female director on the board and firm-years without female directors for 
our sample of complete data. The comparison shows that, in years in which MFIs have female 
directors on their boards, they have larger board size, have worst performance in terms of ROA 
and are smaller in terms of MFI size. MFIs that are more matured have one or more female 
directors on their boards. These comparisons suggest that MFIs choices to include female directors 
could be influenced by MFI characteristics. Hence, it is very important to control for these MFI 
characteristics in our analysis.  
 
Table 6.4        
Comparisons of MFIs with female directors and those without  
        
MFI characteristics  Mean for MFIs without female directors Mean for MFIs with female directors Difference 
        
ROA   0.03  0.02  0.011*** 
        
Board Size  1.67  1.88  -0.216*** 
        
Size   16.75  16.40  0.351*** 
        
Age   2.59  2.78  -0.19*** 
This table shows comparisons of means of MFI-level characteristics for years in which MFI’s have female directors and MFI-years 
without female directors, for the sample. *** indicates significance level at 1%.    
 
 
 
 
  
121 
 
Figure 6.1. Percentage of female directors on board.  
 
Figure 6.2. Percentage of MFIs with female directors 
 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate the trend of female director’s board representation from 2010 to 2014.  Figure 6.1 shows 
that the percentage of female directors on board gradually rises from an average of 28% in 2010 to 32% in 2014. 
Figure 6.2 exhibits the following trend over time. (1) The percentage of MFIs with one or more female directors 
increases from 70% in 2010 to 82% in 2014. (2) The percentage of MFIs with two or more female directors increases 
from 44% in 2010 to 52% in 2014. (3) The percentage of MFIs with three or more female directors does not change 
much, hovering around 29%, suggesting that reaching the critical mass on a board over a sample period is not easy.    
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6.3. Multivariate results  
The relationship between female board of directors and capital structure of MFIs is first examined 
by controlling for regional and year fixed effects. Pooled ordinary least square estimations is used 
for each capital structure variables (leverage, borrowing, deposits, equity and donated equity), and 
the results is presented in Table 6.5 panel A below. The OLS model controls for MFI level 
characteristics and country specifics variables. The results of the ordinary least square regression 
show that female director variable is positively and significantly related to leverage. After 
decomposing leverage into borrowing and deposit, a significant positive relationship between 
borrowing and female director was observed. Consistent with the findings of Alvez et al. (2015) 
that gender diversified boards of directors to be more efficient and to contribute to lower 
information asymmetries and increase the firms proportion of risky securities on its capital 
structure, in this case leverage and borrowings. We also find no association between female 
director variable and deposits.   
In the equity model, the coefficient on the female director is negative and statistically significant 
at the 1% level, confirming the arguments that female directors are likely to hold less risky assets. 
Contrary to our expectations, there is no significant relationship between female directors and 
subsidized. The coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with expectations. 
Profitability measured as ROA is negatively related to leverage and borrowing. This is consistent 
with pecking order hypothesis developed by Mayers and Majluf (1984), which states that firms 
tend to go for internal source of funding first followed by external source of funding. However, 
ROA show a consistent positive relationship with equity, suggesting that profitable MFIs tend to 
attract more equity investors. The chapter also finds negative relationship between ROA and 
subsidies. This makes sense because. Donor agencies in most cases fund non-profit oriented MFIs 
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such as NGO’s, hence the negative relationship between profitable MFIs and subsidised funding.  
Furthermore, a single increase in board size reduces MFIs borrowing by 8% while on the other 
hand increases deposits by 11%. This means MFIs with larger boards have less long-term liabilities 
and more short-term liabilities.  
The size of MFI is positively and significantly related to leverage, borrowing and deposits. The 
most reasonable arguments that explain such relationship is the bankruptcy cost hypothesis (Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995). In this case, large MFIs have low bankruptcy cost and in principle have more 
diversified portfolio and products with less probability of bankruptcy than smaller MFIs. There is 
a significant negative relationship between MFIs size and both equity and subsidised equity. This 
is expected as smaller MFIs are associated with information asymmetry problems and are the main 
target of donor agencies. One of the important country effects is regulation. The chapter finds a 
significant positive relationship between regulation and both leverage and deposits. Regulation in 
this sense helps to protect depositors and restrict MFIs from excessive borrowing. The chapter also 
observes a significant negative relationship with borrowing, equity and subsidies. This is expected 
because regulated MFIs tend to diversify their funding choices and thus reduce their dependence 
on subsidies and grants. The results of other country effects are neither surprising in view of other 
capital structure evidences.   
Table 6.5 panel B represent the random-effect regression with capital structure variables as 
dependent variables and the female director as independent variables and also include control 
variables and both regional and time dummies. The results show the overall statistics are 
satisfactory, with high Wald chi-square statistics throughout. Contrary to our expectations 
concerning the relationship between female director and capital structure, the results show that 
female director is only significant in deposit model. The remaining capital structure variables 
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(leverage, borrowing, equity, subsidies) are not significant, but their coefficients are in the same 
direction. 
A number of the control variables have interesting implications, and are generally in line with the 
OLS regression above. MFI size is highly significant in all regressions, attracting more leverage 
comprising of borrowing and deposit, and reducing equity and donated subsidized funding. Board 
size is likewise highly significant. Larger board attracts more deposits and less of borrowing and 
equity. Similarly, prudential regulations are highly significant in all five-capital structure variables. 
Regulations tend to have negative impact on borrowing, equity and subsidies, but have strong 
positive impact on deposits. These findings indicate that our control variables are highly relevant 
in this study.   
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The sample consists of 584 MFI’s during the 2010-2014 periods. The dependent variables are Leverage, Borrowings, Deposits, Equity and Donated Equity. All other variables are defined in Table 2.1. 
The table reports ordinary least squares (OLS) and random effect estimation of capital structure measures on female director variable and control variables. Standard errors are clustered at the country 
level in order to account for heteroscedasticity. All models include year dummy and regional dummy. Adjusted 𝑅2values are reported in the estimates. The Wald 𝐶ℎ𝑖2  for random effect estimation is 
reported as well. ***, **, * indicate the coefficient estimates are significantly from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
Table 6.5             
Capital structure measures and female directors       
  Panel A: ordinary least squares   Panel B: Random-effect estimation  
Variables  LEV BORR DEP EQUI SUBS  LEV BORR DEP EQUI SUBS 
             
D_female director 0.049*** 0.056*** -0.005 -0.048*** 0.005  0.013 0.004 0.010* -0.012 0.012 
  (3.84) (3.61) (-0.33) (-3.83) (0.61)  (1.07) (0.28) (1.71) (-0.99) (1.36) 
MFI controls 
  ROA  -0.423** -0.303** -0.031 0.422** -0.262**  -0.234 -0.198 0.201 0.226 -0.284 
  (-2.47) (-1.98) (-0.37) (2.49) (-2.48)  (-1.32) (-0.90) (0.68) (1.32) (-1.64) 
  Board size 0.013 -0.084*** 0.110*** -0.009 -0.005  0.032** -0.027** 0.022*** -0.024* -0.002 
  (1.05) (-5.85) (8.13) (-0.75) (-0.52)  (2.17) (-2.20) (3.56) (-1.85) (-0.21) 
  Size  0.035*** 0.009** 0.027*** -0.034*** -0.015***  0.031*** 0.011** 0.013*** -0.033*** -0.010*** 
  (11.03) (2.45) (7.91) (-11.35) (-6.92)  (4.94) (1.99) (4.13) (-5.09) (-3.76) 
  Age  0.004 -0.011 0.014 -0.002 -0.021*  0.007 -0.018 -0.009 -0.003 0.013 
  (0.21) (-0.62) (0.88) (-0.16) (-1.88)  (0.43) (-1.32) (-1.51) (-0.24) (0.72) 
  Risk  0.006 -0.015 -0.067 0.005 0.015  0.038 0.018 -0.022 -0.041 0.012 
  (0.08) (-0.19) (-1.38) (0.07) (0.54)  (0.88) (0.38) (-1.05) (-1.08) (0.56) 
Country controls 
  Regulation 0.071*** -0.150*** 0.247*** -0.080*** -0.036***  0.061*** -0.15*** 0.242*** -0.07*** -0.04*** 
  (5.39) (-9.78) (18.46) (-6.33) (-3.38)  (2.66) (-5.80) (10.50) (-3.00) (-2.70) 
  GDP 0.434** 0.086 0.194 -0.456** -0.352*  0.086 0.133 0.146** -0.069 -0.196 
  (2.01) (0.31) (0.79) (-2.15) (-1.67)  (0.68) (0.81) (2.18) (-0.58) (-0.78) 
  HDI  -0.050 -0.272** 0.275** 0.040 -0.035  -0.136 -0.145 -0.267* 0.145 -0.063 
  (-0.51) (-2.31) (2.31) (0.42) (-0.46)  (-0.90) (-0.82) (-1.91) (0.99) (-0.51) 
CONSTANT  -0.111 0.752*** -0.952*** 1.089*** 0.509***  0.031 0.551*** -0.055 0.980*** 0.436*** 
  (-1.15) (6.75) (-7.83) (11.69) (6.63)  (0.19) (3.27) (-0.34) (6.07) (4.02) 
Obs  1637 1662 1605 1679 1216  1637 1662 1605 1679 1216 
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.209 0.199 0.400 0.218 0.154  0.196 0.180 0.355 0.205 0.140 
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6.3.1. Matching female directors with MFI characteristics  
The chapter addresses the issue of endogeneity using the instrumental variable procedure as 
outlined in Chapter 5 above. In the first-step, the hypothesis that female director is an important 
element on MFIs social mission is tested. This involves factors such as MFI bias towards 
female managers and female borrowers, but also MFIs legal status and average loan size. The 
chapter uses a straightforward probit regression for dummy female director ≥1 and dummy 
female director ≥3, and OLS regression for the fraction of female director and number of 
female director.  
Table 6.6 shows that female directors are more likely in MFIs with gender bias towards female 
managers in all the four definitions of female directors. It is remarkable that MFIs with female 
borrowers are more likely to have female directors as well. Gender bias is significant in three 
out of four definitions of female directors. This is quite consistent with the matching trait 
hypothesis in Beckers (1973), where female directors are expected to match with female 
employees. This is in line with recent evidence provided by Flabbi et al (2014) that female 
directors could be better positioned to match workers to task and serve consumer markets that 
are dominated by women.  
MFIs legal status, that is, Bank, Cooperative, NGO, Other are significant as well except for 
Rural bank and NBFI. Female directors are more likely in older MFIs. However, female is less 
likely when MFIs are larger. Moreover, female borrowers, bank, cooperative, NGO and other 
are significant for at least two out of the four categories of female director definition. Therefore, 
the choice of social mission and legal status are important variables of understanding female 
membership in boards. The instrument we generate can therefore be used in our capital 
structure regressions. 
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Table 6.6 
Female directors and MFI characteristics    
Variables   D_female director 
% Female 
director 
# female 
director 
D_female 
director≥3 
 
Gender Bias and Social mission    
Female Managers  0.806*** 0.188*** 1.439*** 0.363*** 
   (4.74) (7.39) (5.76) (2.8) 
Female borrowers  -0.083 0.102*** 1.235*** 0.519*** 
   (-0.41) (3.3) (4.07) (2.69) 
Loan balance/GNI  -0.217** -0.009 -0.308*** -0.179** 
   (-2.6) (-0.76) (-3.11) (-2.13) 
Institutional 
Variables     
Regulation  -0.080 0.002 0.224 -0.098 
   (-0.77) (0.1) (1.55) (-1.05) 
Bank   -0.004 0.014 1.176*** 1.369*** 
   (-0.01) (0.15) (3.42) (3.3) 
Cooperatives  0.327 0.012 2.349*** 1.812*** 
   (0.77) (0.13) (6.98) (4.41) 
NBFI   -0.077 -0.050 0.340 0.682* 
   (-0.19) (-0.57) (1.26) (1.7) 
NGO   -0.030 -0.008 0.954*** 1.121*** 
   (-0.07) (-0.09) (3.16) (2.76) 
Rural Bank  0.149 -0.067 -0.169 0.193 
   (0.3) (-0.74) (-0.5) (0.39) 
Other   0.084 0.127 1.621*** 1.381*** 
   (0.15) (1.21) (3.15) (2.97) 
MFI/country controls     
ln(Size)   -0.044* -0.015*** 0.004 -0.019 
   (-1.73) (-3.64) (0.12) (-0.82) 
Age   0.460*** 0.063*** 0.581*** 0.384*** 
   (6.31) (5.28) (6.48) (4.96) 
Risk   -0.012 -0.032 0.297 0.375 
   (-0.03) (-0.64) (0.67) (1.02) 
HDI   -1.573*** 0.051 -1.813*** -0.685 
   (-2.55) (0.6) (-2.63) (-1.34) 
CONSTANT  1.287** 0.238** -0.517 -2.229*** 
   (1.89) (2.08) (-0.73) (-3.51) 
Obs   1500 1500 1533 1563 
Pseudo 𝑅2  0.073** 0.1225*** 0.1667*** 0.101 
Wald 𝑥2/F-stat  98.13*** 14.31*** 20.1*** 191.5*** 
Method   Probit OLS OLS Probit 
We analyse the characteristics that are associated with various definition of female directorship (dummy for female director>1, percentage of 
female directors, number of female directors and a dummy for female directors > 3) by means of pooled probit and pooled ordinary least 
squares regression.  ***, **, * indicate the coefficient estimates are significantly from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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6.3.2. Female directors and capital structure 
Table 6.7 shows the results when we use the Heckman (1978) two-stage treatment effect 
procedure that includes the Inverse Mill ratio for all the five different capital structure 
measures. The Wald chi-square test indicates that we cannot leave all explanatory variables out 
of our regression specifications. The Inverse Mill’s ratio denoted as Lambda is not significant 
in any of the regressions except in the borrowing model at 10% significant level, The Inverse 
Mills ratio tells us that our estimations does not suffer from any sample selection bias. The 
results in both sections show that the correction for self-selection bias does not significantly 
alter our earlier results as the sign of the coefficients are almost similar, but the significant 
results are fewer in this case.   
Results for the Heckman (1978) approach in Table 6.7 shows that female director on MFIs 
board are not significantly related with leverage. Although the sign of the coefficient is 
positive, the result is consistent with the findings of Matsa and Miller (2013) who find no 
change in firm leverage after the introduction of female boardroom representation quota system 
in Norway. This means that risk aversion may not be a distinctive part of women approach to 
corporate decision making. By contrast, Berger et al (2014) find that an increase in the 
proportion female bank directors result in increased portfolio risk.    
After splitting leverage into borrowings and deposits, findings suggest that female board of 
directors have positive but not statistically significant relationship with borrowing. We find a 
significant positive relationship between female directors and deposits. This result is consistent 
with earlier result in Table 6.5. With this result, we can forward the argument that female 
directors attract more deposits to MFIs due to the better match between female leadership and 
its female clients. Lending credence to matching or sorting argument proposed in Becker’s 
(1973) model for marriage market. Becker gave several examples of matching such as the 
“optimal sorting of more informed customers and more honest shopkeepers”. For instance, 
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Ghatak (2000) applies Becker’s model in microfinance settings and show how good borrowers 
are matched in a group lending scheme. This finding helps improve our understanding on the 
match between female directors and MFI clients.   
The study also finds that female directors are not significantly associated with equity capital, 
but the coefficients are negative and consistent with previous results in Table 6.5. Thus, it is 
observed that female directors are significantly and positively related to subsidies at 10% 
significant level. MFIs that have one or more female directors on board are having 1% increase 
in subsidised funding than those without. This result is consistent with Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978) argument that board of directors seek to link organizations to the most beneficial 
resources in their external environment. The finding supports such arguments in the sense that 
female directors seem to play a networking role between they MFIs board and other external 
organizations that provide them with the most beneficial resources source of funding in the 
microfinance sector, in this case subsidies.   
The results on the control variables are consistent with previous findings that suggest firms 
with larger boards tend to be more leveraged (Jensen, 1986; Wen et al., 2002; and Alvez et al., 
2015). Furthermore, board size is not associated with subsidies. Larger boards are associated 
with high deposits and less equity. Another important MFI-level control variable is the ROA. 
The result suggests that there is no relationship between ROA and all the capital structure 
measures. However, the sign of the coefficients is similar with previous results.  
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Table 6.7       
Results of a two-stage regressions on female directors and capital structure 
Variables  LEV BORR DEP EQUI SUBS 
       
D_female director 0.017 0.001 0.016** -0.014 0.013* 
  (1.28) (0.09) (2.49) (-1.11) (1.69) 
MFI controls  
  ROA  -0.309 -0.271 0.019 0.310 -0.282 
  (-1.52) (-1.07) (0.56) (1.55) (-1.36) 
  Board size 0.034** -0.021 0.019*** -0.031** -0.008 
  (2.36) (-1.62) (2.88) (-2.24) (-0.80) 
  Size  0.034*** 0.008 0.017*** -0.035*** -0.012*** 
  (4.77) (1.17) (4.71) (-4.66) (-3.58) 
  Age  -0.010 0.029 -0.012 -0.007 0.002 
  (-0.50) (1.36) (-1.20) (-0.44) (0.15) 
  Risk  0.007 0.009 -0.061** 0.001 0.001 
  (0.13) (0.14) (-2.44) (0.02) (0.02) 
County controls  
  Regulation 0.063*** -0.152*** 0.238*** -0.068*** -0.038** 
  (2.67) (-5.63) (10.45) (-2.91) (-2.33) 
  GDP 0.038 0.144 0.105 -0.041 -0.214 
  (0.28) (0.78) (1.42) (-0.32) (-0.72) 
  HDI  -0.089 -0.214 -0.181 0.080 -0.061 
  (-0.58) (-1.15) (-1.26) (0.53) (-0.50) 
Lambda  -0.134 0.411* -0.023 0.030 0.049 
  (-0.63) (1.72) (-0.23) (0.14) (0.32) 
CONSTANT  0.284* 0.445* -0.154 0.780*** 0.244** 
  (1.72) (1.71) (-0.91) (4.86) (1.99) 
 
Regional Dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Time Dummies  Included Included Included Included Included 
 
Obs  1423 1448 1400 1457 1071 
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.202 0.193 0.358 0.214 0.155 
Wald 𝑥2 135.10*** 159.42*** 327.62*** 158.76*** 94.34*** 
Instruments: fitted probabilities from a probit explaining binary variable for female director. Capital structure in terms of Leverage, 
Borrowings, Deposits, Equity, subsidies regressed on female directorship, MFI and country controls using IV. As instruments, fitted 
probabilities from probit analysis explaining the dummy female director have been used in the dummy endogenous variable model of Heckman 
(1978). Significance levels based on heteroskedastic and autocorrelation-corrected standard errors clustered at the MFI level. ***,**,* 
indicates that the coefficient estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, 10% levels.  
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Prudential regulations have negative impact on borrowings, equity and subsidies, but has a positive 
effect on deposits. Being regulated enables, MFIs to diversify their funding choices and thus 
reduce their dependence on subsidies and grants. The study also finds a significant positive 
relationship between regulation and both leverage and deposits. Regulation in this sense helps to 
protect depositors and restrict MFIs from excessive borrowing. The asset size of MFIs is positively 
and significantly related to leverage and deposits and negatively related to equity and subsidies. 
This evidence is consistent with previous studies (Rajan and Zingales, 1995), which suggests that 
larger MFIs with big asset size can easily leverage their assets compared to smaller MFIs with 
small asset size that mostly depend on grants and subsidies. The country effects are neither 
surprising in view of other capital structure evidences. 
6.4. Robustness check 
To test the reliability of our results, we report our robustness check by using different instrumental 
variables for capital structure regression. In the first robustness test, the study uses different 
instrumental procedure, where instruments are taken from the significant variables in the matching 
regressions between female directors and MFI characteristics in Table 6.6. The results are 
presented in Table 6.8. The signs are everywhere the same as in Table 6.7 except for the findings 
that female directors are significantly and positively related to MFI leverage and a marginal 
negative relationship with borrowing. Thus, the result in Table 6.8 may not be robust to the 
estimation method, hence the marginal inconsistency with results from previous estimation in 
Table 6.7.  
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Table 6.8       
Instrumental variables capital structure regression with different instruments  
Variables  LEV BORR DEP EQUI SUBS 
 
D_female directors 0.29** -0.274* 0.10 -0.16 -0.04 
  (1.96) (-1.80) (1.33) (-1.55) (-0.54) 
MFI controls 
  ROA  -0.224*** -0.331*** 0.046 0.268*** -0.305*** 
  (-2.58) (-3.90) (1.13) (3.93) (-4.15) 
  Board Size 0.003 0.021 0.006 -0.012 0.002 
  (0.13) (0.87) (0.62) (-0.65) (0.11) 
  Size  0.039*** 0.010 0.016*** -0.038*** -0.013*** 
  (6.05) (1.27) (4.06) (-7.17) (-3.28) 
  Age  -0.02 0.012 -0.013** 0.000 0.004 
  (-1.22) (0.69) (-1.96) (-0.01) (0.29) 
  Risk  0.034 -0.003 -0.054** -0.011 -0.001 
  (0.60) (-0.04) (-2.08) (-0.25) (-0.03) 
Country controls   
  Regulation 0.076*** -0.168*** 0.244*** -0.075*** -0.041*** 
  (2.74) (-4.52) (8.53) (-3.23) (-2.66) 
  GDP -0.001 0.146 0.094 -0.027 -0.187 
  (0.00) (0.82) (1.25) (-0.20) (-1.10) 
  HDI  -0.099 -0.055 -0.346*** 0.089 -0.070 
  (-0.53) (-0.22) (-2.01) (0.57) (-0.69) 
CONSTANT  0.108 0.589** -0.053 0.855*** 0.296** 
  (0.49) (2.10) (-0.27) (4.73) (2.42) 
 
Regional Dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Time Dummies  Included Included Included Included Included 
 
Obs  1423 1448 1400 1457 1071 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.132 0.066 0.326 0.190 0.139 
Wald 𝑥2 120.4*** 72.55*** 228.56*** 177.49*** 121.12*** 
Instruments used: Female manager, female borrowers, loan balance/GNI, dummy bank, dummy, cooperative, dummy, NGO, dummy NBFI and 
dummy others. An instrumental variables approach to determine whether female directors stimulates capital structure. We regress capital structure 
variables on female directors using 2SLS. For instruments, the variables that have a clear relation with female director according to Table 7 have 
been used. Significance levels based on heteroskedastic and autocorrelation-corrected standard errors clustered at the MFI level. ***, **, * indicates 
that the coefficient estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, 10% levels. 
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Secondly, inconsistent results from prior research on female directors motivate us to employ 
alternative test on various definitions of female director. In particular, the study examines the 
Konrad et al (2008) critical mass theory hypothesis that suggests the need to have three or more 
female directors in order to realise their positive impact on corporate boards. This is otherwise 
known as the magic number. The study implements this with an indicator variable being one if the 
number of female directors is equal to or more than three. Other important female director 
measures put to the test are the absolute number of female directors and the fraction of female 
directors. Table 6.9 report the results. 
The study finds a significant positive relationship between two female director specification and 
leverage, with the one remaining specification having a positive coefficient as well. The critical 
mass hypothesis is upheld in this instance, with the significant results between three or more female 
directors and leverage. Meaning to say, female director’s risk-taking attitude is more pronounced 
when MFIs have three or more of them. Contrary to previous findings that a board with higher 
proportion of female directors is no more or less risk-taking than a more male dominated board 
(Sila et al., 2016). Similarly, Huang and Kisgen (2013) find analogous results for capital structure 
decisions. Female executives are less likely to issue debt, and announcement returns for debt 
offerings are higher when the firm has a female executive. Female executives do not, however, 
make significantly different changes to leverage overall. Our results in this case is quite 
contributory because it reveals that more female directors on board partially substitute for weak 
corporate governance of MFI (Gull et al., 2011), and consequently reduces MFIs agency cost of 
leverage.      
Similarly, the relationship between female directors and borrowings is strongly significant with 
two specifications and marginally significant with magic number of female directors. This finding 
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is consistent with previous study by Alvez et al. (2015) that finds female directors to be associated 
with more debts, that is driven by high monitoring and disclosures which invariably reduces 
information asymmetry problem. While significant positive relationship exists between deposits 
and female board of directors in the two main specifications of female directors. There is no 
relationship between the magic number of female directors in board and deposits. Thus, it is 
remarkable that female directors have consistent positive relationship with deposits in all the 
previous regressions. 
Furthermore, the study observes a significant negative relationship between equity capital and 
female directors across all specification except one. When MFIs have three or more female 
directors, they tend to have 25% less equity capital. Although the result supports the critical mass 
hypothesis, and it also strengthens our risk aversion argument. There is no relationship between 
subsidies and all of the female director specifications. However, the coefficient signs remain 
positive for all the specifications. All other results on MFI and country level effects are consistent 
with the previous regressions. 
Next, the study turns to the possible link between MFIs social performance variables and capital 
structure of MFIs. Thus, our approach is to find variable that previous literature has not yet 
considered as an explanatory variable in the capital structure regressions and by their inclusion, it 
may affect the outcome of the results. One reason that is often provided for the supply of capital 
to microfinance institutions is their social performance (Mersland and Uregeghe, 2013). Social 
performance is usually observed using the number of female client served and the size of MFIs 
loan. We therefore, include female borrowers and loan balance/GNI among the explanatory 
variables in the capital structure regressions, using the Heckman (1978) dummy endogenous 
variable method as in Table 6.7. The regressions results are presented in Table 6.10
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Instruments used: Female manager, female borrowers, loan balance/GNI, dummy bank, dummy, cooperative, dummy, NGO, dummy NBFI and dummy others. % female director is the fraction of female directors. # 
female directors are the continuous variable denoting the number of female directors. D_female director>3 and a dummy that is 1 if the MFI has three or more female directors. For instruments, the variables that have 
clear relation with female director according to Table 6.6 have been used. Significance level are based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected standard errors clustered at the MFI level. ***, **, * indicates 
that the coefficient estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, 10% levels
Table 6.9: Instrumental variables capital structure regressions with different definitions for female director        
Variables  LEV   BORR   DEP   EQUI   SUBS   
% of Female directors 0.091   -0.422***   0.239**   -0.076   0.124   
  (0.71)   (-2.57)   (2.21)   (-0.66)   (1.25)   
# Female directors  0.032*   -0.058***   0.040**   -0.027*   0.003  
   (1.80)   (-2.68)   (2.32)   (-1.71)   (0.30)  
D_female directors>3  0.355**   -0.285*   0.048   -0.254**   0.020 
    (2.29)   (-1.68)   (0.51)   (-1.97)   (0.27) 
MFI controls 
  ROA  -0.312*** -0.303*** -0.273*** -0.274*** -0.255*** -0.188** 0.013 0.005 0.018 0.313*** 0.304*** 0.290*** -0.278*** -0.301*** -0.252*** 
  (-4.90) (-4.59) (-3.52) (-3.44) (-3.21) (-2.26) (0.32) (0.12) (0.53) (5.41) (5.05) (4.26) (-4.21) (-4.64) (-4.17) 
  Board Size 0.041*** -0.021 -0.075 -0.026* 0.100** 0.071 0.031*** -0.055* -0.001 -0.034*** 0.018 0.049 -0.009 -0.017 -0.018 
  (3.34) (-0.58) -1.49 (-1.68) (2.29) (1.37) (3.65) (-1.70) (-0.02) (-3.07) (0.53) (1.22) (-0.83) (-0.65) (-0.60) 
  Size  0.034*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.007 0.003 0.013 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.011*** -0.035*** -0.041*** -0.043*** -0.010** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
  (6.63) (6.70) (5.42) (1.02) (0.38) (1.42) (4.84) (4.39) (2.86) (-7.38) (-7.37) (-6.38) (-2.53) (-3.24) (-3.21) 
  Age  -0.001 -0.003 -0.010 0.009 0.017 0.002 -0.013* -0.019** -0.010 -0.009 -0.007 -0.004 -0.006 0.003 0.005 
  (-0.09) (-0.21) (-0.63) (0.64) (1.15) (0.10) (-1.72) (-2.26) (-1.56) (-0.80) (-0.68) (-0.31) (-0.51) (0.30) (0.41) 
  Risk  0.008 -0.022 -0.028 0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.065** -0.075** -0.060** 0.002 0.034 0.042 0.006 0.001 0.002 
  (0.17) (-0.45) (-0.48) (0.10) (-0.13) (-0.12) (-2.25) (-2.53) (-2.62) (0.05) (0.78) (0.89) (0.14) (0.03) (0.04) 
Country controls 
  Regulation 0.064*** 0.059*** 0.088*** -0.162*** -0.144*** -0.169*** 0.242*** 0.233*** 0.240*** -0.069*** -0.065*** -0.084*** -0.034** -0.041*** -0.041*** 
  (2.96) (2.68) (2.87) (-5.19) (-4.82) (-3.64) (9.88) (8.16) (5.42) (-3.28) (-2.99) (-2.85) (-2.29) (-3.08) (-2.82) 
  GDP 0.042 0.022 -0.136 0.153 0.137 0.147 0.078 0.070 0.109 -0.047 -0.022 0.099 -0.223 -0.235 -0.225 
  (0.28) (0.14) (-0.70) (0.86) (0.77) (0.77) (0.91) (0.81) (1.43) (-0.35) (-0.16) (0.63) (-1.34) (-1.42) (-1.34) 
  HDI  -0.081 -0.080 -0.118 -0.192 -0.116 0.014 -0.129 -0.205 -0.605*** 0.071 0.067 0.097 -0.049 -0.058 -0.059 
  (-0.54) (-0.52) (-0.59) (-0.90) (-0.57) (0.05) (-0.83) (-1.18) (-2.86) (0.49) (0.45) (0.50) (-0.49) (-0.62) (-0.62) 
Obs  1423 1460 1479 1448 1483 1503 1400 1432 1448 1457 1494 1512 1071 1096 1110 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.196 0.155 0.071 0.114 0.118 0.105 0.348 0.318 0.309 0.210 0.175 0.113 0.123 0.162 0.156 
Wald 𝑥2 174.06 167.86 95.77 96.4 97.98 47.83 279.64 211.94 151.27 203.08 197.61 123.97 124.62 139.62 133.94 
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Table 6.10       
Results on MFI capital structure when social performance variables are included 
Variables  LEV BORR DEP EQUI SUBS 
       
D_female directors 0.017 0.004 0.015** -0.014 0.014* 
  (1.24) (0.26) (2.37) (-1.09) (1.76) 
MFI controls       
  ROA  -0.306 -0.279 0.020 0.309 -0.285 
  (-1.51) (-1.11) (0.58) (1.55) (-1.37) 
  Board size 0.037** -0.023* 0.021*** -0.031** -0.007 
  (2.35) (-1.76) (3.19) (-2.25) (-0.76) 
  Size  0.033*** 0.009 0.016*** -0.034*** -0.012*** 
  (4.69) (1.39) (4.46) (-4.58) (-3.57) 
  Age  -0.024 0.048*** -0.028*** 0.005 0.010 
  (-1.15) (2.17) (-2.77) (0.30) (0.55) 
  Risk  0.004 0.012 -0.064** 0.002 0.002 
  (0.09) (0.18) (-2.49) (0.05) (0.06) 
Social performance variables       
  Female borrowers -0.005 0.099** -0.004 -0.015 0.004 
  (-0.14) (2.08) (-0.16) (-0.45) (0.14) 
  Loan bal/GNI 0.036** -0.045** 0.048*** -0.036*** -0.019** 
  (2.39) (-2.27) (4.84) (-2.68) (-2.10) 
Country controls       
  Regulation 0.058** -0.139*** 0.232*** -0.065*** -0.036** 
  (2.48) (-5.15) (10.70) (-2.80) (-2.10) 
  GDP 0.030 0.150 0.092 -0.030 -0.211 
  (0.22) (0.80) (1.21) (-0.23) (-0.71) 
  HDI  0.014 -0.335* -0.016 -0.026 -0.115 
  (0.09) (-1.70) (-0.11) (-0.16) (-0.93) 
 
CONSTANT  0.319* 0.338 -0.139 0.765*** 0.223* 
  (1.92) (1.24) (-0.85) (4.76) (1.78) 
 
Regional Dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Time Dummies  Included Included Included Included Included 
 
Obs  1423 1448 1400 1457 1071 
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.213 0.219 0.400 0.224 0.157 
Wald 𝑥2 148.93 193.56 381.23 178.26 98.43 
Instruments: fitted probabilities from a probit explaining binary variable of female director. The Heckman (1978) dummy endogenous model is 
used in estimations. Significance levels are based on heteroskedastic and autocorrelation-corrected standard errors. ***, **, * indicates that the 
coefficient estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, 10% levels. 
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The study finds significant positive relationship between female director variable and deposits. We 
find only weak relationship in the subsidies regression. This means that our results from Table 6.7 
is upheld and that we do not risk much in not including social performance variables in our main 
capital structure regression in Table 6.7. 
Furthermore, theoretical and empirical literatures suggest that the causality between the choice of 
financing and performance runs from both direction (Berger and di Patti, 2006). It is important to 
account for this potential endogeneity issue in our model. Therefore, we propose to consider lagged 
values of our measures of financial performance and social performance separately. In particular, 
the study considers a one-year lag for Return on Assets (l_ROA), Percentage of female borrowers 
(l_female borrowers) and loan balance divided by GNI (l_loan bal/GNI). The basic assumption is 
that MFIs choice of financing may be endogenously determined by previous year’s performances 
(financial and social). Tables 6.11 and 6.12 show the Heckman results with lag values for financial 
performance and social performance respectively. The Heckman results are very similar to the 
ones without lagged values presented in previous tables. The signs of the coefficients are almost 
similar across all models depending on the significance level.  
The study observes significant positive relationship between female director variable and both 
leverage and deposits. It also finds a significant negative relationship between female director 
variable and equity capital. This comes as no surprise because the inclusion of lagged ROA values 
controls for the endogeneity associated with performance variables, hence the strong significant 
relationships. Similar results were reported when lagged values for social performance variables 
are included in Table 6.12. Only that the study observes a weak relationship at 10% significant 
level for both leverage and equity. However, we still find less than 1% significance level in the 
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deposit model. These results support the specifications used here, by treating the lagged values of 
financial and social performance variables in separate estimations.       
Table 6.11       
Results on female directors and capital structure including lagged financial performance variable 
Variables  LEV BORR DEP EQUI SUBS 
       
D_female directors 0.031** 0.008 0.024*** -0.030** 0.008 
  (2.18) (0.48) (3.20) (-2.33) (0.72) 
Lagged financial performance     
L_ROA  -0.312*** -0.325*** 0.029 0.317*** -0.142** 
  (-4.18) (-3.70) (0.66) (4.66) (-2.20) 
MFI controls      
Board size 0.030** -0.029* 0.021*** -0.023* -0.002 
  (2.20) (-1.83) (2.76) (-1.84) (-0.22) 
Size  0.033*** 0.001 0.017*** -0.035*** -0.010*** 
  (6.10) (0.15) (4.49) (-6.80) (-2.70) 
Age  0.002 0.037 -0.004 -0.008 0.011 
  (0.08) (1.55) (-0.33) (-0.42) (0.69) 
Risk  -0.027 -0.029 -0.038 0.030 -0.019 
  (-0.49) (-0.45) (-1.36) (0.61) (-0.41) 
Country controls      
Regulation 0.070*** -0.139*** 0.241*** -0.071*** -0.023 
  (3.05) (-5.27) (10.13) (-3.16) (-1.56) 
GDP 0.071 0.171 0.156* -0.017 -0.396** 
  (0.41) (0.83) (1.78) (-0.11) (-2.52) 
HDI  -0.157 -0.249 0.195 0.128 -0.003 
  (-1.01) (-1.39) (1.43) (0.85) (-0.03) 
 
CONSTANT  -0.004 0.486** -0.576*** 1.057*** 0.388*** 
  (-0.02) (2.55) (-4.58) (6.78) (3.25) 
 
Regional Dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
 
Obs  1069 1072 1022 1079 857 
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.201 0.186 0.367 0.212 0.125 
Wald 𝑥2 143.63 118.85 279.58 160.51 56.55 
We regress capital structure variables on lagged financial performance and control variables. The capital structure variables are leverage, borrowing, 
deposits, equity and subsidies. The Heckman (1978) model is used in estimations. Significance levels are based on heteroskedastic and 
autocorrelation-corrected standard errors. ***, **, * indicates that the coefficient estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, 10% 
levels. 
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Table 6.12       
Results on female directors and capital structure including lagged social performance variables 
Variables  LEV BORR DEP EQUI SUBS 
       
D_female directors 0.029* 0.003 0.031*** -0.027* 0.016 
  (1.86) (0.16) (3.92) (-1.94) (1.32) 
Lagged social performance     
L_Female borrowers -0.009 0.161*** -0.078** 0.000 0.069** 
  (-0.20) (3.03) (-2.36) (0.01) (2.05) 
L_loan bal/GNI 0.055*** -0.040* 0.051*** -0.051*** 0.012 
  (2.69) (-1.76) (3.99) (-2.69) (0.81) 
MFI controls      
Board size 0.031** -0.030* 0.023*** -0.025* 0.002 
  (2.14) (-1.86) (2.98) (-1.95) (0.16) 
Size  0.027*** 0.000 0.015*** -0.029*** -0.011*** 
  (4.82) (-0.01) (3.69) (-5.40) (-2.78) 
Age  -0.011 0.052** -0.006 0.004 0.014 
  (-0.51) (2.06) (-0.50) (0.20) (0.74) 
Risk  -0.020 -0.006 -0.053* 0.018 0.005 
  (-0.36) (-0.09) (-1.82) (0.36) (0.10) 
Country controls      
Regulation 0.068*** -0.121*** 0.236*** -0.068*** -0.031* 
  (2.90) (-4.57) (10.23) (-2.99) (-1.90) 
GDP 0.097 0.172 0.145 -0.051 -0.443*** 
  (0.52) (0.80) (1.54) (-0.31) -2.61 
HDI  0.026 -0.338* 0.303** -0.048 0.016 
  (0.16) (-1.79) (2.22) (-0.30) (0.13) 
 
CONSTANT  0.020 0.266 -0.520*** 1.041*** 0.307** 
  (0.11) (1.33) (-4.01) (6.25) (2.36) 
 
Regional Dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
 
Obs  1007 1019 966 1023 815 
Adjusted 𝑅2  0.202 0.206 0.419 0.208 0.107 
Wald 𝑥2 123.40 116.43 312.22 133.94 56.86 
We regress capital structure variables on lagged social performance and control variables. The capital structure variables are leverage, borrowing, 
deposits, equity and subsidies. The Heckman (1978) model is used in estimations. Significance levels are based on heteroskedastic and 
autocorrelation-corrected standard errors. ***, **, * indicates that the coefficient estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, 10% 
levels. 
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The causal relationships in the robustness test have similar direction with the main results in Table 
6.7. However, the results of the robustness test using various specifications of female directors 
(Table 6.9) and those that considered lagged values, (Tables 6.11 and 6.12) are more significant. 
The reason is that, the matching variables used as instruments in Table 6.9 may have rightly 
corrected for endogeneity, hence the significant findings. Meanwhile the lagged values used in 
Tables 6.11 and 6.12 may as well purged the estimates with endogeneity, that is, it has eliminated 
the correlation between explanatory variables and the error term. This may lead to the significant 
results. The overall conclusion of the robustness check using different specifications confirms the 
results of the two-stage treatment effect. Thus, the conclusion from the two-step endogenous 
variable method in Table 6.7 is upheld. That is, Female directors are found to have significant 
impact on deposits and subsidies. More specifically, it is evident that MFIs with three or more 
female directors on boards are associated with less agency cost, which results in more leverage. 
This contributory work may seek to provide answers to our research questions.   
6.5. Literature summary 
Female directors in microfinance have been attributed to increase in financial performance 
(Mersland and Strom, 2009; Strom et al., 2014). However, these studies are restricted to MFIs 
performance models. Similarly studies on MFIs funding models fail to address the pertinent role 
of board gender diversity on MFIs capital structure (Bogan, 2012; Tchuigoua, 2014). This study 
finds a significant link between board gender diversity and MFIs capital structure, thereby 
contributing to the general microfinance literature.  
Several empirical studies have analysed the influence of board of directors on firm’s external 
resources. The resource dependency theory argues that board of directors seeks to link organization 
to other external organization in order to address environmental dependencies (Pfeffer and 
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Salancik, 1978). This argument is supported by several studies that find significant evidence 
between board member representing financial institutions and leverage (Pfeffer, 1972), 
commercial bankers on board with short term and long term bank debt (Booth and Deli, 1999), 
and politically connected outside directors with sales to government (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001). 
There are studies on gender diversified boards that provide the basis for some of the most 
convincing argument on resource dependency theory. For instance, Siciliano (1996) did not find a 
link between female directors and external resources (fundraising goal) of firms. However, on the 
contrary, Hillman et al (2007) find that female representation on board is always related to linkages 
with female directors in other boards. In sum the theory point to the beneficial linkages of female 
led MFI’s to resources in its surrounding. 
Another line of research focused on the risk attitude of female directors towards firm financing 
choices. Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998), Adams and Ferreira (2004) and Jacobsen et al., (2014) 
are good examples of this line of research. These studies find that the presence of female directors 
on boardrooms are viewed as a means of reducing firm access to risky securities. Some studies 
find no such evidence, Matsa and Miller (2013) find no change in firm leverage after the 
introduction of a female board representation quota in Norway. The authors posit that risk aversion 
may not be a distinctive part of women approach to corporate decision making.  A board with a 
higher proportion of female directors is no more or less risk-taking than a more male dominated 
board (Sila et al., 2016). Huang and Kisgen (2013) find that female executives do not make any 
significant changes to firm’s overall leverage. By contrast, Berger et al (2014) find that an increase 
in the proportion female bank directors result in increased portfolio risk. Based on this conflicting 
evidences, it is unclear whether higher female directors on boards mean less MFIs risk-taking or 
not. 
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Similarly, evidence from corporate boards suggest that female directors can affect governance 
quality. Carter et al. (2010) show that gender diversified boards can improve its monitoring 
efficiency. Adams and Ferreira (2009) document that female directors attend more board meetings, 
which is an important information gathering mechanism. In a similar view, Gul et al (2008) and 
Alvez et al (2015) show that firms with more female directors have high monitoring, greater level 
of public disclosure and better managerial accountability. However, Adams and Ferreira, (2009) 
argue that in a well governed firms, female directors can negatively affect firm value due to 
excessive over-monitoring Gull et al., (2011) and Strom et al., (2014) argue on the contrary that 
firms can remedy their weak governance by having high female directors on board. These 
conflicting evidences provides the basis for this study.  
6.6. Contributions of the study 
Two main conclusions emerge from the investigation. The results offer supportive evidence that 
female directors have an impact on the capital structure of microfinance institutions. This result is 
the first of its kind in the microfinance literature. First, the study observe that female directors 
increases MFIs deposit financing. It shows a significant positive relationship between female 
director and deposits. This finding support the matching traits hypothesis, where female directors 
tend to attract more deposits due to the better match with its female clients.  
The study also finds that the mere presence of female directors on MFI board increases access to 
subsidies. The study observes a marginal relationship between female directors and subsidies. This 
result contributes to the resource dependence argument by Pfeffer and Salanciks, (1978) that 
female board of directors seek linkages with the most beneficial resources in their environment. 
The finding supports such arguments in the sense that female board of directors seems to play a 
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networking role between the MFI they represent and organizations that provide them with the most 
beneficial source of funding, in this case donor agencies.   
The second main conclusion confirms the findings of Kramer et al., (2007) and Konrad et al., 
(2008) that having three or more female directors on board can create a critical mass where female 
directors can influence the content and process of board decisions.  When a critical mass or three 
or more female directors is reached, MFIs tend to leverage more. This is contributory evidence 
that the risk-taking attitude among female directors is more pronounced when MFIs have three or 
more of them on board. It also suggests that more female directors on board is associated with 
increase in monitoring and disclosures which reduces MFIs agency cost of leverage.  
6.7. Summary 
This chapter examines the role of female directors on microfinance institutions capital structure 
decision. The study aims to answer the question of whether female directors as in (Strom et al., 
2014) have any impact on MFIs capital structure as in (Tchuigoua, 2014). The chapter treats 
possible endogeneity issue using the Heckman endogenous variable method and the inverse mills 
ratio (IMR). The chapter considered different instrumental variable method and considered lagging 
some variables that has not been done in microfinance studies before. The contrasting results from 
the regression specifications are due to the endogeneity problems. The capital structure decision 
of MFIs has perhaps not been settled. The ability of female directors is crucial in this increasingly 
expanding sector. Empirical evidence suggests that capital structure decision of MFIs is 
determined by board gender diversity. Therefore, the questions on the role of female directors in 
determining the capital structure of MFIs remains pertinent.  
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Chapter 7 - Results II: The impact of firm-specific and institutional-specific factors on 
MFIs capital structure 
7.0. Introduction 
This chapter presents empirical evidence on the institutional-specific determinants of MFIs capital 
structure. In doing so, both leverage and subsidies were separately investigated in all analysis. The 
impact of Firm-specific on MFIs capital structure was examined for each country in our sample. 
Particularly, the equality of Firm-specific coefficients across countries was examined. The use of 
joint test for the equality of coefficient is clearly justified given that prior studies suffer from 
significant limitations. For example, Tchuigoua (2014), implicitly assumes that the impact of Firm-
specific factors on MFIs capital structure are the same across countries as observed in many 
previous capital structure studies (Booth et al., 2001; Giannetti, 2003; and Fan et al., 2012). 
The question of whether institutional-specific determinants have direct and indirect impact on 
MFIs capital structure was also investigated using the weighted least square regression method. 
Unlike the previous chapter, this chapter employs only two dependent variables, that is, leverage 
and subsidies. The chapter contains a final sample of 645 MFIs or 5215 firm year observations. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 7.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the key variables. 
Section 7.2 discusses the results of multivariate analyses. The robustness checks are described in 
Section 7.3. Section 7.5 presents brief discussion on key most recent papers. Contributions of the 
study is presented in section 7.5. Section 7.6 summarises the chapter. 
7.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 7.1 presents mean and median values of capital structure variables and other Firm-specific 
variables for 56 countries covering the period 2004 to 2014. The mean for leverage in the sample 
of 56 countries is 67% and the median is 74%. The mean for subsidies is 10% and the median is 
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3%. This is partly consistent with prior studies on MFIs capital structure. Contratry to the claim 
that firms in developing countries have low level of leverage (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
1996; Booth et al., 2001; de Jong et al., 2008), this chapter observes that leverage is high in most 
of the countries in our sample. Countries like Philiphines have as high as 92% leverage while 
Palestine show as low as 22%. The chapter also observes that subsidies such as donated equity is 
low in most countries, however there are exceptional cases like palestine where subsidies are 
observed at 62%.  
In addition, Table 7.1 provides summary statistics of Firm-specific charactersitics per country. For 
instance, the study observe lower level of tangibility across countries, with highest level of 17% 
reported in Mozambique. This is expected since MFIs are typically small businesses in nature and 
most operate in the rural areas. Countries with the high median risk rates include Albania, 
Palestine, Romania and Rwanda. Countries with high mean value for profitability are Benin, 
Ghana and Senegal while those countries with lowest and negative values for profitability are 
Afgahnistan, Albania, Argentina, Chile, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. This 
chapter also observe that countries with high mean value for liquidity are Afghanistan, Congo and 
Egypt. Countries with the lowest means values for liquidity include Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Colombia, Costa-Rica, Jordan and Tunisia. However, among all Firm-specific variables, the values 
of profitability exhibits the highest variation while tangibility shows the lowest variation. 
Similarly, Table 7.2 presents the summary statistics of the institutional-specific determinants.  
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Table 7.1             
Cross-country summary statistics of capital structure variables and other MFI-level variables    
Country LEV SUBS TANG RISK PROFIT LIQUID SIZE AGE Obs % Obs MFI % MFI 
             
Afghanistan  0.78 0.51 0.04 0.04 -0.12 0.31 16.09 1.76 50 0.96% 5 0.78% 
 (0.86) (0.23) (0.02) (0.01) (-0.09) (0.27) (16.17) (2.00)     
Albania 0.47 0.21 0.02 0.14 -0.01 0.11 14.74 2.17 18 0.35% 2 0.31% 
 (0.36) (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.01) (0.10) (15.63) (2.00)     
Argentina 0.61 0.01 0.05 0.04 -0.11 0.14 14.25 2.23 65 1.25% 9 1.40% 
 (0.71) (0.00) (0.02) (0.04) (-0.04) (0.08) (14.68) (2.00)     
Armenia 0.61 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.14 16.15 2.25 69 1.32% 8 1.24% 
 (0.70) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.11) (16.09) (2.00)     
Azerbaijan 0.55 0.18 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.10 15.59 2.33 166 3.18% 22 3.41% 
 (0.66) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.07) (15.39) (3.00)     
Bangladesh 0.81 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.16 16.77 2.99 158 3.03% 19 2.95% 
 (0.84) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.13) (16.74) (3.00)     
Benin 0.71 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.13 14.85 2.38 48 0.92% 7 1.09% 
 (0.76) (0.04) (0.09) (0.06) (0.00) (0.10) (15.18) (3.00)     
Bolivia 0.71 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.13 17.19 2.95 193 3.70% 19 2.95% 
 (0.79) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.11) (17.11) (3.00)     
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.63 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.08 16.98 2.72 110 2.11% 11 1.71% 
 (0.68) (0.07) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (17.11) (3.00)     
Brazil 0.48 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.16 15.59 2.75 108 2.07% 15 2.33% 
 (0.50) (0.00) (0.02) (0.04) (0.08) (0.13) (15.20) (3.00)     
Bulgaria 0.35 0.23 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.18 14.20 2.71 31 0.59% 4 0.62% 
 (0.28) (0.16) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (14.21) (3.00)     
Cambodia 0.66 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.13 16.55 2.69 166 3.18% 18 2.79% 
 (0.74) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.04) (0.11) (16.29) (3.00)     
Chile 0.42 0.18 0.04 0.07 -0.10 0.13 16.12 3.00 19 0.36% 2 0.31% 
 (0.50) (0.00) (0.04) (0.06) (-0.02) (0.11) (16.13) (3.00)     
Congo 0.49 0.36 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.31 15.55 2.22 36 0.69% 4 0.62% 
 (0.57) (0.28) (0.06) (0.03) (0.00) (0.31) (14.91) (2.00)     
Colombia 0.66 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.07 17.39 2.78 172 3.30% 22 3.41% 
 (0.71) (0.00) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (17.51) (3.00)     
Costa Rica 0.60 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.06 14.81 3.00 94 1.80% 11 1.71% 
 (0.61) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (14.84) (3.00)     
Dominican Republic 0.64 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.12 16.54 3.00 61 1.17% 9 1.40% 
 (0.67) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (15.72) (3.00)     
Ecuador 0.70 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.13 16.29 2.78 398 7.63% 43 6.67% 
 (0.82) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.11) (16.20) (3.00)     
Egypt 0.34 0.38 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.38 17.31 2.65 31 0.59% 3 0.47% 
 (0.34) (0.32) (0.05) (0.01) (0.06) (0.38) (17.44) (3.00)     
El-Salvador 0.54 0.24 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.12 15.59 2.92 100 1.92% 10 1.55% 
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Table 7.1             
Cross-country summary statistics of capital structure variables and other MFI-level variables    
Country LEV SUBS TANG RISK PROFIT LIQUID SIZE AGE Obs % Obs MFI % MFI 
 (0.62) (0.17) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.10) (15.51) (3.00)     
Georgia 0.63 0.16 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.10 15.84 2.32 85 1.63% 11 1.71% 
 (0.74) (0.00) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07) (15.85) (3.00)     
Ghana 0.58 0.46 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.16 13.29 2.21 19 0.36% 3 0.47% 
 (0.73) (0.22) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.16) (13.18) (3.00)     
Guatemala 0.47 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.13 15.44 2.80 148 2.84% 16 2.48% 
 (0.52) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (15.49) (3.00)     
Haiti 0.77 0.01 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.19 16.45 2.59 41 0.79% 4 0.62% 
 (0.78) (0.00) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.18) (16.50) (3.00)     
Honduras 0.55 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.12 15.60 2.78 158 3.03% 18 2.79% 
 (0.67) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09) (15.59) (3.00)     
India 0.75 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.16 15.95 2.33 629 12.06% 94 14.57% 
 (0.82) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (15.98) (3.00)     
Indonesia 0.76 0.08 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.21 14.90 2.47 92 1.76% 16 2.48% 
 (0.83) (0.00) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.19) (14.75) (3.00)     
Jordan 0.43 0.36 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.06 16.57 2.82 11 0.21% 1 0.16% 
 (0.50) (0.26) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.05) (16.64) (3.00)     
Kazakhstan 0.59 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.14 16.07 2.56 54 1.04% 6 0.93% 
 (0.74) (0.00) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.09) (16.24) (3.00)     
Kenya 0.80 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.23 17.77 2.77 66 1.27% 7 1.09% 
 (0.81) (0.00) (0.04) (0.08) (0.00) (0.22) (17.68) (3.00)     
Kosovo 0.59 0.20 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.10 15.79 2.53 55 1.05% 7 1.09% 
 (0.65) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.10) (15.85) (3.00)     
Kyrgyzstan 0.66 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.12 15.71 2.23 87 1.67% 10 1.55% 
 (0.66) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.09) (15.70) (2.00)     
Macedonia 0.69 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.11 16.43 2.85 20 0.38% 2 0.31% 
 (0.68) (0.00) (0.03) (0.11) (0.01) (0.10) (16.54) (3.00)     
Mexico 0.58 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.14 16.32 2.27 244 4.68% 32 4.96% 
 (0.63) (0.00) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.13) (16.12) (2.00)     
Mongolia  0.65 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.13 16.80 2.45 38 0.73% 5 0.78% 
 (0.71) (0.00) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.09) (15.75) (3.00)     
Morocco 0.75 0.20 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.13 16.14 2.91 32 0.61% 3 0.47% 
 (0.78) (0.14) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (15.89) (3.00)     
Mozambique 0.45 0.03 0.17 0.04 -0.04 0.23 15.19 1.64 14 0.27% 2 0.31% 
 (0.39) (0.01) (0.13) (0.03) (0.00) (0.18) (15.13) (1.50)     
Nepal 0.87 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.20 14.83 2.73 198 3.80% 28 4.34% 
 (0.90) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.16) (15.06) (3.00)     
Nicaragua 0.70 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.12 16.01 2.91 190 3.64% 20 3.10% 
 (0.74) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.10) (15.99) (3.00)     
Nigeria 0.64 0.07 0.08 0.12 -0.05 0.27 15.38 1.90 60 1.15% 13 2.02% 
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Table 7.1             
Cross-country summary statistics of capital structure variables and other MFI-level variables    
Country LEV SUBS TANG RISK PROFIT LIQUID SIZE AGE Obs % Obs MFI % MFI 
 (0.74) (0.00) (0.06) (0.04) (0.00) (0.25) (16.11) (2.00)     
Pakistan 0.73 0.21 0.05 0.04 -0.04 0.26 16.19 2.44 149 2.86% 18 2.79% 
 (0.76) (0.08) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.21) (15.97) (3.00)     
Palestine  0.22 0.62 0.02 0.17 -0.02 0.21 15.98 2.97 31 0.59% 3 0.47% 
 (0.21) (0.57) (0.02) (0.11) (0.01) (0.23) (16.14) (3.00)     
Panama 0.52 0.19 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.12 15.33 2.68 37 0.71% 4 0.62% 
 (0.61) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (15.79) (3.00)     
Paraguay 0.77 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.18 17.74 3.00 59 1.13% 6 0.93% 
 (0.85) (0.00) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.19) (17.93) (3.00)     
Peru 0.70 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.12 17.60 2.86 152 2.91% 15 2.33% 
 (0.81) (0.00) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.12) (18.20) (3.00)     
Philippines 0.92 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.16 16.37 2.68 73 1.40% 8 1.24% 
 (0.84) (0.00) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.15) (16.50) (3.00)     
Romania 0.81 0.04 0.01 0.15 0.00 0.17 16.33 2.79 19 0.36% 2 0.31% 
 (0.85) (0.00) (0.01) (0.11) (-0.01) (0.15) (16.44) (3.00)     
Russia 0.75 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.14 15.53 2.42 69 1.32% 9 1.40% 
 (0.84) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.09) (15.63) (3.00)     
Samoa  1.44 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.24 14.46 2.64 11 0.21% 1 0.16% 
 (1.36) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.23) (14.47) (3.00)     
Senegal 0.62 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.11 16.46 2.70 40 0.77% 6 0.93% 
 (0.78) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.01) (0.10) (17.31) (3.00)     
Serbia 0.30 0.32 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.15 16.30 2.30 20 0.38% 2 0.31% 
 (0.09) (0.00) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.10) (15.70) (2.00)     
Sri Lanka 0.65 0.34 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.11 14.49 2.08 66 1.27% 12 1.86% 
 (0.66) (0.22) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.07) (14.42) (2.00)     
Tajikistan 0.63 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.15 15.65 2.26 98 1.88% 11 1.71% 
 (0.75) (0.00) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.08) (15.96) (2.00)     
Togo 0.77 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.01 0.20 15.42 2.82 28 0.54% 3 0.47% 
 (0.89) (0.01) (0.05) (0.08) (0.00) (0.19) (14.50) (2.00)     
Tunisia 0.60 0.17 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.03 17.38 3.00 11 0.21% 1 0.16% 
 (0.69) (0.05) (0.08) (0.01) (0.07) (0.03) (17.63) (3.00)     
Uzbekistan 0.56 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.21 18.08 2.11 18 0.35% 3 0.47% 
 (0.60) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.22) (19.30) (2.00)     
Total         5215 100% 645 100% 
This tabel represents mean (median in parenthesis) values of capital structure variables (leverage and subsidies) and other Firm-specific variables 
from 56 countries.   
 
 
  
149 
 
Table 7.2           
Description and summary statistics of institutional specific variables      
Name (abbreviation)  Description     Statistics  
        Mean Median Obs 
           
Creditors right index (CREDRIGHT) Measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders. 5.064 5.000 56 
    Source: Doing Business.       
 
Credit information index (CREDINFO) Measures rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and accessibility of credit Information available  3.739 5.000 56 
   through either a credit bureau or a credit registry. Source: Doing Business.  
 
Financial sector development (FINDEV) Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP). Source: World bank database.  0.342 0.317 56 
 
Legal Origin (LEGAL)  Measure by a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country adopts the common-law system and 0 otherwise. 0.280 0.000 56 
   This variable comes from La Porta et al. (1997)    
 
Corruption (CORRUP)  Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain as captured by World Governance Indicators. -0.623 -0.620 56 
 
Political stability (POLSTA)   Index: Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (-2.5 to 2.5; WGI). -0.792 -0.740 56 
 
Regulation (REGUL) Binary variable: 1 for countries with prudential regulation for MFI, 0 otherwise. Source: Mix market database 0.657 1.000 56 
 
Eonomic Growth (GDP)  Annual growth rate of the GDP per capita of a country. Source: World bank database.    0.038 0.036 56 
This table reports institutional variable names, abbrevaiations, definations, sources of data, number of observations, and means/medians of the available data. Obs. Is the number of countries with available 
data and information. 
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7.2. Multivariate results 
7.2.1. The impact of firm-specific factors 
The discussion of the results starts by country-by-country analysis of Firm-specific determinants 
of financing choices. The regression to explain MFI financing choices from the Firm-specific 
factors as shown in Equation (5.4). The results for each dependent variable is reported in Tables 
7.3 and 7.4 respectively. 
7.2.1.1. Leverage model   
The study finds that less than half of the coefficients of tangibility to be statistically significant 
and majority are at odds with theoretical prediction. The cross-sectional regressions yields as many 
as 19 significant negative coefficients for tangibility and while 14 more coefficient are in the same 
direction. This contradicts the bankruptcy cost argument that higher tangibility results in lower 
risk to creditors  which results in firm high level of leverage (Gropp and Heider, 2010; Frank and 
Goyal, 2009; de Jong et al., 2008; Rajan and Zingales, 1995) and those obtained in microfinance 
sector (Tchhigoua, 2015). To explain this, collateral is seen as a signalling tool that helps to avoid 
adverse selection, that is, ex-ante asymmetric information. In this case, collateral is driven by the 
ex-ante private information from MFIs. Given the poor accounting standard and lack of 
independent third party rating, the problem of information asymmetry is inherent in the 
microfinance sector (Gosh and Tassel, 2013). Creditors tend to have less appetite to lend in such 
situations, even with high level of collateral.     
Similar to tangibility results, the study find 11 significnant and 22 nonsignificant negative 
coefficients for MFI risk on leverage. The findings that more than half of the coefficient in the 
sample are in the same direction is in line with the findings of Lemmon et al. (2008) and Gropp 
and Heider (2010), where risk is found to significantly reduce leverage in the banking sector. 
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Unlike, Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Frank and Goyal (2009) which find that risk is not a reliable 
driver of firm capital structure. The argument that higher risk means higher volatility of earnings 
and higher probability of bankruptcy and less debt. The risk of default for a financial firm such as 
MFIs is important if the quality of credit portfolio is bad. However, outdtanding loans represents 
a significant portion of MFIs total assets. As a result highly contaminated portfolio increases the 
risk of default for MFIs. Therefore, MFIs with poor portfolio quality tend to avoid the risk of 
failure by strengthening their equity and thus reducing their leverage as observed by Tchuigoua 
(2015).    
The study observe that the impact of profitability on leverage are consistent with the pecking order 
theory which suggest that firms use internal financing for new investment and when the need for 
external financing arises, firms choose debt over equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Consistent with 
prior studies (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Fan et al.,2012; de Jong et al., 2008), 
the expected negative relationship between profitability and leverage is found in 23 countries in 
this sample. The empirical studies on microfinance (Tchuigoua, 2014; 2015; Mersland and 
Urgeghe, 2013) seems to confirm the hypothesis that negative relation exist between profitability 
and leverage. This relationship cane be explained using the pecking order theory framework. Due 
to asymmetric information problem synonymous with MFIs (Garmaise and Natividad, 2010), 
MFIs prefer internal source of funding, in this case retained earnings than external. As for the 
impact of liquidity, the findings show that there are more significant negative relationship between 
liquidity and leverage in the sample. This is in line with the conventional theories that high 
liquidity reduces exposure to the risk of being unable to meet short-term financial commitments 
and the appetite for raising debt.  
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The result shows 33 countries with significant positive between MFI size and leverage. The 
findings in morethan half of the countries in the sample are statistically significant and consistent 
with the theoretical prediction that larger firms are more leveraged than smaller firms (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; de Jong et al., 2008; Bogan, 2012; Tchuigoua, 2014). MFI size can as well serve 
as a subtitute or proxy for bankruptcy cost. Our results consistent with Berger et al. (2008) note 
that, large MFIs tend to be more diversified, to be more experienced in risk management, and low 
probability of bankruptcy (Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2008). Finally, there are mixed significant 
results for MFI age and leverage, although empirical studies based on life cycle theory suggest a 
positve relationship between mature MFIs and leverage (Fehr and Hishigsuren, 2004; Bogan, 
2012). The mixed result may be explained by the nature of our sample.   
7.2.1.2. Subsidy model 
The study also observes that the impact of tangibilty on MFIs choice of subsidies yields statistically 
significant coeffients in 14 countries. Eight out of the fourteen significant coefficients are positive, 
meaning to say that there is a positive relationship between tangibility and subsidies. This result is 
consistent with previous study by Tchuigoua (2015). It shows that donor agencies care about risk 
when they decide to fund MFIs. Consistent with prior studies (Tchuigoua, 2014) this chapter finds 
mixed results on the impact of risk on subsidies. Risk is not an important determinants of donor 
funding as evidenced by Tchuigoua, (2015). The amount of subsidies to MFIs increases when the 
MFIs’ loan portfolio is healthy. This result suggests that donors pay attention to how MFIs 
efficiently use their grants and subsidies, and how efficiently they recover loans they allocate.  
The study find mixed results between profitability and subsidies. This result is not consistent with 
the empirical evidence on the value relevance of accounting information in the decision to make 
donations, that supports the positive relation between financial stability and donations (Trussel and 
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Parsons 2007). The rating scores and the profitability of MFIs better inform donors about MFIs  
past performance and global risk profile but are not drivers of subsidies. Being a for-profit MFI 
does not improve subsidies, given that the relation between the for-profit status and donations is 
not significant. This result also does not support the research on the field of microfinance 
(Fernando 2004; Ledgerwood and White 2006). In another angle, donor agencies are insentitive to 
profitability which is by product of commercialisation. Subsidies coming from donor agencies 
mostly targets outreach.  The role of subsidy in reaching the vast majority of poor people is 
important from a welfarist point of view. The argument is that MFIs can be profitable only when 
they are able to continue with with operation, reaching poor clients (Woller et al., 1999). Thus, the 
impact of profitability on subsidies is insignificant. On the impact of liquidity, the results suggest 
a positive relationship between liquidity and subsidies in morethan half of the countries in our 
sample. 
As expected, the study find a significant negative relationship between MFI size and subsidies in 
morethan half of the countries in the sample. The best explanation is that larger MFIs attract less 
subsidies compared to smaller MFIs. This result implies that donor agencies may tend to fund 
smaller MFIs because they are predominantly not profitable and are mostly start-ups. This 
argument is reinforced by Tchugoua (2014), which find a significant negative relatonship between 
MFI size and subsidised funding such as donated equity. When it comes to impact of MFIs age on 
subsidies, this chapter finds a significant positive relationship in 13 countries of the sample. This 
results is against the notion that mature MFIs tend to depend less on subsidized funding compared 
to younger MFIs (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). This can be expalained by the fact 
maturity appears to be a proxy for reputation, professionalism and efficiency. Therefore, donor 
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agencies reflects the ability of the organization to effectively accomplish its mission of reaching 
many poorer clients. 
Overall, there is significant evidence to support the view that the standard firm-specific 
determinants remain applicable to MFIs capital structure. More specifically, it is evident that firm-
specific factors are also relevant on MFIs choice of leverage and subsidies. This evidence answers 
a part of our third research question that examines the impact of firm-specific factors on MFIs 
capital structure. We find that impact for some factors such as risk, profitability, liquidity and size 
on leverage is strong and consistent with standard capital structure theories across large number of 
countries. However, determinants such as tangibility and age show unexpected signs. Considering 
the impact of firm-specific factors on subsidies, the study finds that the impact of tangibility and 
size on subsidies are consistent with our predictions. However, results from a few determinants 
remain mixed, and in some countries, some coefficients are significant with an unexpected sign. 
In order to proceed to the second step of the analysis, it is important to conduct additional analysis 
on the impact of firm-specific determinants on MFIs capital structure decision. More specifically, 
it is important to know if the impact of firm-specific determinants on MFI capital structure decision 
are the same or different across countries. If the firm-specific coefficients does not differ 
significantly across countries, it is wise to apply a single model for all MFIs across countries as 
done by Tchuigoua, (2014) in the microfinance sector and non-MFI studies (Fan et al., 2012: Booth 
et al., 2001), Otherwise the common method of pooling firm-specific determinants from different 
countries into one single regression model may wrongly force different firm-specific coefficients 
to be significant. 
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Table 7.3          
The impact of Firm-specific variables on leverage across countries    
Country  Intercept TANG RISK PROF LIQUID SIZE AGE Obs Adj- R2 
          
Afghanistan -0.09 6.61*** -0.16 -0.12 0.73** 0.03 0.01 45 0.36 
 (-0.12) (3.29) (-0.27) (-0.50) (2.05) (0.47) (0.13)   
Albania 8.92** -6.36 2.91** -0.01 -0.07 -0.63** 0.56*** 13 0.72 
 (3.44) (-1.51) (2.86) (-0.01) (-0.18) (-3.40) (3.85)   
Argentina -0.24 -0.65 -0.92 0.04 -0.08 0.07*** -0.04 51 0.44 
 (-0.68) (-1.34) (-0.97) (0.26) (-0.33) (3.42) (-1.28)   
Armenia -0.29 -1.50 0.59 -1.24*** -0.33 0.07*** -0.02 65 0.25 
 (-0.88) (-1.65) (0.69) (-4.04) (-1.34) (2.99) (-0.51)   
Azerbaijan -0.62*** -0.96* -0.53 -0.74*** 0.39* 0.07*** 0.06* 129 0.51 
 (-4.86) (-1.86) (-0.81) (-3.36) (1.77) (6.98) (1.88)   
Bangladesh 0.86*** 0.02 -0.93*** -2.49*** 0.14 0.00 0.00 106 0.47 
 (10.43) (0.09) (-6.41) (-8.11) (1.52) (0.55) (0.00)   
 Benin 0.15 -1.62*** 2.58*** -0.01 -1.05** 0.05* 0.01 17 0.70 
 (0.44) (-5.07) (3.55) (-1.11) (-3.01) (2.06) (0.63)   
Bolivia 0.40** -2.03*** -0.85*** -3.08*** -0.02 0.05*** -0.09 173 0.54 
 (1.97) (-2.97) (-4.13) (-8.63) (-0.14) (5.83) (-1.66)   
Bosnia and Herzegovina -0.99*** 0.97** 0.55 -0.48* -0.93*** 0.11*** -0.07 100 0.51 
 (-4.45) (2.42) (1.51) (-1.71) (-3.74) (8.21) (-2.01)   
Brazil 0.23 -0.52 -0.34 -0.25 -0.73*** 0.01 0.08 76 0.17 
 (0.62) (-0.25) (-1.26) (-1.14) (-2.86) (0.63) (1.25)   
Bulgaria -0.34 -2.43*** -1.99** -0.63 0.34 0.09 -0.17** 28 0.62 
 (-0.23) (-3.41) (-2.01) (-0.81) (0.94) (0.93) (-2.71)   
Cambodia 0.45 0.75 7.16 0.75 -0.86 0.07* -0.29** 123 0.01 
 (0.76) (0.19) (1.41) (0.89) (-1.18) (1.78) (-2.28)   
 Chile -0.37 13.17** -3.20** -0.10 -0.60 0.04 - 14 0.78 
 (-0.17) (3.09) (-2.86) (-0.24) (-1.25) (0.29) -   
 Congo -1.31*** -1.20* -1.19 0.35 -0.37 0.16*** -0.18* 18 0.91 
 (-3.27) (-2.07) (-1.61) (0.94) (-1.33) (6.79) (-1.89)   
Colombia 0.32*** -1.07*** -1.18*** -1.67*** 0.08 0.02*** 0.04* 138 0.33 
 (2.79) (-4.58) (-2.80) (-5.86) (0.38) (4.33) (1.79)   
Costa Rica 0.69*** -1.22*** -0.65*** -0.96* -0.59** 0.01 - 82 0.35 
 (3.87) (-4.61) (-2.66) (-1.96) (-2.18) (0.69) -   
Dominican Republic -0.35 2.05** -1.68* -0.05 0.33 0.06*** - 42 0.35 
 (-1.25) (2.44) (-1.88) (-0.06) (1.01) (3.76) -   
Ecuador -0.07 1.39*** -0.11 -2.71*** -0.09 0.07*** -0.10*** 339 0.59 
 (-0.79) (5.56) (-0.39) (-9.49) (-1.28) (15.18) (-5.46)   
 Egypt 0.37 -2.08 -1.07 -0.02 0.16 0.01 -0.04 27 0.13 
 (0.43) (-1.59) (-1.37) (-0.01) (0.67) (0.16) (-0.97)   
 El Salvador -1.48*** -0.60*** -0.04 -1.11*** 0.40 0.16*** -0.14** 89 0.77 
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Table 7.3          
The impact of Firm-specific variables on leverage across countries    
Country  Intercept TANG RISK PROF LIQUID SIZE AGE Obs Adj- R2 
 (-5.64) (-2.71) (-0.11) (-2.64) (1.60) (12.46) (-2.60)   
Georgia -0.54** -1.58** 0.08 -0.02 -0.04 0.08*** -0.03 72 0.27 
 (-1.94) (-2.35) (0.29) (-0.06) (-0.13) (3.98) (-0.76)   
Ghana -0.83 3.74 -0.40 0.45 -1.36 0.06 0.29 11 0.15 
 (-0.26) (0.78) (-0.16) (0.77) (-0.77) (0.20) (0.90)   
Guatemala -0.55* 0.02 0.40 -0.84** -0.52*** 0.07*** -0.01 135 0.24 
 (-1.78) (0.03) (1.07) (-2.37) (-3.32) (4.32) (-0.34)   
Haiti -1.15 0.03 0.28 -0.98*** 0.20 0.15*** -0.19*** 34 0.64 
 (-1.45) (0.05) (0.88) (-3.53) (0.87) (2.96) (-3.65)   
 Honduras 0.09 -0.66** -0.99*** -0.79** -1.04*** 0.04*** 0.02 128 0.28 
 (0.36) (-1.99) (-3.05) (-2.30) (-5.05) (2.60) (0.42)   
India 0.31* 1.39*** -0.05 0.06** 1.58*** 0.01 0.05** 470 0.70 
 (1.91) (3.53) (-1.27) (2.26) (28.19) (0.49) (2.24)   
 Indonesia 1.35*** -0.38 0.02 0.03 -0.60*** -0.03* 0.02 59 0.25 
 (4.90) (-0.41) (0.22) (0.92) (-3.35) (-1.88) (0.87)   
Jordan -3.26 -0.52 1.13 1.84 0.03 0.20 0.10 10 0.84 
 (-1.20) (-0.13) (0.52) (0.28) (0.02) (1.12) (0.43)   
 Kazakhstan 1.16*** 1.24 -1.09 -0.09 0.76* -0.02 -0.10 38 0.01 
 (2.77) (0.86) (-1.39) (-0.13) (1.86) (-0.71) (-0.64)   
 Kenya 0.89*** 0.61* -0.05 0.56*** -0.07 0.01 -0.09*** 38 0.31 
 (8.04) (1.98) (-0.27) (2.77) (-0.69) (1.13) (-3.26)   
 Kosovo -0.75 -1.79 -2.50*** -0.90* 1.09** 0.05 0.20*** 48 0.44 
 (-1.59) (-0.66) (-2.94) (-1.73) (2.57) (1.65) (3.07)   
Kyrgyzstan 0.03 0.67 0.00 -0.65*** 0.44 0.04* -0.01 61 0.21 
 (0.12) (0.57) (-0.09) (-3.46) (1.46) (1.77) (-0.16)   
 Macedonia -0.41*** -1.82** -0.42** -1.35** 0.04 0.07*** 0.00 17 0.94 
 (-3.56) (-3.14) (-2.42) (-2.54) (0.29) (7.49) (-0.04)   
 Mexico 0.16 0.11 -0.81*** -0.43*** -0.58*** 0.03*** 0.03 199 0.22 
 (1.09) (0.32) (-4.59) (-3.67) (-4.15) (3.32) (1.40)   
Mongolia -0.12 -1.89** -0.13 -0.03 -0.18 0.04** 0.12** 27 0.74 
 (-0.50) (-2.66) (-0.14) (-0.09) (-0.58) (2.57) (2.44)   
 Morocco 1.30*** -2.37 -0.09 -0.08 0.31 -0.01 -0.10 28 0.14 
 (4.75) (-1.67) (-0.10) (-0.21) (1.71) (-0.89) (-1.47)   
 Mozambique -2.39*** -0.31 -1.20 0.00 -0.49** 0.20*** 0.04 14 0.90 
 (-4.79) (-1.80) (-1.43) (0.55) (-3.06) (5.14) (0.83)   
Nepal 0.53*** -0.96** 0.51*** -0.18*** -0.11** 0.02** 0.03* 123 0.29 
 (4.15) (-2.59) (4.82) (-3.31) (-2.08) (2.56) (1.85)   
Nicaragua 0.21 -0.35 -0.01 -0.86*** -0.25* 0.05*** -0.08* 175 0.25 
 (1.04) (-0.88) (-0.07) (-5.37) (-1.81) (5.25) (-1.91)   
Nigeria 0.21 -0.29 0.65 0.04 0.12 0.00 0.14* 34 0.02 
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The impact of Firm-specific variables on leverage across countries    
Country  Intercept TANG RISK PROF LIQUID SIZE AGE Obs Adj- R2 
 (0.42) (-0.33) (1.70) (0.50) (0.38) (0.15) (1.78)   
 Pakistan -0.22 -3.40*** 0.68 -1.84*** -0.29* 0.05*** 0.10*** 131 0.29 
 (-0.67) (-4.52) (1.62) (-6.67) (-1.67) (2.74) (2.81)   
 Palestine 3.18*** 2.87 -0.41 -0.04 -0.63*** -0.18*** - 27 0.66 
 (3.51) (1.51) (-1.44) (-0.12) (-2.92) (-3.24) -   
 Panama -0.79** 1.85** -0.15 -0.32 -0.05 0.06** 0.12** 29 0.70 
 (-2.23) (2.11) (-0.28) (-0.62) (-0.35) (2.54) (2.66)   
Paraguay 0.57*** -4.31*** -0.64** -0.37* -0.28* 0.03*** - 47 0.87 
 (4.84) (-8.33) -2.35 (-1.78) (-1.70) (4.32) -   
Peru 0.20* -2.27*** 1.24*** -1.01*** 0.31 0.04*** -0.05 131 0.65 
 (1.68) (-6.16) (3.26) (-3.48) (1.41) (6.90) (-1.61)   
Philippines 0.86 0.88 0.99* 0.00 0.47 0.07 -0.49*** 60 0.47 
 (1.27) (0.44) (1.98) (0.37) (1.33) (1.49) (-4.05)   
 Romania -0.44 -3.19*** -0.01 -0.55*** -0.01 0.06*** 0.09*** 15 0.96 
 (-1.75) (-4.05) (-0.20) (-6.19) (-0.25) (4.54) (7.10)   
 Russia 1.88*** -0.84 0.01 -0.73 -0.98*** -0.07** 0.05 47 0.56 
 (4.83) (-1.11) (0.01) (-1.37) (-4.65) (-2.13) (0.70)   
Samoa 8.95*** 1.75 1.85 -4.17** 1.61* -0.61*** 0.36* 11 0.99 
 (9.19) (1.25) (0.88) (-3.84) (2.24) (-10.94) (2.27)   
Senegal 1.52** 2.05 -0.73 0.01 1.63 -0.05 -0.12 22 0.43 
 (2.17) (0.98) (-0.43) (0.64) (1.28) (-1.38) (-0.98)   
Serbia -3.85*** -2.05*** -0.04 0.01 0.13 0.26*** 0.00 19 0.98 
 (-14.21) (-5.66) (-0.23) (0.03) (0.82) (14.43) (-0.05)   
Sri Lanka -0.19 1.09 0.40 0.00 0.21 0.06 -0.07* 42 0.14 
 (-0.24) (1.59) (0.56) (-0.90) (0.56) (1.23) (-1.69)   
Tajikistan -0.45** -0.85* 0.33 -0.43 -0.10 0.08*** -0.01 80 0.58 
 (-2.55) (-1.72) (0.50) (-1.40) (-0.77) (6.59) (-0.54)   
 Togo -0.15 1.55 -0.23 1.23 -0.88 0.07*** -0.02 18 0.65 
 (-0.26) (0.68) (-0.32) (1.47) (-1.34) (3.44) (-0.11)   
 Tunisia -3.20 1.36 -0.77 0.43 1.07 0.21* - 11 0.91 
 (-1.77) (0.88) (-0.24) (0.13) (0.52) (2.25) -   
 Uzbekistan -0.66*** -0.28 0.13 -0.84** 0.11 0.05*** 0.16*** 11 0.99 
 (-6.48) (-0.29) (0.12) (-2.95) (0.80) (5.98) (13.12)   
This table presents regression results of leverage and Firm-specific variables for 56 countries using MFI-level data of 2004-2014 estimated from 
Eq. (1): 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡=  𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑖𝑡 + + 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽6𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + Ɛ𝑖𝑡 where ?̇? denotes individual MFI and 𝑡 denotes 
time. All other variables are defined in Table 3.3. White heteroscedasticity is used. ***, **, * indicates that the coefficient estimates are significantly 
different from zero at 1%, 5%, 10% levels. P-value is reported in parentheses. Obs. is the number of MFI-year observation per country in the 
regressions. Adj- 𝑅2is the value of Adjusted 𝑅2 for the regression.  
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Table 7.4: The impact of Firm-specific variables on subsidies across countries    
Country  Intercept TANG RISK PROF LIQUID SIZE AGE Obs Adj- R2 
          
Afghanistan -0.67 -4.34 1.38 -1.12* -1.80** 0.10 0.02 38 0.18 
 (-0.37) (-0.92) (1.11) (-1.79) (-2.20) (0.75) (0.12)   
Albania 0.49 -5.46 -0.81 0.56 0.38 0.04 -0.37 11 0.63 
 (0.11) (-0.70) (-0.43) (0.26) (0.52) (0.13) (-1.40)   
Argentina 0.31** -0.23 0.04 0.07 -0.15* -0.02** 0.02* 21 0.30 
 (2.18) (-0.39) (0.19) (1.46) (-2.00) (-2.21) (1.96)   
Armenia 1.23*** -0.06 -1.45 1.73*** 0.62 -0.09*** 0.10* 40 0.31 
 (2.99) (-0.06) (-1.47) (3.14) (1.48) (-3.33) (1.97)   
Azerbaijan 0.97*** 1.09 -2.78** -0.55 -0.92*** -0.02 -0.16*** 106 0.24 
 (4.77) (1.22) (-2.57) (-1.33) (-2.70) (-1.15) (-3.27)   
Bangladesh 0.38*** -0.09 0.69*** 0.79*** 0.18* -0.02*** - 100 0.32 
 (4.12) (-0.31) (4.29) (3.13) (1.67) (-4.37) -   
 Benin 0.75* 1.68*** -2.12*** -0.01 0.22 -0.04 -0.07** 16 0.76 
 (1.96) (5.24) (-2.85) (-0.48) (0.46) (-1.20) (-2.35)   
Bolivia 0.35* -0.72 1.56*** 1.35*** 0.52*** -0.04*** 0.10** 163 0.50 
 (1.92) (-1.06) (7.74) (3.53) (3.31) (-5.13) (2.00)   
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.14*** -0.58** -0.10 -0.07 0.53*** -0.06*** -0.01 93 0.37 
 (7.26) (-2.04) (-0.34) (-0.36) (2.62) (-6.29) (-0.54)   
Brazil 0.03 5.07** -0.16 -0.24 -0.44 -0.02 0.11 66 0.12 
 (0.08) (2.40) (-0.59) (-0.87) (-1.67) (-0.88) (1.23)   
Bulgaria 3.85*** 0.47 1.69** -1.12* -0.27 -0.28*** 0.11*** 24 0.75 
 (3.67) (0.66) (2.52) (-1.94) (-0.73) (-3.84) (2.71)   
Cambodia 0.24* -0.55 6.42*** -1.16*** 0.13 0.00 -0.04 82 0.68 
 (1.73) (-0.56) (4.43) (-5.59) (0.60) (-0.53) (-1.37)   
 Chile 12.37 -27.17 2.42 1.16 2.14 -0.71 - 11 0.39 
 (1.95) (-1.63) (0.83) (0.83) (1.07) (-1.96) -   
 Congo 5.44*** -0.65 -1.13 2.86** 2.73*** -0.42*** 0.53 15 0.78 
 (4.54) (-0.33) (-0.45) (2.61) (3.07) (-6.26) (1.83)   
Colombia 0.26** 0.28 1.17*** 0.23 0.32* -0.02*** 0.01 112 0.29 
 (2.47) (1.36) (3.46) (0.95) (1.98) (-4.68) (0.51)   
Costa Rica 0.19* 0.88*** 0.15 0.70** 0.53*** -0.02** - 84 0.39 
 (1.71) (5.17) (0.93) (2.28) (3.02) (-2.21) -   
Dominican Republic 0.54* -0.32 0.57 -0.45 0.09 -0.03 - 31 0.11 
 (1.90) (-0.41) (0.69) (-1.16) (0.25) (-1.56) -   
Ecuador 0.59*** -1.10*** -0.45* -0.08 0.07 -0.03*** 0.02 276 0.29 
 (7.87) (-5.48) (-1.86) (-0.35) (0.68) (-9.43) (1.39)   
 Egypt 1.79** -0.66 0.19 -2.53*** 0.21 -0.06 -0.07* 27 0.84 
 (2.48) (-0.60) (0.29) (-2.70) (1.01) (-1.49) (-1.83)   
 El Salvador 2.12*** -1.11*** -0.45 -0.65 0.09 -0.14*** 0.13 66 0.37 
 (3.62) (-2.77) (-0.61) (-0.83) (0.21) (-5.43) (1.20)   
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Table 7.4: The impact of Firm-specific variables on subsidies across countries    
Country  Intercept TANG RISK PROF LIQUID SIZE AGE Obs Adj- R2 
Georgia 1.80*** -1.34 1.72 0.72* 0.39 -0.14*** 0.21*** 52 0.22 
 (4.26) (-0.97) (1.59) (1.74) (0.91) (-4.13) (2.75)   
Ghana 3.07 -2.68 2.51 -0.09 0.05 -0.15 -0.25 9 0.30 
 (0.21) (-0.08) (0.44) (-0.05) (0.01) (-0.14) (-0.33)   
Guatemala 1.49*** 1.01 -1.40*** -0.64 -0.30 -0.10*** 0.09* 115 0.19 
 (4.24) (0.96) (-2.93) (-1.53) (-1.16) (-4.77) (1.71)   
Haiti 0.79*** -0.40*** -0.10 -0.08 -0.04 -0.05*** 0.03*** 26 0.54 
 (5.36) (-3.59) (-1.71) (-1.53) (-0.92) (-5.46) (3.42)   
 Honduras 0.73*** 0.80*** 0.04 -2.39*** 0.74*** -0.04*** -0.04 121 0.58 
 (3.84) (3.24) (0.16) (-9.24) (4.58) (-2.92) (-0.93)   
India 0.10** -0.08 -0.01 -0.06*** 0.04*** -0.01** 0.01* 288 0.04 
 (2.32) (-0.60) (-0.74) (-3.33) (3.00) (-2.39) (1.93)   
 Indonesia 0.35 0.51 -0.48 0.08 0.20 -0.02 0.01 23 0.21 
 (0.60) (0.28) (-0.61) (1.18) (0.75) (-0.63) (0.22)   
Jordan 5.90* -1.84 -0.99 -0.74 0.08 -0.30 -0.15 10 0.96 
 (2.58) (-0.53) (-0.54) (-0.13) (0.06) (-2.04) (-0.72)   
 Kazakhstan 0.36* 1.95*** -0.06 -0.24 0.20 -0.03** 0.03 25 0.20 
 (1.87) (2.85) (-0.14) (-0.74) (1.10) (-2.13) (0.59)   
 Kenya -0.63 -2.33 0.01 3.59 -0.30 -0.01 0.37 15 0.24 
 (-1.08) (-1.54) (0.02) (1.54) (-0.82) (-0.47) (1.80)   
 Kosovo 1.22** 4.84*** 0.92 1.22* -1.12** -0.06 -0.08 42 0.33 
 (2.13) (2.86) (0.86) (1.74) (-2.03) (-1.39) (-1.09)   
Kyrgyzstan 0.47*** 2.39*** -0.01 0.39*** 0.21 -0.04*** 0.04** 45 0.23 
 (3.55) (3.60) (-0.48) (2.75) (1.51) (-3.87) (2.10)   
 Macedonia 0.01 -0.01 0.06** 0.00 -0.05** 0.00 -0.01** 9 0.92 
 (1.68) (-0.23) (6.91) (-0.13) (-4.87) (0.75) (-4.71)   
 Mexico 0.22*** -0.18 -0.08 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01*** 0.02* 137 0.04 
 (2.96) (-1.19) (-0.86) (-1.09) (-0.09) (-2.67) (1.75)   
Mongolia 0.30 -1.09 1.70 -0.68 -0.42 -0.01 0.02 20 0.05 
 (1.04) (-1.21) (0.64) (-1.60) (-1.00) (-0.56) (0.30)   
 Morocco 0.99** 4.61* 3.00** 0.27 -0.62*** -0.05** -0.07 27 0.64 
 (2.36) (1.76) (2.53) (0.54) (-2.78) (-2.10) (-0.84)   
 Mozambique -1.33** 0.05 -1.05** -0.03** -0.04 0.09** 0.05* 9 0.92 
 (-5.82) (0.88) (-5.34) (-8.02) (-0.76) (5.54) (3.64)   
Nepal -0.01 0.17** 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 77 0.08 
 (-0.42) (2.03) (0.19) (-0.35) (0.39) (0.07) (1.01)   
Nicaragua 0.70*** -0.60 -0.02 -0.05 0.21* -0.05*** 0.05 163 0.20 
 (3.91) (-1.55) (-0.24) (-0.33) (1.88) (-5.64) (1.41)   
Nigeria 0.76 1.28 -0.47 0.55 -0.04 -0.05** 0.03 19 0.33 
 (1.60) (1.64) (-1.18) (1.09) (-0.14) (-2.43) (0.41)   
 Pakistan 1.69*** -0.04 1.50*** -0.40 -0.13 -0.10*** 0.04 106 0.39 
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Table 7.4: The impact of Firm-specific variables on subsidies across countries    
Country  Intercept TANG RISK PROF LIQUID SIZE AGE Obs Adj- R2 
 (4.71) (-0.05) (3.20) (-1.42) (-0.65) (-5.06) (1.03)   
 Palestine 1.55 -11.70 0.53 -0.15 -0.94 -0.04 - 22 0.29 
 (0.35) (-1.32) (0.43) (-0.11) (-1.00) (-0.14) -   
 Panama 2.76*** 1.23 0.20 -0.33 0.64*** -0.22*** 0.28*** 30 0.91 
 (6.32) (1.13) (0.30) (-0.60) (3.48) (-7.15) (5.34)   
Paraguay 0.57*** -1.56** -0.35 -0.11 0.04 -0.03*** - 29 0.36 
 (4.31) (-2.61) (-0.88) (-0.49) (0.19) (-3.74) -   
Peru 0.49*** 0.63 -1.53** -0.15 -0.05 -0.03*** 0.04 88 0.36 
 (3.51) (1.58) (-2.09) (-0.43) (-0.15) (-3.37) (1.00)   
Philippines 0.65** 0.57 -0.75*** 0.00 -0.19 -0.01 -0.14** 55 0.29 
 (2.17) (0.69) (-3.50) (0.11) (-1.31) (-0.47) (-2.79)   
 Russia -0.67 -0.08 1.24 1.48 0.32 0.04 0.02 35 0.19 
 (-1.20) (-0.06) (1.03) (1.30) (0.91) (0.72) (0.18)   
Samoa -0.01 -0.47 1.08 -0.43 -1.13 0.07 -0.23 8 0.78 
 (0.00) (-0.17) (0.20) (-0.22) (-0.87) (0.24) (-0.58)   
Senegal -0.11 -0.79** -0.89*** 0.00 0.30 -0.01 0.12*** 20 0.67 
 (-0.99) (-2.62) (-3.60) (-1.30) (1.62) (-1.28) (5.36)   
 Serbia 0.83 -2.49 0.06 1.96 -1.25 0.00 -0.14 17 0.45 
 (0.40) (-1.15) (0.05) (0.60) (-1.24) (0.01) (-0.96)   
Sri Lanka 2.43 -1.80 -0.74 -1.01 -0.08 -0.12 -0.14 29 0.22 
 (1.25) (-1.01) (-0.31) (-0.64) (-0.09) (-0.92) (-1.35)   
Tajikistan 0.72*** 0.04 0.08 1.05** -0.05 -0.03** -0.07** 63 0.34 
 (2.82) (0.06) (0.09) (2.56) (-0.27) (-2.03) (-2.12)   
 Togo 2.14*** -1.73 -0.34 1.38 0.91 -0.04* -0.51*** 16 0.61 
 (3.72) (-0.63) (-0.46) (1.53) (1.27) (-1.94) (-2.52)   
 Tunisia 4.23* -0.85 -0.01 -2.18 0.55 -0.22* - 11 0.88 
 (2.16) (-0.51) (0.00) (-0.61) (0.25) (-2.20) -   
This table presents regression results of leverage and Firm-specific variables for 54 countries using MFI-level data of 2004-2014 estimated from 
Eq. (1): 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡=  𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑖𝑡 + + 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽6𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + Ɛ𝑖𝑡 where ?̇? denotes individual MFI and 𝑡 denotes 
time. All other variables are defined in Table 3.3. White heteroscedasticity is used. ***, **, * indicates that the coefficient estimates are significantly 
different from zero at 1%, 5%, 10% levels. P-value is reported in parentheses. Obs. is the number of MFI-year observation per country in the 
regressions. Adj- 𝑅2is the value of Adjusted 𝑅2 for the regression. 
 
To test whether each firm-specific coeffcients are equal across countries, this chapter employs the 
f-test setup described ealier in the methodology section. The f-test results are reported in Table 7.5. 
For the test involving the six firm-specific coefficients with leverage, we accept the null hypothesis 
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(all firm-specific coefficients are equall across countries) of all the firm-specific coeffcients except 
for TANG coefficient. This result provides a strong statistical evidence that all of the firm-specific 
coefficient are equal for 56 countries in our sample except tangibility. Similarly, we accept the null 
hypothesis (all firm-specific coefficients are equal across countries) that firm-specific coefficients 
are equal across countries except for RISK coefficients in the subsidy model. However, for the 
most important test on equality of coefficients for all the firm-specific factors. The calculated 
values are 7.76 and 6.69. This result provide a strong statistical evidence that all firm-specific 
coefficients are not equal across the 56 countries in our sample. This evidence provide answer to 
our important research question of whether the impact of firm-specific determinants is equal across 
countries.   
The implication of this results means that it is not valid to construct a single model that pools all 
MFIs across countries as in (Tchuigoua, 2014) to test the impact of institutional-specific factors 
by simply assuming that the impact of firm-specific determinants on capital structure of MFIs are 
equal across countries. This results is in line with de Jong et al., (2008) findings on firms across 
42 countries. Their findings, though similar to ours, suggest the use of country dummies as a 
potential solution to capture the influence of institutional-specific factors on firms capital structure. 
By doing that, it would allow each country to serve as an observation in the analysis, rather than 
pooling all MFIs in all countries. 
7.2.2. Direct impact of institutional-specific factors  
The results that examines the direct impact of institutional variables on MFIs capital structure are 
reported on Tables 7.6 and 7.7. The estimated regression coefficients of the explanatory variables 
are presented in different columns. It was observed that none of the regression model has an 
adjusted-𝑅2 below 10% when leverage is the dependent variable while we observe 7% adjusted-
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𝑅2 when the dependent variable is subsidies. Overall, it indicates that the model specification used 
in this chapter captures a good part of the variation in country dummy coefficients. Therefore, 
institutional factors plays a vital role in explaining the capital structure of MFIs.  
Table 7.5 ƒ-test for the equality of coefficients of Firm-specific determinants across countries 
Panel A        
Variables  TANG RISK PROF LIQUI SIZE AGE 
LEVERAGE       
ƒ-statistics 12.44 1.57 3.48 1.32 0.62 0.48 
p-value  0.002 0.220 0.073 0.261 0.436 0.492 
Results  Rejection No-rejection No-rejection No-rejection No-rejection No-rejection 
Panel B        
SUBSIDIES       
ƒ-statistics 4.23 15.35 3.95 1.51 2.43 0.01 
p-value  0.052 0.001 0.060 0.233 0.134 0.923 
Results  No-rejection Rejection No-rejection No-rejection No-rejection No-rejection 
Panel C        
Variables  LEVERAGE  SUBSIDIES  
        
f-statistics 7.756   6.692   
p-value  0.000   0.000   
N  4101   3159   
K  36   36   
J  330   318   
Results  Rejection   Rejection   
This table presents the test results whether each Firm-specific coefficients is the same across countries in panel A and Panel B. Panel C presents 
results on the equality of coefficients across all the 56 countries. Rejection means the coefficients are not equal across countries. Rejection is at 5% 
level. 
 
7.2.2.1. Leverage model 
The result show that the leverage undertaking of MFIs is directly determined by a number of 
institutional-specific variables such as credit information bureau, country’s legal origin, political 
stability and prudential regulations. The study finds a consistent statistically significant 
relationship between credit information bureau and MFIs leverage. Higher level of information 
sharing is negatively related to leverage, contradicting findings by Sorge and Zang (2010) that 
  
163 
 
higher levels of information sharing in the credit market reduces firms level of information 
asymmetry which results to higher share of leverage in firms capital structure. Perhaps 
microfinance institutions are synanymous to asymmetric information problems (Garmaise and 
Natividad, 2010). The culture of poor accounting standards and lack of independent third party 
rating agencies makes it difficult to identify clear predictors of success in the microfinance 
industry. Therefore, it can be argued that higher credit information reflects the non-fully 
commercial nature of MFIs and the riskiness of microfinance business hence, the negative impact 
on leverage. The result shows that credit information bureau leads to adverse selection in the credit 
market towards MFIs.     
On the contrary, country’s legal origin has a positive impact on leverage. MFIs in countries that 
adopt the common-law system tend to be more leveraged, confirming the findings from the 
literature (La Porta et al., 1998; Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine,2001; Tchuigoua, 2014). This is 
becaause common-law countries have good accounting standards and stronger investor protection. 
Similarly, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2001), argue that common-law system creates incentives 
for market-based system that can easily create wealth. On the contrary, civil-law system tends to 
have underdeveloped financial systems. Due to these characterisitcs inherent in common-law 
countries, information asymmetry problem is greatly reduced and can therefore, facilitate more 
leverage undetaking by MFIs in these countries. Other control variables show interesting 
outcomes. Political stability is found to have positive impact on MFIs leverage. This is reasonable 
because political stability contributes to the certainty of returns for external investrors, which 
implies that MFIs operating in a more stable country are likely to me more leveraged. The study 
also finds that prudential regulation has strong positve impact on MFIs leverage. Countries with 
regulatory framework in place may tend to protect creditors and encourage transperency. As MFIs 
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become, regulated, commercial funding sources are far more willing to lend to them, hence the 
positive impact on leverage as in previous studies (Tchuigoua, 2014).   
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Table 7.6: Direct impact of institutional variables on MFIs leverage       
Dependent variable Explanatory variables        Adj-𝑅2 Obs 
  Intercept CREDRIGHT CREDINFO LEGAL FINDEV CORRUP POLSTA REGUL GDP   
COUNTRYDUM LEV 0.406*** -0.004 -0.025*** 0.135** 0.083 -0.044 0.050* 0.117*** -0.457 0.16 468 
  (4.58) (-0.42) (-2.96) (2.53) (0.75) (-0.99) (1.76) (3.07) (-1.16)   
             
  0.381*** -0.003 -0.024*** 0.135** 0.092 -0.047 0.049* 0.117***  0.16 468 
  (4.43) (-0.37) (-2.81) (2.55) (0.83) (-1.06) (1.73) (3.07)    
             
  0.491*** -0.003 -0.025*** 0.131** 0.082 -0.066 0.058**  -0.457 0.15 477 
  (5.84) (-0.37) (-2.89) (2.45) (0.74) (-1.54) (2.06)  (-1.17)   
             
  0.404*** -0.007 -0.025*** 0.139*** 0.118 -0.011  0.123*** -0.443 0.16 468 
  (4.55) (-0.78) (-2.87) (2.61) (1.08) (-0.26)  (3.24) (-1.12)   
             
  0.380*** -0.006 -0.023*** 0.139*** 0.125 -0.014  0.123***  0.16 468 
  (4.41) (-0.73) (-2.73) (2.62) (1.15) (-0.35)  (3.24)    
             
  0.466*** -0.003 -0.023*** 0.132** 0.089 -0.069 0.057**   0.15 477 
  (5.72) (-0.31) (-2.74) (2.46) (0.81) (-1.61) (2.04)     
             
  0.494*** -0.007 -0.024*** 0.135** 0.121 -0.029   -0.441 0.14 477 
  (5.86) (-0.79) (-2.78) (2.53) (1.11) (-0.74)   (-1.13)   
             
  0.470*** -0.006 -0.022*** 0.136** 0.128 -0.032    0.14 477 
  (5.76) (-0.73) (-2.64) (2.53) (1.17) (-0.82)      
This table presents the WLS regression results of country dummy coeffcients (𝛼𝑗𝑡) against institutional-specific factors estimated in Equation (5.7): 𝛼𝑗= 𝛾0+ 𝛾1𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑗𝑡 +𝛾2𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑗𝑡+ 𝛾3𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑗𝑡+ 
𝛾4𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑗𝑡+ 𝛾5𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑗𝑡+ 𝛾1𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑈𝐿𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝑤𝑗𝑡 in which the country dummy coefficients are estimated from Equation (5.6). All institutional variables are defined in Table 7.2. 
The weight are the inverse standard errors of the corresponding country dummy coefficients estimated from Equation (5.6). Regional dummies are included in the estimates (Not reported). The superscript 
*, ** and *** indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Obs is the number of countries that have all instituional variables. Adj-𝑅2 is the value of adjusted-𝑅2 for the regression. 
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Table 7.7: Direct impact of institutional variables on MFIs subsidies       
Dependent variable Explanatory variables        Adj-𝑅2 Obs 
  Intercept CREDRIGHT CREDINFO LEGAL FINDEV CORRUP POLSTA REGUL GDP   
COUNTRYDUM SUBS -0.027 0.000 0.010 0.071 -0.258*** 0.064* -0.025 -0.075** 1.883*** 0.14 437 
  (-0.35) (-0.05) (1.30) (1.40) (-2.71) (1.67) (-1.02) (-2.26) (5.50)   
             
  0.1010 -0.001 0.003 0.057 -0.310*** 0.088** -0.021 -0.076**  0.08 437 
  (1.31) (-0.17) (0.36) (1.10) (-3.16) (2.25) (-0.82) (-2.21)    
             
  -0.079 -0.001 0.009 0.073 -0.256*** 0.078** -0.029  1.882*** 0.13 446 
  (-1.06) (-0.10) (1.28) (1.45) (-2.70) (2.10) (-1.17)  (5.60)   
             
  -0.023 0.001 0.009 0.070 -0.276*** 0.047  -0.078** 1.873*** 0.14 437 
  (-0.29) (0.15) (1.25) (1.38) (-2.96) (1.37)  (-2.34) (5.47)   
             
  0.1040 0.000 0.002 0.057 -0.325*** 0.074**  -0.078**  0.08 437 
  (1.35) (-0.01) (0.32) (1.09) (-3.38) (2.10)  (-2.28)    
             
  0.047 -0.002 0.003 0.060 -0.306*** 0.101*** -0.025   0.07 446 
  (0.64) (-0.23) (0.35) (1.16) (-3.13) (2.64) (-0.96)     
             
  -0.076 0.001 0.009 0.072 -0.277*** 0.060*   1.870*** 0.13 446 
  (-1.02) (0.13) (1.21) (1.43) (-2.98) (1.77)   (5.56)   
             
  0.049 0.000 0.002 0.060 -0.323*** 0.085**    0.07 446 
  (0.67) (-0.04) (0.30) (1.15) (-3.37) (2.47)      
This table presents the WLS regression results of country dummy coeffcients (𝛼𝑗𝑡) against institutional factors estimated in Equation (5.7): 𝛼𝑗= 𝛾0+ 𝛾1𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑗𝑡 +𝛾2𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑗𝑡+ 𝛾3𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑗𝑡+ 
𝛾4𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑗𝑡+ 𝛾5𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑗𝑡+ 𝛾1𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑈𝐿𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝑤𝑗𝑡 in which the country dummy coefficients are estimated from Equation (5.6). All institutional variables are defined in Table 7.2. 
The weight are the inverse standard errors of the corresponding country dummy coefficients estimated from Equation (5.6). Regional dummies are included in the estimates (Not reported). The superscript 
*, ** and *** indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Obs is the number of countries that have all instituional variables. Adj-𝑅2 is the value of adjusted-𝑅2 for the regression. 
  
167 
 
7.2.2.2. Subsidy model 
The regression results also show that Subsidies is directly related to a number of institutional-
specific factors. The study finds that financial sector development is negatively related to 
subsidies. The possible explanation for this effect is that a developed financial sector enables MFIs 
to access other sources of financing (Vanroose and D’Espallier, 2013), which invariably reduces 
their dependence on subsidised funding. The availability and easy access to other classes of 
funding based on favourable terms makes MFIs less dependent on subsidies.  
It was also found that the level of corruption has a positive impact on subsidies, which is contrary 
to the findings of prior studies Tchuigoua, (2014). The possible explanation for this is that, when 
a country has high level of corruption, MFIs may have less choice for raising finance in the credit 
market because of high level of information asymmetry due to corruption. Therefore, MFIs may 
tend to avoid legal contracts or may be pushed out of the formal credit market, hence the choice 
of non-legally binding form of financing such as subsidies.  
Significant results were observed in some control variables. Regulatory framework have 
significant negative relationship with subsidies. This is expected because regulation tends to 
control MFIs activities and any source of funding that is not legally binding may not be encouraged 
by the regulatory bodies, hense the negative relationship. Results also show a significant positive 
relationship between economic growth and subsidies. The present results are also broadly 
consistent with previous MFIs studies, only that, there are recorded differences in coefficients. 
This diferences may be due to variation in econometric analysis, or simply due to sampling error. 
Other variables not examined in previous MFI studies are consistent outcomes with other corporate 
finance studies. Overall, our results show significant direct impact of institutional-specific factors 
on MFI capital structure (Leverage and Subsidy).    
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7.2.3. Indirect impact of institutional factors 
One of the interesting arguments of this chapter is that institutional-specific factors may have 
potential influence on firm-specific determinants of capital structure. This chapter examines the 
role of institutional diffrences across countries and how they affect the impact of firm-specific 
factors. As previously discussed, the estimated coefficients of firm-specific variables for each 
country is used as dependent variables in all the capital structure models. The regression results of 
the indirect impact are presented in Tables 7.8 and 7.9 for leverage and Subsidies respectively. 
The estimated regression coefficients of institutional factors used as explanatory variables are 
presented in different columns.  
The overall results indicates that institutional-specific factors have an influence on the roles of 
firm-specific determinants of capital structure. The study find a significant negative relationship 
between variable representing legal structure (CREDRIGHT) and the estimated coefficients of MFI 
size. This indicates that MFI size is relatively less important for MFIs choice of leverage. As MFI-
size is reverse proxy of bankruptcy cost, strong creditor right protection may force MFIs to abide 
by their debt contracts thereby mitigating the role of MFI size. This is consistent with 
Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin (2011) findings that quality enforcement of creditors right act as 
substitute mechanism to firm size for controlling financial distress. However, in countries with 
weak creditors right protection, the role of MFI size in reducing information asymmetry is further 
strenghtened. Although, we do not find any evidence for the relationship between legal structure 
variables and subsidies via the estimated coefiicients of asset tangibility, risk and MFI size. 
The study also observe that credit market information (CREDINFO) indirectly influences MFIs 
leverage. We observe a significant negative impact on profitability coefficients. Countries with 
credit information registry have less asymmetric information problem between investors and 
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borrowers. As a result, the role of profitability as a source of internal finance is mitigated. The 
study argues that the presence of good credit information registry encourages MFIs to borrow more 
despite the availability of internal finance. We do not find evidence on subsidies as the coefficients 
of (CREDINFO) is not significant for both profitability and  liquidity variables. 
The study did not find any evidence on the impact of financial sector development on leverage via 
bankruptcy cost variables. However, this chapter finds a strong significant negative relationship 
between financial sector development (FINDEV) and the estimated coefficient of MFI-size. This 
means that in a developed financial sector, MFI-size is less important in determing MFI access to 
subsidies. Furthermore, the study observe several significant relationships that have interesting 
implications. Credit Information (CREDINFO) has a significant negative effect on MFI risk 
coefficent. When there is better credit information sharing in a country, MFIs are more likely to 
be more leveraged, thereby mitigating the influence of MFIs risk. 
Countries legal origin (LEGAL) indirectly influences capital structure of MFIs. The negative 
impact on liquidity coefficients indicates that liquidity is relatively less important for leverage 
choice of MFIs. As liquidity is a proxy of pecking order assumption, better legal origin is likely to 
influence MFIs choice of external finance over internal finance. The control variable, corruption 
(CORRUP) shows up with a significantly mitigating impact on the role of risk in determining MFIs 
leverage, while regulation (REG)  show a strengthening impact on the role of profitability. We do 
also observe several significant relationships on subsidies. The study finds significant negative 
effect between legal origin with liquidity. The control variables such as corruption level 
(CORRUP) and political stability (POLSTA) show up with a significantly mitigating impact on 
bankruptcy cost (MFI-size) variable and pecking order varibales (profitability and liquidity) 
respectively. 
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Overall, the results reported in Tables 7.6, 7.7, 7.8 and 7.9 suggest the critical role of institutional 
specific factors in determining the capital structure of microfinance institutions directly and 
indirectly. The study finds that variables characterising the legal structure (creditors right and legal 
origin) of countries and credit market informations to have significant direct and indirect impact 
on MFIs capital structure (Leverage and Subsidy).  
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Table 7.8: Indirect impact of institutional variables on MFIs leverage        
Dependent variable Explanatory variables        Adj-𝑅2 Obs 
  Intercept CREDRIGHT CREDINFO LEGAL FINDEV CORRUP POLSTA REGUL GDP   
TANG  3.280* -0.220 -0.190 0.545 -4.009* 0.334 0.553 0.063 17.718 0.28 53 
  (1.77) (-1.27) (-1.14) (0.56) (-1.78) (0.33) (0.93) (0.06) (1.10)   
             
  2.834 -0.240 -0.215 0.547 -3.412 0.815  0.296 19.357 0.28 53 
  (1.59) (-1.39) (-1.32) (0.57) (-1.58) (0.93)  (0.30) (1.21)   
             
  3.327** -0.218 -0.188 0.554 -4.037* 0.307 0.562  17.797 0.30 53 
  (2.00) (-1.30) (-1.17) (0.59) (-1.85) (0.34) (0.98)  (1.12)   
             
  3.454* -0.196 -0.212 0.659 -3.691 0.174 0.625 0.153  0.28 53 
  (1.87) (-1.13) (-1.28) (0.68) (-1.65) (0.17) (1.05) (0.15)    
             
RISK  1.339 0.179 -0.228** -0.045 0.166 -1.759*** 0.625* -1.020* 0.309 0.30 54 
  (1.21) (1.64) (-2.02) (-0.07) (0.13) (-2.99) (1.94) (-1.76) (0.03)   
             
  1.556 0.156 -0.199* -0.035 0.293 -1.213**  -0.869 2.022 0.25 54 
  (1.36) (1.39) (-1.71) (-0.05) (0.22) (-2.27)  (-1.46) (0.20)   
             
  0.724 0.133 -0.256** -0.219 0.266 -1.379** 0.549*  0.973 0.26 54 
  (0.67) (1.23) (-2.22) (-0.34) (0.20) (-2.46) (1.68)  (0.10)   
             
  1.344 0.179* -0.228** -0.041 0.163 -1.760*** 0.626* -1.021*  0.31 54 
  (1.23) (1.66) (-2.04) (-0.07) (0.13) (-3.03) (1.98) (-1.78)    
             
PROF  0.668 0.107** -0.240*** -0.465 0.715 -0.342 0.268 -0.822*** 7.019 0.82 54 
  (0.35) (2.20) (-4.60) (-1.19) (1.11) (-1.26) (1.33) (-2.99) (1.20)   
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Table 7.8: Indirect impact of institutional variables on MFIs leverage        
Dependent variable Explanatory variables        Adj-𝑅2 Obs 
  Intercept CREDRIGHT CREDINFO LEGAL FINDEV CORRUP POLSTA REGUL GDP   
             
  0.241 0.110** -0.236*** -0.522 0.915 -0.198  -0.761*** 9.273 0.81 54 
  (0.13) (2.25) (-4.48) (-1.33) (1.45) (-0.78)  (-2.78) (1.64)   
             
  0.363 0.066 -0.317*** -0.733* 1.165* 0.017 0.168  5.389 0.78 54 
  (0.18) (1.31) (-6.38) (-1.77) (1.70) (0.06) (0.78)  (0.85)   
             
  0.991 0.106** -0.256*** -0.407 0.797 -0.400 0.337 -0.791***  0.81 54 
  (0.53) (2.17) (-5.02) (-1.04) (1.24) (-1.48) (1.74) (-2.87)    
             
LIQUID  1.048 0.002 -0.071 -0.903** -0.430 0.570 0.086 1.028** -12.281* 0.27 55 
  (1.35) (0.02) (-0.99) (-2.10) (-0.45) (1.55) (0.39) (2.48) (-1.84)   
             
  1.023 -0.003 -0.073 -0.894** -0.367 0.635*  1.065*** -12.125* 0.29 55 
  (1.34) (-0.03) (-1.03) (-2.10) (-0.39) (1.95)  (2.67) (-1.84)   
             
  1.809** 0.050 -0.021 -0.816* -0.852 0.190 0.208  -13.228* 0.18 55 
  (2.39) (0.64) (-0.28) (-1.80) (-0.85) (0.53) (0.92)  (-1.87)   
             
  0.895 -0.009 -0.069 -1.065** -0.433 0.650* 0.062 1.072**  0.23 55 
  (1.13) (-0.11) (-0.94) (-2.46) (-0.44) (1.73) (0.27) (2.52)    
             
SIZE  -0.338 -0.039** 0.006 -0.063 0.380 0.046 -0.104 0.108 2.181 0.31 55 
  (-1.58) (-2.05) (0.29) (-0.56) (1.51) (0.42) (-1.63) (0.86) (1.08)   
             
  -0.268 -0.040** 0.009 -0.058 0.334 -0.038  0.058 1.868 0.28 55 
  (-1.25) (-2.04) (0.43) (-0.50) (1.31) (-0.39)  (0.47) (0.92)   
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Table 7.8: Indirect impact of institutional variables on MFIs leverage        
Dependent variable Explanatory variables        Adj-𝑅2 Obs 
  Intercept CREDRIGHT CREDINFO LEGAL FINDEV CORRUP POLSTA REGUL GDP   
             
  -0.259 -0.036* 0.012 -0.044 0.356 0.000 -0.091  2.107 0.31 55 
  (-1.34) (-1.94) (0.60) (-0.40) (1.43) (0.00) (-1.47)  (1.05)   
             
  -0.298 -0.037* 0.008 -0.056 0.393 0.038 -0.097 0.102  0.31 55 
  (-1.41) (-1.95) (0.37) (-0.50) (1.56) (0.34) (-1.53) (0.81)    
This table represents the WLS regression results of coefficients of Firm-specific variables in Table 7.3 estimated from Equation (5.4) against institutional-specific factors estimated in Equation (5.8): 𝛽𝑘𝑗= 𝜆0+ 
𝜆1𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑗 +𝜆2𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑗+ 𝜆3𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑗+ 𝜆4𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑗+𝜆1𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑗 + 𝜆1𝐿𝐸𝐺𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑗 + 𝜆1𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑗 + 𝜆1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗+ ℯ𝑘 in which 𝑘 denotes the coefficients of Firm-specific factors and 𝑗 denotes a country. All instituional-
specific variables are defined in Table 7.2. The weight are the inverse standard errors of the corresponding Firm-specific coefficients estimated in Equation (5.4). Regional dummies are included in the estimates (Not 
reported). The superscript *,** and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Obs means the number of countries that have all institutional variables. Adj-𝑅2 is the value of Adjusted-
𝑅2 for the regression. 
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Table 7.9: Indirect impact of institutional variables on MFIs Subsidies         
Dependent variable Explanatory variables        Adj-𝑅2 Obs  
  Intercept CREDRIGHT CREDINFO LEGAL FINDEV CORRUP POLSTA REGUL GDP    
TANG  0.519 0.198 0.364** -1.094 -0.503 -0.984 -0.066 -1.281 -15.418 0.20 52  
  (0.26) (0.98) (2.04) (-0.86) (-0.20) (-0.90) (-0.10) (-1.17) (-0.87)    
              
  0.564 0.202 0.366** -1.107 -0.557 -1.038  -1.309 -15.538 0.22 52  
  (0.29) (1.02) (2.10) (-0.88) (-0.23) (-1.09)  (-1.25) (-0.89)    
              
  -0.423 0.150 0.325* -1.261 0.030 -0.437 -0.250  -17.133 0.20 52  
  (-0.23) (0.75) (1.85) (-0.99) (0.01) (-0.44) (-0.40)  (-0.97)    
              
  0.290 0.196 0.376** -1.347 -0.573 -0.823 -0.103 -1.360  0.21 52  
  (0.15) (0.97) (2.12) (-1.09) (-0.22) (-0.76) (-0.16) (-1.25)     
              
RISK  -0.686 0.047 0.125 0.761 0.269 0.964 -0.205 0.530 -3.810 0.02 54  
  (-0.50) (0.34) (0.88) (0.95) (0.16) (1.32) (-0.51) (0.73) (-0.31)    
              
  -0.757 0.054 0.115 0.758 0.227 0.785  0.480 -4.371 0.04 54  
  (-0.56) (0.41) (0.83) (0.96) (0.14) (1.23)  (0.68) (-0.36)    
              
  -0.367 0.070 0.139 0.851 0.217 0.766 -0.165  -4.155 0.03 54  
  (-0.28) (0.54) (1.00) (1.09) (0.13) (1.13) (-0.42)  (-0.34)    
              
  -0.741 0.048 0.122 0.723 0.305 0.973 -0.216 0.538  0.04 54  
  (-0.55) (0.36) (0.88) (0.93) (0.19) (1.34) (-0.55) (0.75)     
              
PROF  0.884 -0.126 -0.049 -0.012 0.315 0.588 -0.844** -0.609 -0.921 0.57 54  
  (0.29) (-1.61) (-0.58) (-0.02) (0.30) (1.33) (-2.59) (-1.36) (-0.10)    
              
  2.231 -0.136 -0.062 0.170 -0.315 0.132  -0.802* -8.028 0.51 54  
  
175 
 
Table 7.9: Indirect impact of institutional variables on MFIs Subsidies         
Dependent variable Explanatory variables        Adj-𝑅2 Obs  
  Intercept CREDRIGHT CREDINFO LEGAL FINDEV CORRUP POLSTA REGUL GDP    
  (0.69) (-1.63) (-0.69) (0.25) (-0.29) (0.31)  (-1.71) (-0.83)    
              
  0.659 -0.156** -0.106 -0.211 0.649 0.854** -0.918***  -2.129 0.56 54  
  (0.21) (-2.05) (-1.42) (-0.34) (0.63) (2.13) (-2.83)  (-0.22)    
              
  0.842 -0.126 -0.047 -0.020 0.305 0.595 -0.853*** -0.613  0.58 54  
  (0.28) (-1.63) (-0.58) (-0.03) (0.30) (1.39) (-2.77) (-1.40)     
              
LIQUID  -1.079* -0.021 -0.020 -0.685** 1.399** 0.421 -0.364** 0.470 2.950 0.34 55  
  (-1.99) (-0.40) (-0.40) (-2.28) (2.08) (1.64) (-2.38) (1.63) (0.63)    
              
  -0.972* -0.004 -0.011 -0.722** 1.134 0.146  0.316 2.288 0.27 55  
  (-1.71) (-0.07) (-0.22) (-2.29) (1.62) (0.60)  (1.06) (0.47)    
              
  -0.731 0.001 0.003 -0.645** 1.206* 0.247 -0.308**  2.518 0.32 55  
  (-1.44) (0.01) (0.05) (-2.12) (1.79) (1.04) (-2.03)  (0.53)    
              
  -1.042* -0.019 -0.021 -0.646** 1.400** 0.402 -0.358** 0.460  0.35 55  
  (-1.95) (-0.36) (-0.42) (-2.22) (2.10) (1.59) (-2.36) (1.60)     
              
SIZE  0.106 0.003 0.001 0.033 -0.374*** -0.219*** 0.120*** -0.017 -0.133 0.73 55  
  (1.00) (0.34) (0.13) (0.60) (-3.01) (-4.04) (3.81) (-0.27) (-0.13)    
              
  0.025 0.004 -0.002 0.027 -0.321** -0.121**  0.041 0.229 0.64 55  
  (0.21) (0.35) (-0.18) (0.42) (-2.26) (-2.21)  (0.59) (0.20)    
              
  0.094 0.003 0.000 0.030 -0.370*** -0.211*** 0.118***  -0.122 0.74 55  
  (0.99) (0.31) (0.05) (0.56) (-3.03) (-4.55) (3.90)  (-0.12)    
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Table 7.9: Indirect impact of institutional variables on MFIs Subsidies         
Dependent variable Explanatory variables        Adj-𝑅2 Obs  
  Intercept CREDRIGHT CREDINFO LEGAL FINDEV CORRUP POLSTA REGUL GDP    
              
  0.103 0.003 0.001 0.033 -0.374*** -0.218*** 0.120*** -0.016  0.74 55  
  (1.00) (0.33) (0.12) (0.60) (-3.05) (-4.09) (3.86) (-0.27)     
This table represents the WLS regression results of coefficients of Firm-specific variables in Table 7.4 estimated from Equation (5.4) against institutional-specific factors estimated in Equation (5.8): 𝛽𝑘𝑗= 
𝜆0+ 𝜆1𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑗 +𝜆2𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑗+ 𝜆3𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑗+ 𝜆4𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑗+𝜆1𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑗 + 𝜆1𝐿𝐸𝐺𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑗 + 𝜆1𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑗 + 𝜆1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗+ ℯ𝑘 in which 𝑘 denotes the coefficients of Firm-specific factors and 𝑗 denotes a country. 
All instituional-specific variables are defined in Table 7.2. The weight are the inverse standard errors of the corresponding Firm-specific coefficients estimated in Equation (5.4). Regional dummies are 
included in the estimates (Not reported). The superscript *,** and *** indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Obs means the number of countries that have all 
institutional variables. Adj-𝑅2 is the value of Adjusted-𝑅2 for the regression. 
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7.3. Robustness check 
The results using annual avarerage method are presented in Tables 7.10 and 7.11 respectively. The 
signs are almost similar as in Tables 7.6 and 7.7, except for the findings that legal origin show 
significant and positive relatioship to leverage and a marginal positive relationship between credit 
information index and subsidies, thereby, reinforcing the findings in Tables 7.6 and 7.7. All other 
variables are not significant but signs of the coefficients are in the same direction with ealier 
findings. However, with limited data, it is expected that this method would have less ability to 
explain MFIs capital structure. It offers limited understanding of the determinants of MFIs capital 
structure compared to previous method with full data. Thus, in conclusion, the results from the 
main weighted least squares regression method in Tables 7.6 and 7.7 are upheld.  
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Table 7.10: Direct impact of institutional variables on MFIs leverage using annual average data       
Dependent variable Explanatory variables        Adj-𝑅2 Obs 
  Intercept CREDRIGHT CREDINFO LEGAL FINDEV CORRUP POLSTA REGUL GDP   
COUNTRYDUM LEV -0.329 -0.015 -0.011 0.724*** -0.152 0.048 -0.030 0.028 -1.624 0.80 30 
  (-1.09) (-1.34) (-0.63) (4.26) (-0.85) (0.76) (-0.67) (0.44) (-1.32)   
             
  -0.575** -0.012 -0.014 0.802*** -0.055 0.045 -0.050 0.020  0.79 30 
  (-2.38) (-1.08) (-0.78) (4.94) (-0.33) (0.71) (-1.15) (0.30)    
             
  -0.353 -0.015 -0.009 0.750*** -0.136 0.039 -0.037  -1.570 0.81 30 
  (-1.22) (-1.40) (-0.55) (4.84) (-0.79) (0.67) (-0.88)  (-1.31)   
             
  -0.207 -0.014 -0.012 0.656*** -0.179 0.041  0.043 -1.897 0.80 30 
  (-0.88) (-1.33) (-0.72) (4.87) (-1.04) (0.67)  (0.71) (-1.66)   
             
  -0.425** -0.010 -0.017 0.701*** -0.076 0.032  0.044  0.79 30 
  (-2.08) (-0.93) (-0.99) (5.09) (-0.45) (0.51)  (0.70)    
             
  -0.586** -0.012 -0.012 0.819*** -0.046 0.039 -0.054   0.80 30 
  (-2.52) (-1.13) (-0.75) (5.51) (-0.29) (0.66) (-1.35)     
             
  -0.204 -0.015 -0.010 0.677*** -0.162 0.024   -1.906 0.81 30 
  (-0.88) (-1.38) (-0.59) (5.21) (-0.96) (0.43)   (-1.69)   
             
  -0.423** -0.010 -0.014 0.722*** -0.057 0.015    0.79 30 
  (-2.09) (-0.97) (-0.86) (5.45) (-0.35) (0.25)      
This table presents the WLS regression results of country dummy coeffcients (𝛼𝑗) against institutional-specific factors and estimated in Equation (5.9): 𝛼𝑗= 𝛾0+ 𝛾1𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑗 +𝛾2𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑗+ 𝛾3𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑗+ 
𝛾4𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑗+ 𝛾5𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑗+ 𝛾1𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑗 + 𝛾1𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑈𝐿𝑗 + 𝛾1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 + 𝑤𝑗. All institutional-specific variables are defined in Table 7.2. The weight are the inverse standard errors of the corresponding country dummy 
coefficients. Regional dummies are included in the estimates (Not reported). The superscript *, ** and *** indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Obs is the number of countries that 
have all instituional variables. Adj-𝑅2 is the value of adjusted-𝑅2 for the regression
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Table 7.11: Direct impact of institutional variables on MFIs subsidies using annual average data       
Dependent variable Explanatory variables        Adj-𝑅2 Obs 
  Intercept CREDRIGHT CREDINFO LEGAL FINDEV CORRUP POLSTA REGUL GDP   
COUNTRYDUM SUBS 0.130 -0.009 0.021* 0.059 -0.215 0.034 0.002 0.025 -0.208 0.35 27 
  (1.22) (-1.19) (2.00) (1.25) (-1.54) (0.80) (0.07) (0.52) (-0.23)   
             
  0.125 -0.008 0.021* 0.058 -0.204 0.033 0.000 0.024  0.34 27 
  (1.24) (-1.20) (2.05) (1.27) (-1.61) (0.80) (0.00) (0.51)    
             
  0.154 -0.008 0.022** 0.062 -0.223 0.030 0.000  -0.136 0.33 27 
  (1.63) (-1.17) (2.12) (1.34) (-1.64) (0.73) (0.00)  (-0.15)   
             
  0.130 -0.009 0.021* 0.058 -0.214 0.036  0.025 -0.190 0.35 27 
  (1.26) (-1.22) (2.07) (1.47) (-1.59) (0.93)  (0.53) (-0.22)   
             
  0.125 -0.008 0.021** 0.058 -0.204 0.033  0.024  0.34 27 
  (1.27) (-1.23) (2.11) (1.52) (-1.65) (0.93)  (0.52)    
             
  0.149 -0.008 0.021** 0.061 -0.215* 0.029 -0.001   0.33 27 
  (1.72) (-1.20) (2.18) (1.37) (-1.76) (0.74) (-0.04)     
             
  0.154 -0.008 0.022** 0.062 -0.223 0.030   -0.136 0.33 27 
  (1.68) (-1.21) (2.19) (1.63) (-1.71) (0.84)   (-0.16)   
             
  0.149* -0.008 0.021** 0.062 -0.215* 0.029    0.33 27 
  (1.76) (-1.23) (2.25) (1.68) (-1.81) (0.85)      
This table presents the WLS regression results of country dummy coeffcients (𝛼𝑗) against institutional-specific factors estimated in Equation (5.9): 𝛼𝑗= 𝛾0+ 𝛾1𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑗 +𝛾2𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑗+ 𝛾3𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑗+ 
𝛾4𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑗+ 𝛾5𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑗+ 𝛾1𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑗 + 𝛾1𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑈𝐿𝑗 + 𝛾1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 + 𝑤𝑗. All institutional-specific variables are defined in Table 7.2. The weight are the inverse standard errors of the corresponding country 
dummy coefficients. Regional dummies are included in the estimates (Not reported). The superscript *, ** and *** indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Obs is the 
number of countries that have all instituional variables. Adj-𝑅2 is the value of adjusted-𝑅2 for the regression. 
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7.4. Literature Summary 
Prior studies finds that a firms capital structure are influenced by firms-specific factors and 
institutional specific factors. In this study, we investigate the capital structure of MFIs based 
on some important firm characterisitcs. Studies by Booth et al., (2001), Gianetti, (2003), de 
jong et al., (2008), Frank and Goyal, (2009) and Fan et al., (2012) report that most cross-
sectional variation in international capital structure is caused by heterogeneity of firm-specific 
determinants. A remarkable feature of these studies on international capital structure is the 
implicit assumption that the impact of firm-specific determinants on leverage is equal across 
countries. This seems to be the case in the microfinance studies (Tchuigoua, 2014; 2015). This 
study utilized an alternative regression framework proposed by de Jong et al., (2008) using 
microfinance experience to investigate the validity of this implicit assumption. 
Similarly, previous studies on firms capital structure demonstrate that the  impact of 
institutional-specific factors on firm capital structure can be grouped in two ways. On the one 
hand, these factors influence capital structure directly (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; La Porta et 
al., 1998; Hall et al., 2004; de Jong et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2012; Tchuigoua, 2014). For 
example, Tchuigoua, (2014) studies a sample of 292 MFIs and shows that strong creditors 
rights is associated with higher leverage. A more developed bond market facilitating issue and 
trading of public bonds may lead to the use of higher leverage in a country (de Jong et al., 
2008).  
On the other hand, some studies show that institutional-specific factors can also influence 
capital structure indirectly through their impact on the effect of firm-specific factors (de Jong 
et al., 2008; Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin, 2011). For example, although the developed bond 
market of a country stimulates the use of debt, the role of asset tangibility as collateral in 
borrowing will be rather limited for firms in the same country. In other words, institutional 
characterisitcs may explain why in one country a firms tangibility affects leverage, but not in 
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another country. The effect of the firm-specific factors are either strenghtened or mitigated by 
the institutional specific factors, and these indirect effects of institutional factors may explain 
the variation in firm capital structure. Previous microfinance studies have not systematically 
investigated this effect. 
7.5. Contribution of the study 
This study is the first attempt to carry a detailed comparative analysis of the impact of firm-
specific determinants on MFI capital structure across 56 countries. The chapter finds that the 
impact of several firm-specific factors such as risk, profitability, liquidity, size and age on both 
capital structure measures (leverage and subsidies) is strong and consistent with standard 
capital structure theories across a large number of countries. This study therefore, contributes 
by demonstrating how conventional theories of capital structure, developed using non-MFI 
firms in developed countries, work well for MFIs in developing countries. As an additional 
contribution, this study finds that the impact of firm-specific factors on MFI capital structure 
decision is not equal across countries. This study shows the invalidity of the implicit 
assumption that the impact of firm-specific coefficients is equal across countries using the 
microfinance experience. 
Other contributions include; first, the study shows that institutional-specific factors determine 
MFIs’ capital structure directly and indirectly. This is a novel approach in the microfinance 
literature. Second, applying the information asymmetry theory, the study shows the presence 
of adverse selection in the credit market towards MFIs. In this respect, Higher credit 
information reflects the non-fully commercial nature of MFIs and the riskiness of the 
microfinance business. Similarly, the study observes that commercially related institutional-
specific factors such as creditors right are not applicable in the case of MFIs non-commercial 
funding such as subsidies. Finally, the study provides the evidence that institutional-specific 
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factors indirectly impacts MFIs capital structure by showing how institutional environment 
mitigates the effect of firm specific factors in determining MFI capital structure decision.     
7.6. Summary 
The study examines the impact of firm-specific and institutional-specifics factors on MFI 
capital structure decision across 56 countries. The study investigates the validity of the implicit 
assumption that the impact of firm-specific factors on MFI capital structure are equal across 
countries. Furthermore, the study examines the direct and indirect impact of the institutional- 
specific factors on MFI capital structure decision. Overall, the results show that the implicit 
assumption is unfounded and the impact of firm-specific factors does differ across countries. 
Similarly, findings suggest that institutional-specific factors play an important role in 
determining MFIs capital structure decision around the world.  
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Chapter 8 - Results III: Joint determinants of the use of deposits and borrowings 
8.0. Introduction 
The previous chapter examines the determinants of the use of deposits and borrowings 
saperately. However, it seems unlikely that MFIs consider these two financing instrument 
independently. In many situations, the decision to use deposits or borrowings depends on the 
institutional environment in which MFIs operate. This chapter considers the choice between 
the two instruments and its relationship with the institutional settings.  
Gujarati (2003) argues that, in many economic situations, it is not uncommon for the dependent 
and independent variables to be determined simultaneously, rendering a one-way or 
unidirectional cause-and-effect relationship less meaningful. Moreover, Baltagi (2005) suggest 
that many economic relationships are dynamic in nature in which the dynamic relationships 
are characterised by the presence of a lagged dependent variable among the repressors. In light 
of these two arguments, this chapter presents the results of the joint determinants of the use of 
deposits and borrowings based on the dynamic panel data method. By examining deposits and 
borrowing simultaneously, the behaviour of the determinants in influencing the decisions can 
be better ascertained and also the extent to which borrowing and deposits are substitutes or 
complement are re-investigated. 
In terms of the sampling, a similar sample of firms as used in Chapter 7 is employed (i.e., final 
sample of 645 MFIs or 5215 firm year observations). The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 
8.1 briefly presents the descriptive statistics of key variables. Section 8.2 discusses results of 
the dynamic panel data method. Section 8.3 extends the analysis on the sensitivity of the 
substitutability relationship. Contribution of the study are presented in Section 8.4. Section 8.5 
summarises the chapter.  
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8.1. Descriptive statistics 
Since this chapter employs similar set of explanatory variables as used in Chapter 7, the results 
and the subsequent discussion of the descriptive statistics of this chapter  are limited to the two 
dependent variables namely, deposits and borrowing ratio. These statistics are presented in 
Table 8.1 below. Comparing with prior deposits and borrowing ratios used in Chapter 6 (i.e., 
Table 6.2), notice that the downward adjustement of the mean and median values is expected 
as the study period is longer in this chapter compared to Chapter 6.  
 
 
Table 8.1 
Summary statistics       
Panel A: Overall sample description      
Variables  Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Obs 
 
Dependent variables      
Deposits (DEP)  0.179 0.000 0.268 0.000 2.543 4666 
Borrowings (BORR) 0.439 0.466 0.288 0.000 4.985 4946 
 
Institutional variables      
 
Creditors right (CREDRIGHT) 5.064 5.000 2.526 0.000 11.000 4859 
Credit Information (CREDINFO) 3.739 5.000 2.553 0.000 8.000 4859 
Financial sector development (FINDEV) 0.342 0.317 0.153 0.021 1.060 5198 
Legal origin (LEGAL) 0.280 0.000 0.449 0.000 1.000 5221 
Corruption (CORRUP) -0.623 -0.620 0.389 -1.640 1.560 5221 
Political stability (POLSTA) -0.792 -0.740 0.679 -2.810 1.160 5198 
Regulations (REGUL) 0.657 1.000 0.475 0.000 1.000 5177 
Economic Growth (GDP) 0.038 0.036 0.038 -0.139 0.330 5220 
The sample consists of 645 MFIs during the period 2004-2014 (6500 firm year observations).  
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Figure 8.1. Total deposits and borrowings, 2004-2014 
 
Source: Mix Market, 2004-2014. See data in Funding Structure Analysis 
Figure 8.1 illustrates the total deposits and borrowings financing to MFIs between the 2004 and 20147. Borrowings 
constitutes the major source of funding to MFIs. Borrowings increased from 10 billion USD in 2011 to 34 billion USD 
in 2014. Similarly, deposits increase from 2 billion USD to 8 billion USD in 2014. 
8.2. Dynamic panel data results 
Going further, the results of the dynamic panel data are reported in Table 8.2 overleaf. The Sargan 
test statistics do not reject the joint null hypothesis that the model is correctly specified and that 
the instruments used in the estimation are valid. The estimates also test negatively for second-order 
correlation, and satisfy this necessary condition for the consistency of the GMM estimator 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). Of primary interest to this chapter, it seeks to examine whether the 
joint specification alter the results of saperately investigating the determinants of the use of 
deposits and borrowings by many microfinance literatures. Regarding the country’s credit right, it 
                                                          
7 The information contain in the graph is for MFIs that only report to Mix Market, and does not represent the entire MFIs around the world. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
B
ill
io
n
s 
$
Fiscal Year
Borrowings
Deposits
  
186 
 
is found that the joint specification analysis has improved the results. There is a no clear distiction 
between the effect of creditors right on deposits and borrowing, where the coefficient is positively 
related with both deposits and borrowings, but only significant in deposit specification. This 
suggest that the strenght of creditors right is relevant in MFIs decision to mobilize deposits. This 
contradicts the findings of Tchuigoua (2014) on negative relationship between creditors right and 
deposits. By contrast, there is clear distinction between the creditors information effect on deposits 
and borrowings, where the coefficients is positively (negatively) related with deposits 
(borrowings), but only significant in borrowing specification. This suggest that the presence of 
better creditors information sharing is only relevant when MFIs make decisions to borrow (non-
deposits laibilities). The result is consistent with the findings of Chapter 7, where we show the 
presence of adverse selection in the credit market towards MFIs.  
The results also improve our understanding on the relationship between financial sector 
development and the decision for MFIs to borrow and mobilize deposits. The results shows that 
the relationship is positively significant with borrowing, while the sign of the coefficient is positive 
in the deposit specification. This suggest that a developed financial sector is important to MFIs 
when making decision to borrow consistent with previous MFIs studies by Tchuigoua, (2014) that 
find complimentarity between formal banking sector and microfinance sector. Perhaps, MFIs in 
countries with well developed financial sector face less information asymmetry problem and 
consequently increases MFI access to debt. The higly significant negative relationship between 
corruption variable and deposits is contrary to the findings in previous microfinance studies 
(Tchuigoua, 2014). Generally, this result suggest that MFIs find it difficult to raise deposits 
financing in an environment with high level of corruption.  
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Table 8.2 
Dynamic panel data estimates   
  Exp sign 
(1) 
DEP 
(2) 
BORR 
     
lagged DEP ? 0.692***  
   (12.54)  
lagged BORR ?  0.237*** 
    (6.24) 
BORR  ? -0.069***  
   (-4.89)  
DEP  ?  -0.586*** 
    (-7.54) 
CREDRIGHT + 0.002*** 0.004 
   (2.83) (1.54) 
CREDINFO + 0.001 -0.005*** 
   (1.39) (-2.66) 
FINDEV  + 0.026 0.216*** 
   (1.43) (4.80) 
LEGAL  + 0.067 -0.248 
   (0.81) (-1.00) 
CORRUP  - -0.019** 0.024 
   (-2.02) (1.20) 
POLSTA  + 0.001 0.014 
   (0.28) (1.23) 
REGUL  + 0.298*** -0.198 
   (3.59) (-1.08) 
GDP  + 0.026 0.087 
   (0.84) (1.37) 
CONSTANT  -0.161*** 0.574*** 
   (-2.68) (5.39) 
OBS   3795 3994 
Sargan 𝑥2   64.02 60.74 
AR (1)   -3.86*** -4.79*** 
AR (2)   -0.37 -0.43 
The sample consist of 3795 firm year observation for deposits estimates and 3994 firm year observation for borrowings estimates over the period 
of 2004 to 2014, but the estimations are over t = 3,....,T; where T = 8. Borrowing is the ratio of total borrowings (non-deposit liabilities) to the total 
assets of MFIs. Deposits are the ratio of total deposits to the total assets of MFIs. Creditors right (CREDRIGHT) is the legal rights of borrowers 
and lenders measured by the index (0 to 10; Doing Business). Credit information (CREDINFO) is the index that measures the scope and accessibility 
of credit Information available through either a credit bureau or a credit registry (0 to 6; Doing Business). Financial sector development (FINDEV) 
is the domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) provided by World Banks. Corruption (CORRUP) is an index that measures the control of 
corruption provided by world governance indicators (-2.5 to 2.5; WGI). Political stability (POLSTA) is an index that measures political stability 
and absence of violence/terrorism (-2.5 to 2.5; WGI). Economic growth (GDP) is the annual growth rate of the GDP per capita of a country (World 
Bank). Year dummies for 2006 to 2013 are included in the estimates (not reported). Single expected sign is applicable to both borrowing and 
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deposits; otherwise the dual signs apply particularly to borrowings (deposits). z-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (2-tail test). 
 
Prior evidence of a positive influence of prudential regulation on deposits financing is also 
confirmed by the joint specification estimates. Because of the importance of protecting public 
depositors fund, strict regulations are in place to ensure soundness of institutions allowed to 
mobilize deposits, which invariably reduces depositors risk. To some extent, the results have 
confirm the findings on the role of prudential regualtions on borrowings. While the results show a 
negative sign of the coefficient but not significant. 
Turning to the question of whether deposits and borrowing are complements or substitute, the 
results clearly show that the sign of the coefficients (i.e., BORR in DEP specification and vice-
versa) are consistently negative in both specifications and significant. To this end, this evidence of 
substitutability tends to answer the question whether deposits and borrowings are substitute or 
complement. In another, the singinificant positive relationship between the dependent and lagged 
dependent variables should not be surprising as MFIs do enagage in a persistent pro-cyclical 
capital structure policy, hence the notion that firms adjust their capital structure infrequently as 
discussed in Welch (2004) and Strebulaev (2007) is supported. 
8.3. Sensitivity of substitutability 
In this section, the study investigate the variation in the substitutability between deposits and 
borrowings in different institutional environment. The three institutional characterisitcs examined 
are creditors right (column 1), credit information (column 2) and financial sector development 
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(column 3). Similar to the two-step GMM technique used, Table 8.3 reports the results on the 
change in total deposits8.  
In colunm 1, it is found that the coefficient of the intereactive variable, BORR*CREDRIGHT, is 
not significant. This suggest that the substitutability between deposits and borrowings is indifferent 
on whether the strenght of creditors right is either strong or weak. In column 2, the coefficient of 
the intereactive variable, BORR*CREDINFO is not significant as well. This result suggest that the 
substitutality relationship between deposits and borrowings is less pronounced in environments 
with strong or weak credit information, hence rejecting the asymmetric information hypothesis.  
Finally, turning to the effect of financial sector development on the substitutability between 
deposits and borrowings. Financial sector development is used as a proxy of information 
asymmetry. As suggested by Diamond (1984) and Gianetti (2003) that the developed financial 
sector overcomes information asymmetry and facilitate external financing to firms. Tchuigoua 
(2014), came to similar conclusion using microfinance data. Interestingly, it is found in column 3 
that the coefficient of the interactive variable BORR*FINDEV is significant and negative. This 
suggest that the substitutability between deposits and borrowing is more pronounced in a 
developed financial sector, hence supportng the asymmetric information hypothesis. MFIs tend to 
substitute borrowing against deposits in a developed financial sector. That is, an extra amount of 
borrowings decreases the amount of deposits of MFIs to a greater degree in a well developed 
financial sector. 
 
                                                          
8 Replacing the change in the total deposits ratio with the change in the borrowings ratio will yield results similar to those presented in the study. 
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Table 8.3      
Sensitivity of the substitutability relationship between deposits and borrowing    
    DEP  
  Exp sign (1) (2) (3) 
      
lagged DEP ? 0.693*** 0.692*** 0.682*** 
   (12.61) (12.56) (12.21) 
BORR  ? -0.068*** -0.069*** -0.115*** 
   (-2.98) (-3.78) (-4.74) 
BORR*CREDRIGHT ? 0.000   
   (0.00)   
BORR*CREDINFO ?  0.000  
    (0.06)  
BORR*FINDEV ?   -0.127** 
     (-2.51) 
CREDRIGHT + 0.002 0.002*** 0.002*** 
   (1.09) (2.84) (2.94) 
CREDINFO + 0.001 0.001 0.001 
   (1.35) (0.72) (1.51) 
FINDEV  + 0.026 0.026 -0.033 
   (1.47) (1.40) (-1.13) 
LEGAL  + 0.068 0.068 0.062 
   (0.82) (0.82) (0.74) 
CORRUP  - -0.019** -0.019** -0.017* 
   (-2.06) (-2.00) (-1.71) 
POLSTA  + 0.001 0.001 0.003 
   (0.27) (0.27) (0.63) 
REGUL  + 0.298*** 0.299*** 0.308*** 
   (3.62) (3.60) (3.66) 
GDP  + 0.026 0.026 0.030 
   (0.85) (0.84) (0.93) 
CONSTANT  -0.162*** -0.162*** -0.142** 
   (-2.69) (-2.69) (-2.29) 
OBS   3795 3795 3795 
Sargan 𝑥2   64.23 64.03 63.20 
AR (1)   -3.86*** -3.86*** -3.84*** 
AR (2)   -0.37 -0.38 -0.40 
Notes: see Table 8.2   
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Financial sector development can serve as a proxy for information asymmetry between MFIs and 
the credit market. MFIs in operating in a developed financial sector with lower asymmetric 
information are more likely to access long-term funding such as borrowings. Thus, the result in 
this chapter is consistent with the asymmetric information hypothesis, suggesting that the 
substitutability between deposits and borrowings is more pronounced in credit market that face a 
greater degree of asymmetric information. 
8.4. Contribution of the study 
This chapter contributes to the substitutability literature by introducing the substitutability of 
deposits-borrowings in the microfinance context. To our knowledge, empirical investigation along 
the substitutability of deposits and borrowings of MFIs is currently non-existent. The study 
contributes by presenting fresh empirical evidence and renewed interpretation regarding the 
relationship between MFIs access to deposits and borrowings. The study show that the degree of 
substitutability between deposits and borrowing is more pronounced in a developed financial 
sector, where the degree of information asymmetry is lower. In this regard, this study highlights 
the importance of institutional environment as an indicator for possible determinants of 
substitutability of MFI financial assets.  
8.5. Summary 
This chapter has presented an empirical examination on the relation between deposits and 
borrowings. A model was constructed to relate the substitutability or complementarity of deposits 
and borrowing simultaneously, rather than sapereately as in Chapter 6. The study then test the 
hypothesis of deposits-borrowing substitutability using the GMM technique that controls for both 
endogeneity issues and MFI fixed effects. The result shows strong evidence that deposits and 
borrowings are substitutes rather than complement. Essentially, this chapter highlights useful 
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insight to enrich our understanding of the interactions among alternative financing choices in an 
environment associated with asymmetric infromation problems. 
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Chapter 9 - Summary and conclusions 
9.0. Introduction 
This chapter presents the key conclusion of this study, their implications, and the areas for future 
research. The conclusions are presented in four sections with reference to the main research 
objectives. The first section (9.1) presents the effect of board gender diversity on microfinance 
institutions capital structure. The impact of firm-specific and institutional-specific factors on 
microfinance institutions capital structure are presented in the second section 9.2. The third section 
(9.3) is about the joint determinants of microfinance institutions capital structure variables of 
deposits and borrowings. The fourth section (9.4) is about the applicability and limitations of the 
findings from previous studies to the microfinance institutions. The four conclusion sections are 
followed by: the implications of the conclusion made (9.5); a summary of key contributions to 
knowledge made by this study (9.6); and finally, the areas for future studies 9.7. 
 
9.1. The effect of board gender diversity on MFIs capital structure  
Based on the empirical evidence from the econometric analysis provided in Chapter 6, we conclude 
that board gender diversity affects microfinance institutions capital structure variables such as 
leverage, deposits and subsidies. The p-values of these variables were significant at 5 percent level 
of significance. Additionally, considering different instrumental variable procedure and various 
female director definition, we find empirical evidence that female directors have significant 
positive influence on deposits and subsidies, supporting the resource dependency argument 
respectively. Furthermore, we show evidence that when a critical mass of three or more female 
directors is reached, MFIs tend to leverage more. 
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9.2. The impact of firm-specific and institutional-specific factors on MFIs capital structure 
The econometric results provided in Chapter 7 presents the empirical results of the investigation 
on the impact of firm-specific and institutional-specific determinants of capital structure. First, the 
study makes a detailed comparative analysis of the impact of firm-specific determinants on MFI 
capital structure across 56 countries. Considering the two capital structure measures (leverage and 
subsidies), we conclude that the impact of firm-specific factors such as risk, profitability, liquidity 
and size on leverage is strong and consistent with standard capital structure theories across a large 
number of countries. However, determinants such as tangibility and age show unexpected signs. 
Considering the impact of firm-specific factors on subsidies, the study finds that the impact of 
tangibility and size on subsidies are consistent with our predictions. However, results from a few 
determinants remain mixed, and in some countries, some coefficients are significant with an 
unexpected sign. Secondly, using a simple statistical test known as joint test of significance of 
regression coefficients, the study concludes that the implicit assumption on the equal impact of 
firm-specific factors on MFI capital structure across countries is unfounded.  
In the analysis of the direct and indirect impact of Institutional-specific factors on MFIs capital 
structure. The study observes that institutional-specific factors such as credit information index, 
legal origin, political stability and regulations significantly explain the variation of MFIs leverage 
across countries. Factors such as financial sector development, corruption, regulation and 
economic growth significantly determine the level of MFIs subsidies across countries. In the 
indirect impact of institutional factors, the result shows the importance of institutional factors as 
we report their significance effect through firm-specific factors. For example, the presence of good 
credit information sharing encourages MFIs to borrow more despite the availability of internal 
finance, that is, the effect of firm-specific determinants such as profitability and liquidity are 
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mitigated. In countries with developed financial sector, MFIs size is less important in determining 
MFIs choice of subsidies.  
9.3. Joint determinants on the use of deposits and borrowings 
From the empirical evidence obtained from the econometric results in Chapter 8, we generally 
conclude that deposits and borrowings are substitute rather than complement. The sensitivity of 
this result is tested using various institutional-specific variables and we conclude that the degree 
of substitutability is more pronounced in financially developed market, where information 
asymmetry is expected to be lower. The p-value of the coefficient of this variable is statistically 
significant at 5 percent significant level.  
9.4. Implications of the conclusions made 
The conclusions made in this chapter imply that, to have access to funding, microfinance 
institutions should have more female directors on their boards. First, female directors attract more 
subsidies to MFI because donor agencies consider microfinance institutions as part of the social 
investment field. From a pragmatic point of view this seems reasonable. After all, even if a donor 
agency does not specifically focus on female board representation as an indicator of social 
performance, normally half of MFIs customers will in any case be women (D’Espallier et al., 
2011). As a result, donor agencies should concentrate in identifying MFIs that can demonstrate 
good level of social performance combined with sound financial results and efficient operations.  
Second, MFIs should utilise the easy access to deposits brought about by the matching trait 
between female directors and female customers. That is, having more female board representation 
brings about more savings from female customers. This may promote financial sustainability as 
well as social performance. Third, MFIs access to risky capital comes only when they have three 
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or more female directors on board. This evidence however, should be treated with caution, 
considering the impact of increasing female directors on firm governance quality and subsequent 
agency problems. On one hand, Adams and Ferreira (2009) show that in a well governed firms, 
more female directors may be detrimental to firm value due to unnecessary over-monitoring. On 
the other hand, Gull et al., (2011) and Strom et al., (2011) suggest that firms can partially remedy 
their weak governance by having more female directors. Therefore, the debate around increased 
female board representation should offer a more cautious route towards encouraging MFIs to strike 
balance between bringing more female directors to their board rooms and its implication on agency 
problem. 
Fourth, the conclusion made on how standard firm-specific determinants affects the MFIs capital 
structure on a country-by-country basis imply the following for microfinance institutions. For 
access to leverage, MFIs should strive to keep lower their tangibility ratio, less portfolio at risk, 
improve profitability, maintain higher liquidity to meet short-term obligations as they fall due and 
be large in size to absorb any shock. In the case of subsidies, MFIs are expected to maintain higher 
level of tangibility, liquidity and be matured and small in size to have access to subsidies. Overall, 
the conclusion implies that proper combination of firm-specific determinants that are unique for 
each country is necessary. This is because, in each country, one or more firm-specific determinants 
are not significantly related to leverage and subsidies. Moreover, the econometric results (an 
evidence) show that the equal impact of firm-specific determinants across countries is not true.        
Fifth, evidence provided in our econometric results highlights the importance of the impact of 
institutional-specific factors in determining MFI capital structure decision around the world. As 
implied in the findings and conclusion there from, institutional-specific factors directly and 
indirectly affect capital structure of MFIs. Thus, institutional factors need to be appropriately taken 
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into account in the analysis of MFI capital structure. Sixth, the microfinance institutions should 
understand the effect of institutional factor such as credit information bureau on MFI capital 
structure choice. For example, MFIs in countries with good credit registry experience lower 
leverage, while the same would increase subsidies. That is, credit information reveals the non-fully 
commercial nature of MFIs and riskiness of microfinance business, hence, MFI choice of less 
leverage and more subsidies. This could risk the sustainability of MFIs as donor funding weans. 
MFIs need to show its business worthiness by attracting commercial funding and at the same 
maintain its social orientation to attract non-commercial funding.  
The impact of institutional factors on MFIs capital structure through its effect on firm-specific 
factors is highly important. because of the nature of MFIs. They are typically small and mostly 
operate in rural areas which makes it difficult to determine their clear predictors of success. 
Therefore, institutional factors serve as either mitigating or reinforcing factors on MFIs level 
characteristics. Additionally, the choice between deposits and borrowings under different 
institutional environment, implies the need for MFIs to be flexible in maintaining optimal capital 
structure that may eventually lead to sustainability. Although we did not investigate the link 
between capital structure and sustainability, ensuring that MFIs have optimal capital structure 
becomes imperative if MFIs have to remain sustainable. 
From a practical point of view, the empirical evidence of this study may provide useful guidance 
for policy makers, regulators and corporate decision makers. Ultimately, the case for greater 
gender diversity on corporate board rest on pure economics rather than sense of fairness. Our result 
does point to greater influence of female directors on MFI capital structure. We therefore, consider 
the possibility of regulations around increased gender diversity on MFIs board rooms, consistent 
with many developed countries (among them, Belgium, Norway and Italy) that have passed 
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legislation mandating more female board representation for certain firms. The study also highlights 
that the impact of institutional-specific factors on MFIs capital structure decision is not 
straightforward because of the non-commercial part of their capital structure. This particular 
uniqueness of MFIs makes it difficult for them to thrive in an efficient credit market. Evidence 
suggest the presence of adverse selection issue in the credit market towards MFIs. It is therefore, 
important for MFIs to develop a good financing strategy to access funding in the credit market.  In 
addition, government and regulatory agencies should consider developing a unique financial 
package for MFIs, taking into account the peculiar and rampant information asymmetry in the 
sector. Financial institutions such as Stock Exchange should have a look at their listing 
requirements and work towards designing a mechanism that would enable MFIs to get listed in 
order to access funding.   
9.5. Contribution to Knowledge made by this study 
The key contributions to knowledge made by this study are: First, this is the first attempt to 
determine the factors affecting microfinance institutions capital structure around the world. 
Applying the capital structure theories, the study has determined both firm-specific and 
institutional-specific factors that affects the capital structure decision of microfinance institutions. 
Second, the study reveals the relationship between board gender diversity and MFIs capital 
structure is driven by reverse causality. However, when this relationship is not considered in 
determining factors affecting MFI capital structure, there may be inconsistent evidence on the role 
of female directors. Third, it unveils the trade-off between improving and worsening governance 
quality by having more female directors on board. That is, more female directors on board, 
improves governance quality which reduces agency problem and increases firm leverage 
undertaking. On the other hand, more female directors on board is associated with excessive over-
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monitoring that worsens governance quality which leads to less gearing. Fourth, the study provides 
empirical evidence that the impact of female directors on microfinance institutions risk-taking 
depends on the number of them in board. Lastly, consistent with the resource dependence view, 
the study provides empirical evidence that female directors on boards improves their access to 
subsidies. 
Other contributions to knowledge include: First the study documents the applicability of standard 
firm-specific determinants of capital structure to microfinance institutions. Second, applying the 
theories of capital structure, studies using firms in developed countries, work well for MFIs in 
developing countries. As an additional contribution, this study finds that the impact of firm-
specific factors on MFI capital structure decision is not equal across countries. This study shows 
the invalidity of the implicit assumption that firm-specific coefficients are equal across countries 
using the microfinance experience. Second, the study shows that institutional-specific factors 
determine MFIs’ capital structure directly and indirectly. This is a novel approach in the 
microfinance literature. Third, applying the information asymmetry theory, the study shows the 
presence of adverse selection in the credit market towards MFIs. In this respect, Higher credit 
information reflects the non-fully commercial nature of MFIs and the riskiness of the microfinance 
business. Similarly, the study observes that commercially related institutional-specific factors such 
as creditors right does not affect MFIs non-commercial funding such as subsidies. Additionally, 
the study provides the evidence that institutional-specific factors indirectly impacts MFIs capital 
structure by showing its mitigating and reinforcing influence on various firm-specific factors.   
Similarly, the study contributes by presenting fresh empirical evidence and renewed interpretation 
regarding the relationship between MFIs access to deposits and borrowings. To our knowledge, 
empirical investigation along the substitutability of deposits and borrowings of MFIs is currently 
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non-existent. The study confirms that deposits and borrowings are substitute and that the degree 
of substitutability is more pronounced in a developed financial sector, where the degree of 
information asymmetry is lower. In this regard, this study highlights the importance of institutional 
environment as an indicator for possible determinants of substitutability of MFI financial assets. 
Finally, the study provides evidence that decomposing MFIs capital structure helps to better 
explain its determinants.          
9.6. Limitations of the study and areas for future research 
In this study, we attempt to determine factors affecting capital structure of microfinance 
institutions. The research design, therefore, was specifically focused to address this microfinance 
institutions problem. Thus, the findings in this study are subject to a number of limitations that 
deserve further works and research. First, the study reveals that female directors affects MFIs 
capital structure. Future research would benefit by exploring other female leadership role such as 
female CEO, female chair and CEO duality. The effect of female directors on MFI capital structure 
can be strengthened by examining complementary female director characteristics such as 
occupational background, education, experience and skills. In addition, supplementing the 
empirical investigation with a qualitative study (for example, using interview data as in Konrad et 
al., (2008) can increase the reliability of the findings. Perhaps future research can focus more on 
testing the psychological influence in female decision making by incorporating cognitive biases 
and limitations into financing decision models. 
Second, this study used five years’ data to determine the effect of board gender diversity on MFIs 
capital structure. The study is limited to five years because female director information is 
unavailable beyond this period. Thus, the five years’ period is too short to allow some detailed 
econometric analysis. For example, we were not able to perform other test at two or more lags due 
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to fewer observations that we had. More observations, given longer study period would have 
helped to isolate time effects on capital structure even before explaining the determinants of MFI 
capital structure. Thus, future studies may consider taking longer study period. The longer study 
period may unearth what was probably not unveiled in this study.  
Fifth, in this study we attempted to control for the effect of geographical location on MFIs capital 
structure. Although the results were insignificant, the implied differences in institutional 
environment may call for future research.  For instance, Galema et al., (2011) and CGAP (2011) 
highlight that debt as the main funding instrument in which MFIs in Europe and central Asia as 
well as those in Latin America and Caribbean can easily access while deposits are the main source 
of funding for MFIs in Africa. This may be partly explained by the quality of the institutions in 
these regions. Therefore, investigating whether the quality of institutions is the main driver of MFI 
capital structure in those regions is a subject for further research. 
Sixth, in this study, we attempt to explain the impact of institutional-specific factors on MFIs non-
commercial source of funding such as subsidies. However, we did not find any significant results 
because they are in many cases not legal binding. Therefore, other unobserved institutional factors 
may determine MFIs access to non-commercial funding. For instance, broad base financial 
inclusion is an important determinant for donor agencies (Earne and Sherk, 2013).  It thus seems 
important to extend this study in examining other unobserved institutional specific factors. 
Lastly, in this study we use different capital structure measures (leverage, borrowings, deposits, 
equity and subsidies). However, as we noted above, the results may be biased as microfinance 
institutions access other sources of funding other than the ones studied. For example, donations 
for operating and non-operating expenses are recorded in the income statement and excluded from 
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subsidies (Hudon and Traca, 2011). Thus, future studies may focus on, among others, to explain 
the exact composition of microfinance capital structure. This will help to apply appropriate 
measures of MFIs capital structure studies.  
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